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Abstract
Sexual Victimization, Disclosure, and Accountability: Organizational Responses of the Boy
Scouts of America to Child Sexual Abuse
By
Michelle A. Cubellis

Adviser: Professor Karen Terry, Ph.D.

Child sexual abuse has always been a highly publicized and controversial topic due to the
vulnerability of children. However, there have been several recent child sexual abuse (CSA)
scandals garnering even more attention and concern. With the exposure of the Catholic Church
abuse scandal in 2002, public attention became focused on the Archdiocese’s poor and prolonged
response. However, this crisis was not the sole case of widespread sexual violence and
institutional failure. In October of 2012, Boy Scouts of America files from 1959 to 1991
containing reports of child sexual abuse were released. These reports feature detailed information
about the abuse incident, the offender, and the Boy Scouts’ response to the allegations of abuse.
While there appears to be some research on organizational child sexual abuse, these studies focus
primarily on prevention of abuse, and not on organizational responses to abuse. This dissertation
addressed the factors of the abuse and the organization that influenced the Boy Scouts of
America's response. Data for this study comes from roughly 2379 publically released files of
sexual abuse reports from the Boy Scouts of America. These reports, dating from 1959 until
1991, feature detailed information about the abuse incident, the offender, and the Boy Scouts’
response to the allegations of abuse. Multivariate analysis, survival analysis and intervention
analysis was conducted on the 2379 cases as well as qualitative content analysis. In addition, in-
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depth case studies were conducted of a few select cases to gain a deeper understanding of how
the BSA responded to abuse.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Child sexual abuse has always been a highly publicized and controversial topic due to the
vulnerability of children. Recently, there have been several child sexual abuse (CSA) scandals
garnering even more attention and concern. With the exposure of the Catholic Church abuse
scandal in 2002, public attention became focused on the issue of children being sexually abused
by Catholic priests and the Archdiocese’s poor and prolonged response. However, this crisis was
not the sole case of widespread sexual violence and institutional failure. In October of 2012, Boy
Scouts of America (BSA) files from 1959 to 1991 containing reports of child sexual abuse were
released. The files demonstrate numerous cases of CSA and an organizational failure to keep
children safe.
Organizations that serve youth as their primary population have the responsibility of
ensuring that the children are provided with safe and nurturing environments. One of the greatest
responsibilities of these organizations is to ensure that the adults chosen to work with youth do
not take advantage of their positions of power. Instances of child sexual abuse by staff members
violate both the law and all organizational regulations and ethics. Ultimately, the organization is
accountable for these incidents of sexual abuse by its staff and volunteers. Child abuse occurring
in institutional settings relies heavily on the inappropriate use of power and authority by its
members (Wolfe, 1999). The misuse of power and authority by members of these institutions is
especially upsetting due to the high esteem and trust they have gained (Wolfe et al., 2003).
In 2012, the Oregon State Supreme Court ordered the release of private records held by
the BSA detailing sexual abuse allegations ranging from the 1960s to 1990s. These records were
submitted in 2010 as evidence in a sexual abuse lawsuit against the organization in which six
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former scouts successfully sued the organization. As a result of the lawsuit, the BSA was ordered
to pay the six plaintiffs almost $20 million in damages (Duggan, 2012).
In 2012 following this ruling, under Oregon’s open records law, the files, termed the
‘perversion files’, were publically released (Duggan, 2012). The files contain information about
the alleged offender, the victims, and in many cases the circumstances of the abuse. In addition,
communication between Scouting executives and local area organization members is often
featured. These 2379 cases represented the sample for this study.
1.1 Purpose, Goals, & Objectives
This dissertation addressed the abuse committed by BSA agents and the organizational
response to CSA allegations. The study has four main goals: (1) to understand how the BSA
learned of allegations of abuse and responded to these allegations (2) to understand the time it
took BSA officials to respond to allegations of child sexual abuse and which factors of the abuse
incident or offender may have influenced this time frame, (3) to understand what tactics the
organization may have used to justify their behavior, and (4) to determine if methods taken by
the BSA to protect youth from sexual abuse had a measurable impact. To this end, quantitative
data analysis was conducted on the data gleaned from the 2379 cases and qualitative analysis
was conducted on 200 of the cases. In addition, a more in-depth analysis of a ten cases was
conducted to provide greater insight.
1.2 Research Questions
This dissertation will addressed the following research questions:
1) What are the characteristics of abusers and abuse incidents in the BSA?
2) How did the Boy Scouts of America learn of abuse and to whom did victims first disclose
abuse?
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a. How were allegations of child sexual abuse reported to the BSA (calls, letters, in
person, etc.)?
b. Who did victims first report their abuse to (parent, BSA member, other victims,
etc.)?
3) Did the response of the BSA to allegations of sexual abuse differ across council region?
4) Were there time and pattern differentials between initial disclosures and the offender’s
eventual removal from the organization?
a. What disciplinary procedures were taken by the institution?
b. Were there discernible characteristics of abuse incidents or abusers that
influenced whether formal reports of child sexual abuse were made for legal
prosecution or how long it took for removal to occur?
5) Are there differences in the prevalence of child sexual abuse reports pre and post two
person leadership policy implementation?
a. Are there trends in the number of allegations of CSA against organization
members before and after the implementation of polices aimed at preventing
CSA?
6) Are institutional rationalization tactics an insightful frame to understand the BSA
response to abuse allegations?
1.3 Hypotheses
Based on the goals of this dissertation and proposed research questions, hypotheses have
been developed drawing upon organizational theory and existing literature surrounding child
sexual abuse.
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H1a) The majority of abuse incidents reported to the BSA featured older abusers who hold a
higher position of authority with children, such as assistant scoutmaster or scoutmaster.

H1b) The majority of abuse incidents reported to the BSA were isolated abuse incidents
featuring some form of unclothed or clothed physical contact, but not explicit sexual contact.

H2a) The majority of abuse allegations were made in person, rather than through phone calls or
letters sent to scouting officials.

H2b) The majority of victims first disclosed abuse to their parents, not the BSA.

H2c) In the majority of cases, the BSA were more likely to handle cases informally through
internal removal from the organization rather than through the use of formal methods such as
referral to law enforcement or referral to mental health treatment.

H3) The response of BSA officials to allegations of CSA against organization members will
differ across council regions.

H4a) The length of time the alleged abuser served in the organization and their position within
the organization results in a longer period of time between initial disclosure and removal from
the organization.
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H4b) Offenders with histories of sexual abuse against children prior to joining the Boy Scouts
who then offended in the BSA were more likely to feature law enforcement involvement than
offenders who abused solely while members of the BSA and were removed from the
organization more quickly.

H4c) In cases where abuse incidents featured explicit sexual relations, the time between initial
disclosure and removal from the organization was shorter.

H4d) Cases featuring several victims and/or law enforcement involvement will result in a shorter
time period between initial disclosure and removal from the organization.

H4e) In cases where the alleged abuser was married or had children, the time between initial
disclosure and removal from the organization will be longer.

H5) The prevalence of reports of CSA after the implementation of the two person leadership
policy in 1987 will be less than the prevalence of reports prior to the implementation of this
policy.

H6) Rationalization tactics, especially appeals to higher loyalties and metaphor of the ledger,
were employed by the Boy Scouts to justify their response to allegations of abuse.
1.4 Research Design

This dissertation utilized a mixed methods approach, featuring traditional quantitative
and qualitative methods including thematic content analysis and an exploratory case study
5

analysis. For both the qualitative and quantitative portions of the study, examination of
individual case files was undertaken in order to code data necessary for quantitative analysis and
compile the written response of the BSA used in the qualitative analysis. While quantitative
methods of research have become more common over the past years, the insight that can be
gained from qualitative research in the form of case studies should not be overlooked (Travis,
1983). Creswell notes that qualitative research “involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to
the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings,
attempting to make sense of or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to
them” (Creswell, 2007, p.36).
Flick (2009) notes that mixed methods approaches are useful in obtaining broader
knowledge about the issue under study than can be obtained using a single approach. This
dissertation combined both quantitative analysis of variables contained in the case files and a
qualitative content analysis of written responses to abuse in order to mutually validate the
findings. Quantitative and qualitative methods should be viewed as complimentary, as
quantitative methods can address the inability of qualitative findings to be generalized, while
qualitative methods can provide a more in depth and personal understanding of an issue (Flick,
2009). The combination of both quantitative and qualitative methods in the current dissertation
more clearly conveyed and mutually confirmed the conclusions of the study.
1.4.1 Description of the Sample

Data for this study comes from 2379 publically released files of sexual abuse reports
from the Boy Scouts of America from the Oregon Supreme Court’s ruling in 2010. When an
individual was alleged to have sexually abused a child, a report was made to the BSA. BSA
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officials then tried to substantiate the abuse to the best of their ability by interviewing victims,
other organization members, the parents of victims, and in some cases the alleged offender.
These reports, dating from 1959 until 1991, feature detailed information about the abuse
incident, the offender, and the Boy Scouts’ response to the allegations of abuse. These files
represent reports made to the BSA between 1959 and 1991 and thus could include information
on abuse events that occurred prior to this time period. The files range in length from less than 5
pages to more than 70 pages, with differing levels of depth and information. Each file contains a
confidential record sheet with demographic information about the alleged offender, as well as
information about where they served, when they joined the organization, and when they were
removed. In addition, files also may feature letters between BSA officials, statements from
victims, statements from the alleged offender, newspaper clippings about the abuse incidents,
and in some cases legal documents. These 2379 files represent the known universe of reported
allegations of abuse made to the BSA during that time period.
For the purposes of this dissertation, Gallagher’s (2000) definition of institutional abuse
will be used. This definition defines institutional abuse as:
The sexual, physical, or emotional abuse of a child (under 18 years of age) by an
adult who works with him or her. The perpetrator may be employed in a paid or
voluntary capacity; in the public, voluntary, or private sector; in a residential or nonresidential setting; and may work either directly with children or be in an ancillary role.
(797)
All of the files were coded for relevant variables relating to the abuse incident and response of
the BSA organization. During preliminary coding of the files, a sample of ten files was selected
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for case study analysis. These files were selected based on the detail of information and different
documents contained in the files.
While the data represents a wealth of knowledge about abuse allegations made against
BSA agents and the organization’s response, there are some data quality issues that were
addressed. In many cases, the files contained handwritten reports and letters that were then
scanned into pdf form. This process resulted in some instances where information was not clear
enough to be read. In addition, the handwriting of some individuals was difficult to read. Finally,
missing data was an issue. The confidential record sheets included in each file were not always
filled out completely, and some files featured more detail about the abuse incident and
organizational response than others. When necessary, quantitative analysis was conducted with
the original dataset and with missing data imputed. Findings were compared to determine
whether the technique for addressing missing data impacted the interpretation of findings.
1.5 Ethical/Human Subjects Considerations
While this dissertation examined files of abuse of reported offenders in the BSA and did
not directly involve individuals, there are some ethical considerations that still remained. The
files released by the BSA are incredibly detailed, featuring identifying information about the
offenders and victims. In all of the files, identifying information about victims has been redacted;
however, identifying information for the offenders was not. In order to protect the identity of
those BSA organization members who have been accused of CSA, coding of the files excluded
all identifying information such as name, social security number, and date of birth. As the aim of
this study was to address the response of the BSA to allegations of child sexual abuse by
organization members, focus on the identifying characteristics of offenders was neither helpful
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nor warranted. In order to comply with University regulations regarding the undertaking of
research, an application for Internal Review Board Review was submitted and approved.
1.6 Limitations and Contributions
The study presented some limitations. Missing data was a substantial issue given the
nature of how information was collected for each file. In order to address this limitation, multiple
imputation through chained equations was utilized. Differing amounts of information in each file
also limited the understanding of child sexual abuse within the organization and how the BSA
responded in these cases. The cases included in this dissertation only range from 1959 to 1991.
The limited time period of the sample makes it impossible to examine whether youth protection
policies implemented after this time period had a measurable impact on child sexual abuse
allegations in the organization. Finally, the reliance on both allegations of abuse and
substantiated cases clouds the issue of whether all 2379 cases were about actual sexual abuse
committed by members or whether these cases could in fact feature false positives.
Despite these limitations, this dissertation represented the first examination of child
sexual abuse in the BSA and their response to these allegations. The findings of this dissertation
extended the knowledge of child sexual abuse in youth serving organizations, illustrating that
most offenders were younger, abuse tended to be more serious, and the BSA was most likely to
deal with abuse allegations in an internal, informal manner. This study also revealed that the
BSA was often unwilling to conform to mandatory reporting laws. Using this information,
recommendations for policies applicable to all youth serving organizations to improve screening
of members, protection of youth members, and reporting of abuse were presented. In addition,
this study presented the first application of institutional theory and rationalization tactics to
organizational responses to child sexual abuse, finding that the BSA did in fact use
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rationalization tactics to justify their responses. The application of these theories illustrated the
importance of rationalization tactics in the symbolic management of an organization’s legitimacy
while extending institutional theory to explain how organizations respond to deviance such as
child sexual abuse by members.
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Chapter 2: Child Sexual Abuse
Child sexual abuse is commonly viewed as a global issue, affecting hundreds of
thousands of children worldwide (Stoltenborgh, van IJzendoorn, Euser, & BakersmanKranenburg, 2011). The definition of child sexual abuse has evolved to become more inclusive
(Collin-Vezina, Daigneault, & Hebert, 2013), with child sexual abuse currently defined as “any
contact or non-contact sexual experience perpetrated on a child” (Goldman & Grimbeek, 2011,
p.2). Child sexual abuse can include behaviors such as kissing, fondling, and oral intercourse, as
well as non-contact behaviors such as sexual remarks, exhibitionism, online solicitation of sexual
behavior, and pornography (Finkelhor, 1994; Stanley, 2001). In addition, child sexual abuse can
take the form of molestation, forced masturbation (Pagitt, Shewmake, Lundberg-Love, &
Garland, 2013), and in some cases forced prostitution (Bang, Baker, Carpinteri, & Van Hasselt,
2014). While originally child-on-child sexual abuse was thought to be harmless, this type of
abuse is increasingly being recognized as detrimental to the emotional well-being of victims
(Collin-Vezina et al., 2013).
It is difficult to determine actual rates of child sexual abuse due to barriers of reporting
(National Sexual Violence Resource Center, 2012). One such issue is the ability of children, due
to their age or mental capability, to report their own abuse. In conjunction with this, children
might not be aware that the behavior of the adult is inappropriate, and thus may not think there is
anything to report. In many instances, child victims of sexual abuse may repress memories or
forget experiences, or they may refuse to report victimization due to the desire to cooperate with
demands for secrecy made by the abuser (Johnson, 2004). Disclosure of abuse is also affected by
the implicit or explicit pressure for secrecy and feelings of embarrassment, shame, or
responsibility (Collin-Vezina et al., 2013).
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The private nature of the abuse (Molnar, Buka, & Kessler, 2001) and differences in
definitions of child sexual abuse and data gathering techniques can also impact our knowledge of
child sexual abuse. In some countries, economic resources required to manage reports of child
sexual abuse and collect data may be lacking, as well as the conflation of child sexual abuse with
other types of sexual offending in official statistics. Despite the difficulties with estimating child
sexual abuse prevalence, a meta-analysis of studies revealed that the prevalence of child sexual
abuse worldwide ranged from 2-62 percent for women and 3-16 percent for men (Johnson,
2004).
In order to address the incidence and prevalence of child sexual abuse in the United
States, the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System (NCANDS) was created in 1988
under the amendment to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA). This program
collects annual data on reports of child abuse and neglect voluntarily submitted from the 50
states, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Based on this annual data, in 2012, 3.4 million
reports of allegations of child abuse and neglect were made to Child Protective Services (CPS)
for a total of 6.3 million children (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2012).
Of these reports, 48.7 percent of victims were male children, while 50.9 percent of
victims were female children. While the overall number includes all forms of child abuse and
neglect, disaggregation of the data reveals that 9.3 percent of these reports were for allegations of
child sexual abuse. This represents a total of 62,936 confirmed victims of child sexual abuse in
2012. When further disaggregating the data, 20.9 percent of children sexually abused were
between 15 and 17 years old, 26.3 percent were between 12 and 14 years old, and the greatest
percentage, 33.8 percent, were less than 9 years old when sexually victimized. While these
numbers shed light on the issue of child sexual abuse, they are only an estimate that likely
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underestimates the problem (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2012).
While research has tried to address the prevalence and incidence of child sexual abuse,
attention has also been paid to the consequences of child sexual abuse for victims. Numerous
studies have found that child sexual abuse can result in both short and long-term psychological,
physical, and interpersonal issues (Briere & Elliott, 1994; Chan, Yan, Brownridge, Tiwari, &
Fong, 2011). When addressing the short-term consequences of child sexual abuse, victims of
sexual abuse in early childhood were more likely to experience early sexual behavior, emotional
issues, depression and anxiety, phobias, and sleep disorders (Kelley, 1994). In addition to these
consequences, Finkelhor, Williams, & Burns (1988) found that child victims also experience bed
wetting, unexplainable fear, frequent crying, and displayed more aggressive behaviors than nonsurvivors.
Survivors of child sexual abuse face physical issues including self-harm behaviors and
higher rates of obesity (Collin-Vezina et al., 2013). Some psychological problems resulting from
sexual abuse in childhood include posttraumatic stress, cognitive distortions, emotional pain and
avoidance, and an impaired sense of self (Briere & Elliott, 1994). Child sexual abuse can also
result in mood disorders, leading to major depressive episodes, along with substance abuse and
suicidality (Collin-Vezina et al., 2013).
In addition to these psychological and physical consequences, both male and female
victims of child sexual abuse are also more likely to experience physical or sexual revictimization later in life, often in the form of intimate partner violence (Banyard, Arnold, &
Smith, 2000; Cambell, Greeson, Bybee, & Raha, 2008; Hattery, 2009). In addition to increased
risk of re-victimization, victims of child sexual abuse are also at higher risk of experiencing
violence in their early romantic relationships (Vezina & Herbert, 2007; Herbert, Lavoie, Vitaro,

13

McDuff, & Tremblay, 2008) and engage in risky sexual behavior, especially in their teen years
(Collin-Vezina et al., 2013). Studies have shown that there is no significant gender difference in
the mental and psychosocial impact of child sexual abuse on survivors (Cashmere & Shackle,
2014).
2.1 Child Sexual Abuse of Boys
The rate of sexual abuse of boys specifically is especially alarming given the
underreported nature of this victimization. Boys who have been sexually abused are often
unwilling to report their abuse due to the following: fear that they will be labeled gay if their
abuser is male (Cermak & Molidor, 1996), societal notions that they should consider themselves
lucky if the abuser was female (Valente, 2005), and/or because offenders are more likely to use
force and threats against male victims. In addition, male sexual abuse survivors often perceive
early sexual abuse experiences as non-abusive. This denial of the abusive nature of their
victimization serves as a protective factor to shield them from painful memories of their
experience (O’Leary & Gould, 2010). The underreported nature of male youth victimization has
led to a disproportionate focus on samples of young women (Maikovich-Fong & Jaffee, 2010).
In order to try to address the true extent of the issue some studies have examined
prevalence rates of unreported sexual abuse of boys within nonclinical samples. The results of
these studies provide more detailed information about the prevalence and incidence of sexual
abuse of boys. One such study by Risin and Koss (1987) found that within their sample of 2,972
male university students, 7.3 percent reported experiencing sexual abuse as a child. More
importantly, these men outlined three criteria which were often features of their abuse, 1) an age
discrepancy between them and the perpetrator, 2) the use of some form of coercion, and 3) a
perpetrator who was a caregiver or authority figure. Overall, studies have found that boys are
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more likely to be fondled or forced to engage in oral intercourse (Fontanella, Harrington, &
Zuravin, 2000) and are more likely to be victimized by strangers (Gold, Elhai, Lucenko, &
Swingle, 1998).
For the past several years, beginning in 1992, there has been a decline in the number of
reports of sexual abuse against children made to CPS. Some estimates place the decline at
upwards of 62 percent (U. S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2012). One suggestion
as to the decline of reporting of allegations of child sexual abuse to CPS is a shift in reporting to
local law enforcement (Finkelhor, Jones, & Kopiec, 2001; Finkelhor & Jones, 2006).
When comparing NCANDS data on child sexual abuse and National Incident Based
Reporting System (NIBRS) data featuring incident level data compiled by police departments,
Terry and Tallon (2013) found that state criminal justice agencies reported considerably more
cases of child sexual abuse than CPS. In addition, the decline in cases of child sexual abuse
could be the result of changes in definitions of child sexual abuse used for reporting purposes
(Finkelhor, Jones, & Kopiec, 2001; Finkelhor & Jones, 2006).
In addition to the decline in the number of reports of child sexual abuse made to CPS,
beginning in 1992 there has also been a decline in the incidence of child sexual abuse. From
1992 to 2011, there was a 63 percent decline in sexual abuse against children (Finkelhor, Jones,
& Shattuck, 2013). The decline in child sexual abuse was found in several agency data sources,
including the NCANDS, the National Incidence Study of Child Abuse and Neglect (NIS), as well
as victim self-report surveys such as the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), National
Survey of Children Exposed to Violence (NatSCEV), and National Survey of Adolescents
(Finkelhor & Jones, 2012). While there has been no agreed upon reason given for the decline in
child sexual abuse, economic improvement, increased law enforcement and child protective
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services personnel, more aggressive prosecution and incarceration policies, and increased
awareness of child sexual abuse have all been cited as possible explanations (Finkelhor, Jones, &
Shattuck, 2013).
2.2 Sexual Abuse in Youth Serving Organizations (Institutional Child Sexual Abuse)
Youth Serving Organizations (YSOs) are defined by Wurtele as “establishments,
organizations, facilities and clubs that provide services and activities for children, and include
schools, residential treatment facilities, youth groups, faith centers, and recreational or sporting
clubs” (Wurtele, 2012, p.2443). Given the population that YSOs serve, it is critical that they have
clear, appropriate, and effective policies and training on CSA.
YSOs can often provide protective factors for youth from sexual abuse, including
increased self-esteem, relationships with positive adults, and relationships with peers (Trocmé &
Schumaker, 1999). However, the ability for adults and youth members to develop close and
caring relationships can also leave youth members vulnerable to physical and sexual
victimization (Wurtele, 2012).
Research on organizations caring for children, including juvenile facilities, schools, and
child care organizations have found alarming rates of child sexual abuse. A 2010 study by the
Department of Justice found that 10.3 percent of children in state and non-state facilities reported
being victimized by facility staff at least once (Beck, Harrison, & Guerino, 2010). Similarly,
studies by the U.S. Department of Education found that prevalence rates for sexual abuse among
children at school ranged from 3.7 percent to 50.3 percent among students in U.S. schools
(Shakeshaft, 2004). Overall, in 2002, one percent of all investigated cases of child abuse
involved child care providers (Wolfe, Jaffe, Jette, & Poisson, 2003). What follows is a brief
discussion of two of the most well-known daycare child sexual abuse cases.
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2.2.1 Daycares
Despite the fact that children have a greater chance of being victimized at home
(Finkelhor, Williams, & Burns, 1988), the increased media attention on reports of daycare child
sexual abuse has led to beliefs among the general public that children are at an increased risk of
being victimized at daycare (Kelley, 1994). Child sexual abuse in daycare settings typically
ranges from fondling to more intrusive acts such as penetration, usually with a foreign object.
There are often cases of children being forced to abuse other children, and photographing of
children is common (Kelley, 1994).
Faller (1990) developed a typology for adults abusing children in daycare settings. Faller
outlined two types of offenders: those who had unplanned sexual encounters with children due to
circumstance, and those who had planned sexual encounters with children. These two typologies
distinguish between offenders who only victimize children after an opportunity presents itself
and those who target children for victimization (Faller, 1990). While there tends to be a higher
prevalence of male sexual offending against children in home settings, sexual offending against
children in daycare settings features a higher proportion of female offenders (Kelley, 1994).
Two infamous cases of child sexual victimization in daycare settings, the McMartin
Preschool case and Fells Acre Day Care case, resulted in increased concern over the safety of
youth in daycares. These cases ultimately contributed to the awareness of and increasing concern
about child sexual abuse (Best, 1990).
In Manhattan Beach, California, in August of 1983, a parent reported to police that they
believed their child had been molested by Ray Buckley, a McMartin Preschool staff member.
The mother reported that she had questioned her child after he came home with a reddened anus.
Upon repeated questioning, the child claimed that Ray Buckley had taken his temperature anally.
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A medical examination conducted the next day was inconclusive for sexual abuse. When initially
questioned by the police the child denied any sexual abuse had taken place, but on further
questioning he admitted that both he and other children had experienced perverse sexual acts at
the hands of daycare staff (deYoung, 1997).
Police sent a letter to parents who used the daycare, naming Ray Buckley as a suspect
and instructing them to question their children about whether they had experienced abuse. Police
also advised parents who believed their children were victims to consult with the Children’s
International Institute for verification of abuse. Some 400 McMartin preschool children were
taken to the Institute, and of these 396 were determined to be victims of sexual abuse (deYoung,
1997). This initial report and following investigation into the McMartin Preschool resulted in
suspicion that children were being satanically ritually abused in the tunnels underneath the
school by daycare staff. Following the initial report, mental health professionals examined
dozens of children. These examinations resulted in 300 charges of rape, fondling, oral
copulation, and ritualistic abuse against Buckley, his mother and owner of the daycare Peggy
McMartin, and five other women who worked there (Wyatt, 2002).
By January of 1986, all of the charges except those against Ray Buckley and Peggy
McMartin had been dropped due to lack of evidence. In January of 1990, all charges against
Peggy McMartin were dismissed. After initial discussions to retry Ray Buckley on twelve
charges that jurors were deadlocked on, prosecutors declined to retry the case (Wyatt, 2002).
Ultimately, at the end of the investigation and in later years it was largely believed that the
reports of abuse at the McMartin daycare center were the result of inappropriate, leading, and
repeated questioning by police, despite archeological surveying which revealed a tunnel had in
fact been filled in under the preschool property (Stickel, 1993). In addition, many scholars later
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studying the incident believed the children were questioned so relentlessly that they eventually
began fabricating stories (deYoung, 1997).
The McMartin preschool case was the first of its kind to receive national media attention,
and it was only the first in a line of daycare sexual abuse scandals in the U.S. in the following
years. In1984, a similar case of child abuse by daycare workers occurred at the Fells Acre
daycare center in Malden, Massachusetts. The initial report of abuse came after a child claimed
that Gerald Amirault, a worker at the day care center, had changed his pants and underwear after
he wet the bed during nap time. Upon further questioning by his mother, the child claimed he
had been taken to a secret room and molested by Amirault. In an initial interview with a social
worker the child again denied anything had taken place but eventually admitted abuse had
occurred to himself along with another boy. The other boy denied any abuse occurred (Robinson,
2013).
After reporting to police, the local police station invited parents to a meeting during
which social workers provided a list of symptoms of sexual abuse (bed wetting, crying, and
appetite problems) and police advised parents to question their children. Police specifically
stated that denials of abuse should not be believed and parents should continue to question their
children. Following this, 40 potential cases of child sexual abuse were identified. Of these,
nineteen children continued to deny allegations occurred and only ten were deemed credible
enough to testify at trial. Malden police charged Gerald Amirault, his mother Violet Amirault,
and his sister Cheryl Amirault LeFave with sexual abuse against children under their care. The
prosecution’s case was based on the belief that the Amirault’s were conducting abuse in order to
create child pornography for distribution, despite the fact that no child pornography was ever
found (Robinson, 2013).
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At trial, the children claimed that they had been sodomized, sometimes by a twelve inch
butter knife, engaged in oral sex, molested by a clown, abused by lobsters, witnessed the murder
of a baby and dog, were forced to eat dead frogs, and had been chased naked in the school yard.
They noted that many of these events had occurred in a magic room they were taken to by one of
the Amiraults. Despite these claims, there was no evidence of sexual abuse, and while children
said they had been to the magic room hundreds of times, none of them could trace their steps
back to the room. A search of the school revealed no such room. The jury in the case deliberated
for 64 hours, ultimately convicting all three. Gerald Amirault was sentenced to 30 to 40 years in
prison while his mother and sister were both sentenced to eight to ten years in prison (Robinson,
2013).
While these two cases represented the most high profile cases of day care child sexual
abuse, several other cases occurred during the same time period. These included the 1989 Little
Rascals Day Care Center scandal in Edenton, North Carolina and the 1985 Wee Care Day
Nursery scandal in Maplewood, New Jersey (Goldberg, 1998). The outbreak of day care sexual
abuse scandals in the 1980s and early 1990s resulted in more aggressive case finding of child
sexual abuse by social workers with investigations into hundreds of other day care centers across
the U.S. following the McMartin preschool case (deYoung, 2007). These cases also led to
increased concern about the possibility of individuals targeting daycares as a method of
obtaining victims.
2.2.2 The Catholic Church
Child sexual abuse does not solely occur in organizations caring for children, but can also
occur in organizations where adult members have increased access to and power over youth.
This relationship is clearly evident in the Catholic Church child sexual abuse scandal. While
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literature suggests that child sexual abuse has occurred in the Catholic Church, and other
religious institutions, for thousands of years (Dale & Alpert, 2007), the issue of child sexual
abuse by priests gained large-scale media attention beginning in the 1980s (Jenkins, 1996). This
rise in media attention was partly due to the 1985 Gilbert Gauthe case. Gilbert Gauthe, a priest in
the Savannah Diocese and Boy Scout chaplain, was moved between four different parishes and
during this time molested more than one hundred boys. Church officials were aware of his
victimization of children for more than ten years prior to the public surfacing of allegations in
1983 (Werth, 2003).
Then, in January 2002, the Catholic Church was again rocked by allegations of child
sexual abuse against Father John Geoghan, a priest in the Archdiocese of Boston. Allegations
against Father Geoghan indicated that he had abused more than 130 children over three decades
(Kerry, 2008). The Boston Globe’s coverage of the case indicated that Archbishop Bernard
Cardinal Law and his predecessors had been aware of the abuse occurring and created a system
whereby priests were able to sexually abuse children for long periods of time by moving them
from one location to another (Carroll, 2002). Ultimately, this case led to increased scrutiny of the
Catholic Church and a sharp increase in reporting of past abuse by priests. In 2003, Laurie
Goodstein, a reporter for the New York Times, estimated that by the end of 2002, roughly 1,205
clerics had been named as abusers of roughly 4,268 victims (Goodstein, 2003).
In 2002, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops commissioned John Jay College to
undertake two studies to address the nature and scope of sexual abuse in the Catholic Church and
the causes and context of abuse. The Nature and Scope report released in 2004 relied on the
universe of all records for priests and deacons in the U.S. from 1950 to 2002 to determine the
nature of allegations and characteristics about the abuser and victim (John Jay College, 2004).
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This study extended the research of prior studies that had largely relied on small samples or
clinical populations (Terry, 2008).
The studies represented the largest and most extensive study of child sexual abuse by
priests and provided insight into the characteristics of abusers and abuse incidents, as well as the
Catholic Church’s response to abuse. The study found that between 1950 and 2002, 4,392 priests
were accused of abusing 10,667 victims. These priests represented four percent of all priests in
the U.S. during this time period. While the number of sexual abuse cases peaked in the 1970s,
abuse rates were comparable across the different dioceses during this time period. In response to
allegations of abuse, the Catholic Church paid nearly 572 million dollars in victim compensation,
treatment for both victims and priests, and court costs by 2002 (Terry, 2008).
Priest abusers ranged in age from 18 to 90, with the largest majority abusing between the
ages of thirty and thirty-nine. Most priests only had one formal allegation of abuse and on
average priests usually began abusing after serving in the ministry for eleven years. Those priests
with ten or more allegations were found to have begun abusing within their first four years in the
ministry. The study revealed that 69 percent of priests abused children for more than one year
and that the duration of abuse increased with the number of victims. Most of the abuse occurred
privately, in the priest’s home or work office. The majority of victims were boys between the
ages of eleven and fourteen years old (Terry, 2008). While these studies revealed detailed
information about child sexual abuse in the Catholic Church, a majority of the allegations of
abuse were reported years after the abuse occurred. Due to this delay in reporting, statute of
limitations often hindered criminal prosecution of priests (Terry, 2008). Of all priests for whom
allegations were reported, only six percent were ultimately criminally prosecuted (John Jay,
2004).
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The Causes and Context study conducted by John Jay College in 2011 also shed light on
the Catholic Church’s response to allegations of child sexual abuse against priests. In 1992, the
American Bishops instituted the “Five Principles” for addressing allegations of sexual abuse
against children by priests. These principles included a prompt response to allegations, removing
the priest from clerical service and referring to treatment, complying with civil law requirements
for reporting abuse, reaching out to victims to provide support and guidance, and being as open
as possible with the community while maintaining the privacy of the victim. For the most part,
when responding to allegations of child sexual abuse, Church responses tended to focus on the
priest being accused and not the victim. Reponses also focused heavily on rehabilitation of the
priest through treatment. Church leaders relied heavily on internal responses such as internal
investigations and administrative leave, rather than relying on external criminal justice oriented
responses. Finally, laicization of priests was often avoided as it was considered too complex and
difficult to remove priests from clerical work (Terry, Smith, Schuth, Kelly, Vollman, & Massey,
2011).
The two studies conducted by John Jay College provided greater insight into the nature of
child sexual abuse in the Catholic Church while also providing more detailed information about
the Church’s response to these allegations. While media attention focused on child sexual abuse
in the Catholic Church, it is important to note that child sexual abuse extends to other religious
institutions as well (Terry, 2008). The cases of child sexual abuse in daycares and the Catholic
Church led to increased concern over institutional child sexual abuse. In addition, attention was
also turned to cases where offenders selected these institutions in order to facilitate offending
against children.

23

2.3 Professional Perpetrators
Termed ‘professional perpetrators’ by Sullivan and Beech (2002), these individuals are
perpetrators who use organizations or institutions in which they work as a method for targeting
victims. There is increasing concern that individuals who want to victimize children may be
targeting these institutions. Research has shown that in some cases offenders target youth serving
organizations in which they can abuse children, sometimes for years prior to being discovered
(Colton, Roberts, & Vanstone, 2010; Sullivan & Beech, 2004). The fear of predators targeting
these institutions has led to a new focus on tools and procedures for screening potential
volunteers and members (Saul & Audage, 2007).
Studies of professional perpetrators have addressed whether these offenders are
inherently different from ordinary sex offenders, finding that they were usually older and better
educated (Haywood, 1994; Sullivan & Beech, 2004). While professional perpetrators have been
found to be less likely to be in adult sexual relationships or to have children, they have similar
histories of child sexual abuse to the general population of child sexual offenders (Sullivan &
Beech, 2004). Professional perpetrators have also been found to rely on special techniques and
features to aid the commission of abuse and prevent disclosure (Brannan, Jones, & Murch,
1993). While ‘grooming’ techniques are often used by the general population of child sex
offenders to manipulate their victims, Gallagher (1998, 1999) claims that the techniques used by
professional perpetrators are more akin to entrapment. He notes that these sex offenders often
use emotional and material inducements to target their victims, while also targeting vulnerable
groups of children such as those with learning disabilities or special needs. Ultimately, one of the
key differences between professional perpetrator sex offenders and traditional sex offenders is
the level of sophistication of techniques used to manipulate victims to allow for abuse or prevent
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disclosure of abuse (Sullivan & Beech, 2002).
Questions have also been raised regarding the motivation of professional perpetrators.
Two main motivations are debated: that professional perpetrators seek employment that will
generate opportunities to sexually abuse, or that they do not intend to abuse but are corrupted by
the position of power they hold (Sullivan & Beech, 2002). Faller’s 1988 study found that the
majority of offenders in institutional settings deliberately sought out these professions and
situations allowing for abuse. Despite these findings, later research dismissed the idea that there
is one type of professional perpetrator (Sullivan & Beech, 2002). Professional perpetrators of
sexual abuse have been found to be authoritarian and controlling (Sloan, 1988) in some cases,
but quiet and unassuming in others (Rowlands, 1995).
In the 1980s, research began to evaluate programs and strategies for preventing physical
abuse, neglect, and sexual abuse of children. At the time, many sexual abuse prevention
programs focused on educating youth serving organizations on the most appropriate methods for
preventing and responding to sexual abuse. These methods often centered on educating parents,
teachers, and children about sexual abuse through the use of verbal instruction, film, and
behavioral training. Evaluation of these prevention programs largely found that while
educational programs could improve the knowledge of children about sexually abusive behavior,
these programs were not shown to reduce the occurrence of sexual abuse (Macmillan,
Macmillan, Offord, Griffith, & Macmillan, 1994). More recently, efforts have been focused on
school-based educational programs which teach children how to identify dangerous situations,
refuse an approach, break off interaction with a perpetrator, and request help (Finkelhor, 2009).
Currently, there is no federal law requiring YSOs to screen individuals before offering
them positions in the organization (Davis, Grasso, Dennis, Wells, & Liss, 1998). In addition,
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there is no mandate for these organizations to develop policies aimed at prevention of
institutional child sexual abuse, or to provide education and training to members on child sexual
abuse (Wurtele, 2012). While there is no law mandating criminal background checks, under the
National Child Protection Act, the Attorney General created guidelines on suggested screening
mechanisms, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s criminal records check (Davis et al.,
1998).
While there appears to be some research on child sexual abuse by organizational
members and the prevention methods these organizations can employ, these studies focus
primarily on prevention of abuse, and not on organizational responses to abuse. While it is
important to understand the characteristics of institutional abuse and the prevention methods
used by organizations, attention must also be paid to how organizations respond to abuse. How
the organization learned of abuse and the methods they used to address abuse are important in
understanding the larger context in which this abuse occurs. To date, there has also been no
comprehensive large-scale study of institutional child sexual abuse (Wurtele, 2012).
2.4 Mandatory Reporting Of Child Sexual Abuse
Beginning in the 1950s, studies of infants and children displaying multiple fractures and
subdural hematomas began to question whether the trauma these children were displaying was
intentionally inflicted (Nelson, 1984; Sussman, 1975). It wasn’t until 1962 that the term battered
child syndrome was first introduced in a study looking at children who were severely injured by
their parents (Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller, & Silver, 1962). In order to address the
sexual abuse of children and increasing recognition of battered child syndrome, mandatory
reporting laws were created in the United States in the 1960s (Myers, 2008). In 1962, the U.S.
Children’s Bureau proposed a model statute for mandatory reporting laws, which was quickly
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picked up by the states. Between 1963 and 1967, all of the states and District of Columbia had
passed a version of the mandatory reporting statute. Following this, in 1974 Congress passed the
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), which created the National Center for
Child Abuse and Neglect. This center was developed to specify how and when reports should be
filed and who was required to report (Hutchinson, 1993). As of 2012, all U.S. states, the District
of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands have enacted mandatory reporting laws (Child Welfare Information Gateway,
2012).
Mandatory reporting laws are based on several key assumptions. These assumptions are
that:
1) Children are in need of protection and require others to act on their behalf
2) Mandatory reporting laws will ensure complete and accurate reporting of child
maltreatment; and
3) Mandatory reporting will lead to early detection and prevention of more serious harm
(Hutchinson, 1993).
Ultimately, the greatest factor leading to the development of mandatory reporting laws is
the early detection of abuse. This early detection is especially important for child victims
because requiring adults that these children come into contact with to report can cease future
abuse. Mandatory reporting laws are a useful tool to ensure children aren’t subjected to repeated
victimization as well as ensuring additional children do not fall prey to abuse (Pietrantonio,
Wright, Gibson, Alldred, Jacobson, Niec, 2013).
While the majority of mandatory reporting laws are aimed at abuse committed by a
child’s parent or legal guardian, these laws have been extended to “cases where the perpetrator is
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a specified person, usually a parent, caregiver or other individual having care, custody or control
of the child, or a person who is responsible for the care of the child” (Mathews & Kenny, 2008;
11). This extension further protects children by requiring abuse committed by any individual
with control over the child to be reported.
Mandatory reporting laws specify “who is required to by law to report suspected cases of
child abuse and neglect” (National Child Protection Clearinghouse, 2004; 1). It is important to
note that when reporting suspected cases of child abuse or neglect, proof of maltreatment is not
required. Instead, there only has to be a reasonable belief that abuse is occurring (Pietrantonio et
al, 2013). Initially, these laws were only applied to medical professionals due to concern that the
extension of mandatory reporting requirements to other professionals could result in unforeseen
harm (Hutchinson, 1993).
While all states, the District of Columbia, and all U.S territories currently have some type
of mandatory reporting law, the professions designated as mandatory reporters varies by state. In
48 states, professions whose members are mandated by law to report child maltreatment are
listed in the statute. These professions are largely those in which members have access to
children, such as teachers, child care workers, social workers, medical professionals, and law
enforcement (Higgins, Bromfield, Richardson, Holzer, & Berlyn, 2009).
However, some states have expanded mandatory reporting to professions such as
commercial film or photograph processors and members of the clergy. In addition, only eleven
states mandate reporting by directors, employees, or volunteers at organizations that provide
activities for youth. Only 18 states and Puerto Rico require any individuals who suspect abuse to
report, regardless of their profession (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2012).
While mandatory reporting laws specify who is required to report child abuse and
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neglect, in all states any individual who suspects abuse is allowed to report. To ensure that
reports of abuse are based on some standard, the majority of states require that an individual
making a report “suspects or has reasons to believe that a child has been abused or neglected”
(Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2012; 3). Any individual is also permitted to report
conditions that could result in harm to a child. Most states have created toll free telephone
numbers to allow anonymous reporting of suspected child abuse, however, some states require
reporters to leave their name (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2012).
The expansion of mandatory reporting laws to additional professionals with daily
interactions with children has been especially important given the widespread distribution of
child abuse allegations. In 1974, roughly 60,000 cases of child abuse were reported. This number
rose to more than one million reports in 1980, two million reports in 1990, and three million
reports of child abuse in 2000 (Myers, 2008), and over 5.8 million in 2007 (Levi & Portwood,
2011) . In 2010, of the reports of child abuse and neglect made to Child Protective services, 11.5
percent were made by social workers, 16.4 percent were made by teachers or child care
providers, 16.7 percent were made by law enforcement officers, and 8.2 percent were made by
medical professionals (The Administration on Children, Youth and Families, 2010; USDHHS,
2011).
Mandatory reporting laws are meant to protect children, but several issues have been
raised, including:
1) The overreporting of unsubstantiated abuse
2) The diversion of resources from substantiated cases of child sexual abuse (Mathews
& Kenny, 2008); and
3) Ambiguity and vagueness in the statutes (Levi, Brown, & Erb, 2006).
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When addressing the issues of mandatory reporting laws, it is important to acknowledge
the possibility of both false positive and false negative reports. False positives occur when
individuals are investigated for suspicion of child abuse but these allegations are not
substantiated. False positives can cause damage to individuals and families due to the disruption
and stress associated with CPS investigations. False negatives occur when child abuse is not
reported to CPS, leaving the child vulnerable to future abuse (Levi & Portwood, 2011).
Mandatory reporting laws can also result in the inefficient use of CPS’ extremely limited
resources or the unequal treatment of children requiring attention (Levi & Crowell, 2011), as
time and effort may be spent on investigating suspected child abuse in cases where abuse is not
present.
The current set of mandatory reporting laws lack a “clear standard for when an individual
is meant to report suspected child abuse” (Levi & Portwood, 2011, p.62). In addition, whether
abuse will be reported is dependent upon individual attitudes toward discipline, the individuals’
experiences with abused children and CPS, and often the characteristics of the family and child.
Overall, neither laws nor professional literature or standards provide a clear indication of when
reporting should occur. In fact, 22 states cite some level of belief that child abuse is occurring,
while 28 states cite suspicion of abuse as a guideline for reporting; however neither of these
terms is clearly defined within the statutes (Levi & Portwood, 2011).
The refusal of mandatory reporters to report suspected child abuse has also been raised as
an issue. Physicians have noted that fear of legal or physical reprisals represent a significant
barrier when reporting suspected child abuse (Pietrantonio et al, 2013), while psychologists have
expressed concerns regarding client confidentiality (Kalichman & Craig, 1991). The concern for
liability among mandatory reporters is especially apparent in instances where suspected abuse
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cannot be substantiated (Hutchinson, 1993). While some states have instituted strict penalties for
failure to report suspected child abuse, others have incredibly lenient penalties or lack legal
penalties all together (Brown & Gallagher, 2013).
The problem of failure to report child abuse also brings to light the issue of willful refusal
to report suspected child abuse, and in some cases willful tolerance of the abuse. Several high
profile cases have brought the issue of willful tolerance of suspected child abuse to the forefront
of debate regarding mandatory reporting. In 2003, the Boston Globe printed a series of exposés
detailing the more than 900 children who were sexually abused by priests in the Roman Catholic
Church (Brown & Gallagher, 2013). The reporting of the Boston Globe revealed that priests
within the Church were often aware of abuse committed by fellow priests, usually resulting from
confession with the victim. Despite having this knowledge, the priests did not report cases of
sexual abuse to formal authorities (Goldenberg, 2013).
In 2009, a similar issue of willful tolerance was discovered in the case of Dr. Earl B.
Bradley. Dr. Bradley, a pediatrician in Delaware, was indicted in 2010 on 471 counts of child
sexual abuse against 103 children. Further discovery revealed that there were actually 526 counts
of sexual abuse against 130 children. It was also discovered that throughout his years victimizing
children, medical, police, and legal authorities were all aware of the abuse but failed to report
this to child protective services (Brown & Gallagher, 2013). Most recently, the 2011 case of
Pennsylvania State University defensive football coordinator Jerry Sandusky has sparked states
to take another look at their current mandatory reporting laws. In 2011, Jerry Sandusky was
charged with 52 counts of sexual abuse of ten young boys that he met through the Second Mile
Foundation for needy children he created. Similar to the other cases mentioned, in the Sandusky
case numerous Pennsylvania State University officials knew the abuse was occurring due to
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reports from junior employees at the University, but failed to report it to law enforcement (Kim,
Gostin, & Cole, 2012). These cases and others like them have led to an increased push for
mandatory reporting laws that apply to all individuals and have stricter penalties for individuals
who fail to report (Brown & Gallagher, 2013).
Mandatory reporting laws have not been solely applied to reporting of child sexual abuse,
but also the issue of reporting of sexual assault on college campuses. Many scholars note that
college is the time of greatest risk for sexual violence, with research showing that one in five
women will experience either attempted or completed sexual assault while in college (Krebs,
Lindquist, Warner, Fisher, Martin, 2007). Reporting of sexual assault on college campuses has
not always occurred. Prior to 1988, less than four percent of college campuses publically
released information on crime that occurred on campus. In 1990, calls for transparency from
sexual assault survivors led to a Federal response in the form of the Student Right-to-Know and
Campus Security Act. This act made it mandatory for all college campuses to report sexual
assault, in addition to other crimes, that occurred on campus. In 1998, this act was amended and
renamed the Jeanne Cleary Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics
after Jeanne Cleary, a student who was raped and sodomized in her dorm room. In 1999,
Congress mandated the National Institute of Justice to assess the compliance of institutions of
higher education with the Cleary Act (McMahon, 2008).
Despite these steps, incidence of sexual assault on college campuses has failed to decline
(Karjane, Fisher, & Cullen, 2005). Studies have found that campuses often have trouble
implementing policies to address sexual abuse on campus due to lack of funding (Bohmer &
Parrot, 1993) and difficultly raising awareness about the services available to students
(Ashworth, Franklin, & Viada, 2014). Following the failure of college campuses to adequately
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address the issue of sexual assault, President Obama announced a targeted response to sexual
assault on college campuses in 2014. This comprehensive program to respond to sexual assault
on campuses had a four-pronged approach. The first step involved the implementation of an
appropriate response, including reporting, investigation, and accountability, and providing
services to victims. The second prong focused on an awareness of sexual assault and risk
reduction strategy, while the third prong focused on the education of bystanders on their role in
intervening in sexual assault incidents. The final prong centered on primary prevention, whereby
the culture of college campuses was shifted to take sexual assault seriously and focus on issues
of consent (Burrows, 2014). While it is yet to be seen how this new approach will impact sexual
assault on college campuses, this could present a useful model for addressing issues of child
sexual abuse in youth serving organizations.
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Chapter 3: Boy Scouts of America

3.1 History of BSA
The Boy Scouts of America (BSA) was created in 1910 and received a federal charter in
1916. Under Title 36 of the United States Code, federally chartered organizations are free from
antitrust and monopoly regulation as well as control over their symbols and insignia. During the
first years of operation, the President of the U.S. served as the honorary president of the BSA.
By the end of the 1920s, the BSA was the largest male youth organization, with 358,573 scouts
and 15,117 scoutmasters (Hantover, 1978). In 1999, the BSA reported 3.5 million registered
scouts. In 2000, the BSA claimed to have registered their 100 millionth member (Mechling,
2004).
The BSA largely gained national acceptance and support in the U.S. due to concerns
regarding the decline of American masculinity (Mechling, 2004). From the 1870 to 1910,
changes in the workforce, family, and adolescent lifestyle were considered threatening to the
expression of manly traits and behaviors in adult males. Feminism played a large role in this
change due to the drastic change in the spheres of work for men and women (Hantover, 1978).
The American workforce shifted to white-collar jobs, in which both men and women
served in clerical or sales positions. The role of men in service oriented work was in stark
contrast to the independence and self-reliance traditionally associated with farming and family
owned business which dominated prior to this shift. According to Hantover, masculinity is a
cultural construct confirmed through ongoing action with work providing the central method for
externalizing masculinity. The inability of men to exert overt masculinity in their everyday lives
due to these societal changes hinted at the decline of traditional masculine ideals (Hantover,
1978).
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In light of the apparent decline of opportunity for men to exert their masculinity, scouting
was viewed as providing boys with opportunities to exert their often latent masculinity in
accordance with traditional male ideals. Men who were unable to exert their masculinity in
white-collar jobs “sought nonoccupational means of masculine validation, one of which was
being a scoutmaster” (Hantover, 1978, p. 189). This concern was further deepened because
diminishing opportunities were viewed as a barrier to the development of masculinity in
adolescent boys. Smaller family size, the absence of fathers from home life due to the shift of
work to service industries, and the expansion of public schools all served to weaken boys
physically leading to dependency and inactivity (Hantover, 1978). In order to staunch this
weakening of the physical and masculine identities of boys and men, the BSA was developed to
provide order, discipline, and the opportunity to build character (Macleod, 2004).
The BSA is based on the values of honor, duty, and integrity (Mechling, 2004). Boy
scouts are taught that they should be trustworthy, loyal, helpful, friendly, courteous, kind,
obedient, cheerful, thrifty, brave, clean and reverent (Macleod, 2004). This focus of the BSA on
developing boys into intelligent, resourceful, and masculine men is clearly visible in the Scout
Oath adopted in 1910:
On my honor I will do my best
To do my duty to God and my country
And to obey Scout Law;
To help other people at all times;
To keep myself physically strong,
Mentally awake, and morally straight (Mechling 2004).
The BSA is primarily comprised of white, middle class boys and men. However, troops for poor
youth, certain racial and ethnic groups, and youth with disabilities have been established
(Mechling 2004). The basis for which the Boy Scouts of America was founded provided support
for the status of members within the community. Similar to doctors, who are often viewed as
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having a high social status and beyond reproach because of their wisdom and beneficence
(Lazaro, 1999), members within the organization could also be viewed as having a similar status
within society. These individuals conformed to traditional ideals regarding marriage, the family,
and behavior, and worked in an organization dedicated to ensuring that these traditional views
remained intact.
The BSA operates a National Council, housed in Irving Texas, which features elected
national officers, executive board members, regional presidents, local council representatives,
and members at large. This National Council is responsible for developing the program, in
addition to setting and maintaining quality standards for training, registration, and literature
development. The National Council also publishes the magazines Boys’ Life and Scouting. The
National Council is not-for-profit and funded by membership dues and corporate sponsors.
The BSA is also divided into four regions to make management easier: Western, Central,
Southern, and Northeast. Each region has a Regional Committee run by an Area director who
supervises the various councils in that region. Each region is required to implement the National
BSA program and policies. The BSA also operates local councils in each state. Each BSA unit
(troop, pack, etc.) is part of the local council in which it resides. These local councils are
incorporated into the larger state council and fall under regional and national review. BSA units
are chartered through the local council on an annual basis. While there is oversight on the
regional and national level, each council is autonomous and manages the registration of
individuals and operation of the local BSA units. Local BSA units are usually chartered through
civic organizations, such as churches or schools. Individual leaders are selected by the chartering
organization. The BSA does provide information on membership standards and
recommendations on how to select BSA volunteers (Bill, 2008).
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The BSA offers five main programs, Tiger Cubs, Cub Scouting, Webelos Scouting, Boy
Scouting, and Varsity Scouting. “The BSA maintains that, by virtue of the private nature of its
organization and of the beliefs it tries to instill, it has the ‘right’ to exclude women, atheists,
agnostics, and publically avowed homosexuals” (Goodman, 1999, p. 827). While the Federal
courts have ruled that the BSA can exclude women, atheists, and agnostics from membership in
the organization, the exclusion of homosexual members has been harshly criticized. The BSA
have claimed that allowing homosexual youth members and adult volunteers and leaders is
contrary to their beliefs, noting that the terms ‘morally straight’ and ‘clean’ found in their Scout
Oath and Scout Law can be used to justify the exclusion of homosexuals (Goodman, 1999).
The question of whether homosexual scouts should be allowed in the BSA has been
raised in numerous legal settings, most notably in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000). James
Dale joined the BSA when we was eight years old, remaining in the organization as a scout until
the age of eighteen. Upon turning eighteen, James applied for adult membership for which he
was approved. Two years later, after learning that James had come out as homosexual while
attending Rutgers University and served as the President for the University’s Lesbian/Gay
Alliance, James’ adult membership was revoked by BSA officials. James filed suit arguing that
the revocation of his membership based on his homosexual orientation was discrimination (Lee,
2008). The suit reached the Supreme Court where they held in a 5-to-4 vote that the BSA could
exclude gay members under the first amendment’s protection of freedom of association. The
Court ruled that the BSA could legally exclude homosexual members because the inclusion of
these individuals was contrary to the organization’s “expressive message” (Greenhouse, 2000).
In 2013, the BSA finally ended the policy forbidding openly homosexual scouts from
membership in the organization. The decision to end the policy was based on the votes of more
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than 1400 volunteer scout leaders across the country, with more than 60 percent voting that no
youth should be denied membership based on their sexual orientation. While the policy change
became effective in January of 2014, this change only applied to the admittance of homosexual
scouts, not openly gay adult volunteers or scout leaders. Prior to the BSA’s policy change,
several organizations including UPS, Merck, and Intel pulled their funding of the BSA citing that
the policy forbidding homosexual youth violated their own nondiscrimination policies (Eckholm,
2013). More recently, Disney has pulled all funding for the BSA through their VoluntEARS
program beginning in 2015 due to the continued ban on gay leaders in the BSA (Sayers, 2014).
3.2 Boy Scouts of America and Child Sexual Abuse
Increased attention has focused on the BSA in the past several years due to high profile
cases of child sexual abuse. In 2010, former Boy Scout Kerry Lewis sued the BSA claiming that
he was the victim of abuse by his scoutmaster in Portland, Oregon during the 1980s. Lewis
claimed to have been sexually abuse by scoutmaster Timur Dykes, who admitted at the time that
he had sexually abused scouts. Despite this confession, Dykes was allowed to remain in the BSA
organization (McGreal, 2010).
In April of 2010, Lewis was awarded 18.5 million dollars in damages. In addition,
following this case the Oregon Supreme Court ordered the release of confidential files kept by
the BSA on allegations of child sexual abuse against its members. While Lewis’ case is one of
the more well-known cases against the BSA, over the past several years the organization has
settled 60 cases of child sexual abuse outside of court (McGreal, 2010).
Based on the allegations of child sexual abuse and resulting lawsuits against the
organization, it would appear as though the BSA has done little to protect youth from
victimization. However, the organization has had policies and procedures set in place to protect
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youth for a century. Beginning in 1911, the BSA began requiring character reference checks for
all individuals applying for scoutmaster positions (Boy Scouts of America, 2012).
This policy was expanded in the mid-1920s to include cross referencing of all volunteers
against a list of individuals deemed to be ineligible for BSA service maintained by the National
Headquarters (Boy Scouts of America, 2012). Registration for Scoutmasters and Scouts wasn’t
formally required until 1913. In 1994, the BSA instituted a policy of criminal background checks
for all professionals working with youth in the organization, and expanded it in 2004 to include
all BSA volunteers. In 2011, the BSA instituted mandatory reporting of child abuse within the
organization (Boy Scouts of America, 2012). A timeline of the policies and efforts made by the
BSA to protect youth in their organization can be found in Appendix A.
To further address the issues of child sexual abuse and to hold institution members
accountable, the Boy Scouts have instituted several policies to create a safe environment for
scouts. The BSA instituted mandatory youth protection training for all registered volunteers in
2010. This training has to be updated every two years in order to remain as a volunteer in the
organization. The BSA also reserves the right to deny any individual admission as a volunteer.
Leadership within the organization is a privilege, not a right, and can only be bestowed to those
individuals who have passed a background check (Boy Scouts of America, 2013). Upon entry as
a volunteer into the BSA, all individuals undergo youth protection training, complete with a
youth protection training guide, youth protection training for volunteers and parents DVD, and a
youth protection quiz. The BSA also created a youth protection facilitator’s guide to show
organization members how to prepare and present training sessions to volunteers, parents, and
scouts (Boy Scouts of America, 2011a).
In all of their manuals and publications relating to youth protection, the BSA mention the

39

importance of protecting youth from sexual abuse and other forms of maltreatment. The BSA
rely on the definition of child abuse originally set forth by Congress in the Federal Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) of 1974, whereby child abuse is defined as “any recent
act or failure to act on the part of a parent or caretaker, which results in death, serious physical or
emotional harm, sexual abuse, or exploitation; or an act or failure to act which presents an
imminent risk of serious harm” (Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 2010). The ultimate
goal of youth protection training is to ensure that there is prompt reporting of suspected abuse
and behavior that violates youth protection policies. To this end, all suspicions of abuse by BSA
volunteers must be reported to the individual in charge of the activity occurring at the present
time as well as the local Scout Executive, “regardless of whether the child is in the scouting
program” (Boy Scouts of America, 2011a; 5).
When defining what standards should be used to dictate reporting of suspected abuse, the
BSA have the following guidelines: “any suspicion or belief that any child is or has been
physically, emotionally or sexually abused, exploited or exposed to any form of violence, threat,
pornography or obscene material should be reported to local authorities and to the Scouting
Executive” (Boy Scouts of America, 2011a; 5). While BSA manuals note that action taken by the
BSA against alleged abusers can include revocation of membership, they also specify that “all
suspected abuse will be reported to the appropriate law enforcement or child protective services
agency for investigation” (Boy Scouts of America, 2011b). It is important to note here the
difference between reporting of allegations of abuse to proper authorities and investigation of
these allegations by the BSA. When reporting the allegations, the only responsibility of the
organization was to report that allegations had been made. All investigation of these allegations
would have been undertaken by the authority to which they reported. Investigating allegations,
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on the other hand, required that the BSA have a set standard of procedures to determine what
abuse was alleged to have occurred and whether this abuse was substantiated and what evidence
would be considered adequate when substantiating abuse.
Due to concerns about child sexual abuse, the BSA has also created a manual, Camp
Leadership-Youth Protection Begins with You: A Guide for Camp Staff, which deals specifically
with abuse of scouts. This manual outlines ‘barriers to abuse within scouting’ that all scout
leaders must comply with, including respect for privacy, prohibiting organizations, appropriate
attire, constructive discipline, youth leadership training and supervision, and prohibited hazing
and bullying. The manual also spells out behavior that is considered inappropriate between adult
volunteers and youth members such as long hugs, massages, and wrestling in addition to signs of
physical and sexual abuse. With the advent of cellular phone and recording device technology,
the BSA has also instituted policies on the use of cameras and cell phones to either record or
distribute pornographic material (Boy Scouts of America, 2011b).
Several policies relating to everyday operations of BSA clubs have also been created to
protect youth. In 1987, the BSA developed a two-deep leadership policy requiring two adult
leaders to be present at all scouting events. This policy requires that either two registered adult
leaders, or one registered adult leader and a parent, must be present at all trips and outings. It is
important to note that the two-deep policy was implemented prior to the documented decline in
child sexual abuse in 1992. To further prevent sexual abuse of scouts, the BSA eliminated all
one-on-one contact between adults and scouts and require scouts and adults to have separate
accommodations when on camping trips (Boy Scouts of America, 2012). While these policies
were instituted prior to the scandal in 2010, the majority of reports of child sexual abuse
addressed in this dissertation occurred prior to the implementation of these policies.
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The 1977 BSA publication Procedures for Maintaining Standards of Leadership was the
first document created which outlined the procedures regarding investigation and suspension of a
scout leader. This document noted that a review must be conducted by the BSA of scout leaders
who may have issues of a moral or ethical nature which make them unacceptable to serve as
volunteers. When a complaint is made against a volunteer, a file is created for that individual.
BSA officials then attempted to collect as much hard evidence, such as newspaper clippings,
statements from victims or the alleged offender, and information from local police, to support the
allegations and the offender’s removal from the organization. Only after written complaints were
received was this information passed on to the National Council for consideration. The National
Council could then suggest that additional investigation needed to occur to provide adequate
proof of wrongdoing or confirm that the individual was placed on the confidential file (Boy
Scouts of America, n.d.).
The decentralized nature of the BSA’s organizational structure impacted the extent to
which regional and national councils were able to respond to allegations of child sexual abuse by
organization members. Allegations against an individual only resulted in that person being
placed on the confidential file once substantial proof had been obtained that abuse actually
occurred. While the BSA had policies detailing when abuse should be reported and the measures
required in order to place someone on the confidential file, there was no internal oversight to
ensure that these procedures were followed. Often times, local BSA troops and councils decided
on the best method of dealing with allegations without consulting with the regional or national
council. Thus, the National Council, while responsible for keeping a list of all individuals
deemed inappropriate to serve in the organization, in effect had little ability to ensure that local
councils and troops reported allegations of abuse against members to them (Boy Scouts of
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America, n.d.).
3.3 CSA Reporting in other YSO
A search of the literature and websites of other youth serving organizations, such as the
Young Men’s Christian Association and Big Brothers Big Sisters of America, yielded very little
public information about when youth protection policies were implemented in these
organizations. From the available literature, the Big Brother Big Sisters organization had
implemented some form of child safety procedures and requirements of reporting applied to all
volunteers since at least 2003. This document, although most likely not the earliest form of their
reporting requirements, was the only one available for examination. The manual, titled the Child
Safety Volunteer Handbook, noted that in order to protect children, the organization undertook
professional screening, offered child safety and abuse prevention education programs to parents,
volunteers, and children, and established guidelines for recognizing and maintaining appropriate
boundaries. The manual also provided indicators of abuse, including signs of physical abuse,
neglect, sexual abuse, and emotional maltreatment, and guidelines for appropriate responses by
volunteers. Finally, the report featured a specific section on the individual’s role as a mandatory
reporter, noting that they were required by law to call either the Department of Human Services
(DHS) or a local law enforcement agency to report suspected abuse. The manual even went as
far to indicate that “a call to your BBBS case manager is also required but does not replace your
need to contact DHS or law enforcement” (Big Brothers Big Sisters of America, 2003, pg.6).
While it is difficult to determine from the limited resources available the extent to which
BSA policies conformed to those of other agencies, it is important to note that in none of the
policies and procedure manuals available from the BSA is there any discussion of the volunteer’s
requirement to report suspected abuse under mandatory reporting laws. All BSA policies simply
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state that reporting must occur to the organization without mention of if, when, or how law
enforcement or child protection services should be notified. Thus, while the BSA may have taken
necessary measures to protect children within the organization, they still appeared to disregard
the need to educate volunteers and organization members of their duty to report suspected abuse
under mandatory reporting laws.
3.4 The BSA and American Culture 1960-1990
In order to understand the BSA’s poor response to CSA, it is critical to examine the
cultural frame of the time. The 2379 files analyzed in the study reflect the overall culture of the
organization at the time of the incident, but also reflect how the culture of American society at
the time may also have impacted the organization’s response.
3.4.1 Political and Social Change
In the years following World War II, most working and middle class Americans
conformed to current societal values and ideals regarding industrial expansion and consumerist
lifestyles. While this conformity to a system of shared values and goals appeared to be stable, the
1960s witnessed the beginning of a decline in societal consensus. Beginning in the 1960s,
American society faced “a serious moral crisis stemming from the failure of many people,
especially the young, to adequately incorporate the moral values and ideals of the society. Often,
the era of the 1960s is identified as contributing to the moral decline because of an abandonment,
at the time, of traditional values” (Turiel, 2002, p.3).The 1960s is largely viewed as a time of
rapid social and political change in the U.S (Bureau of International Information Programs,
2011). During this time, the U.S. experienced social and political unrest against government
actions and societal values considered to be unjust and discriminatory (Turiel, 2002).
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During the late 1960s and early 1970s, America’s increasing youth population rejected
traditional patterns of middle class life, instead adopting different styles of dress and sexual
behavior. The use of illegal drugs, ascendance of rock and roll, and creation of music with
political and social commentary became common, and represented to many an attack on
traditional American ideals (Bureau of International Information Programs, 2011).
In addition, the Vietnam War led to a division in the U.S., with a majority of America’s
youth vehemently opposing the war and taking part in protests (Bureau of International
Information Programs, 2011). Often considered by some to be a time of crisis, the 1960s is
largely viewed as a rebellious decade featuring social division and confrontation, with the “first
major rally against the Vietnam War in April 1965, organized and attended primarily by students
and young people” ushering in the anti-war youth movement (Bodroghkozy, 1991, p. 219).
Ultimately, the actions of America’s youth in the 1960s and early 1970s began to be viewed by
some as a moral panic due to the clash between rebellious youth and the traditional values held
by society (Bodroghkozy, 1991).
In line with the Vietnam War protests, the Civil Rights movement, lasting from the
1950s-1970s, largely focused on eliminating racial, and eventually gender, discrimination in
society. The Civil Rights Movement brought attention to the unequal treatment of members of
American society, noting their lack of representation in the common value system
(Bodroghkozy, 1991). Subordinate groups, including women, African Americans, Native
Americans, and Latinos, began to assert themselves in the social and political spheres. The Civil
Rights Movement relied on reform through the use of peaceful methods, such as sit-ins, freedom
rides, and rallies such as the now famous 1963 “March on Washington”. While certain Civil
Rights activists, such as Martin Luther King Jr, relied on peaceful methods, others including
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Malcolm X and Stokely Carmichael believed that any means necessary were appropriate. The
protests and calls for change resulted in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Bureau of International
Information Programs, 2011).
By 1985, there existed large-scale disillusionment with social, economic, and political
trends. Conservatives increasingly gained support because of their focus on protecting traditional
American values. At the same time, fundamentalist Christians came forward striving for a return
to “religion or the moral precepts often associated with it to a central place in American life”
(Bureau of International Information Programs, 2011, p. 308). While Bodroghkozy (1991)
argues that in order to prevent complete social breakdown in the early 1960s and 1970s the
dominant social groups had to be willing to embrace change. The actions taken by the BSA when
responding to allegations of sexual abuse can be taken as a direct attempt to maintain conformity
to the traditional values of the 1950s.
3.4.2 Decline of Marriage, the Family, and Traditional Identity
In the 1950s, there was increased focus on the nuclear family and marriage as the only
socially acceptable way to engage in sexual behavior. However, the 1960s saw a shift in the
dominance of marriage in American culture. During this time, the median age of marriage
increased, cohabitation prior to or in place of marriage became more common, childbearing
outside of marriage became more acceptable, and divorce rates began to rise (Cherlin, 2004).
During the 1960s and 1970s, focus was placed on self-development, with the idea that marriage
roles should be flexible and that openness should occur when confronting potential problems
(Cancian, 1987).
During the 1970s, some scholars argue that the substantial changes occurring in
American society played a large role in the deinstitutionalization of marriage. The change in
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division of labor within the home and the increase in childbearing outside of marriage are viewed
as contributing factors to which undermined the basis of marriage. In the 1980s, the change in
structure of American society was increasingly apparent in the shift of the American workforce
to service jobs (Bureau of International Information Programs, 2011).
In the mid-1980s, three fourths of all workers in the U.S. were in the service industry.
Following the decline in population after the “baby boom” of the 1960s, in the 1980s the
percentage of family households also began to decline. Instead, there was an increase in
nonfamily households where unrelated people lived together (Bureau of International
Information Programs, 2011). In addition, cohabitation became an acceptable alternative to
marriage, with a larger proportion of stepfamilies during the 1970s and 1980s formed through
cohabitation and not marriage than was previously the case (Bumpass, Raley, & Sweet, 1995).
In addition to the decline of marriage and the family, traditional sources of identity such
as class, community, and religion began to lose influence (Beck & Beck-Gernshiem, 2002).
Increased emphasis on individual freedom and less emphasis on obedience to societal standards
resulted in both behavioral changes, such as premarital sex and the use of contraceptives
(Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001), as well as attitude changes towards family values and
gender roles (Thornton, 1989). Ultimately, the changes occurring from the 1960s to 1985 led to
increased tolerance for behaviors that were previously prohibited, “weakening the social
prescriptions concerning the necessity of marriage and staying married, having children, and
limiting sexual expression and childbearing to marriage” (Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001,
p.1011).
While the debate as to whether the decline of the family and marriage was a negative
(Davis, 1997) or positive (Coontz, 2000) factor for individuals and the larger society, the shift
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away from traditional values spurred a conservative backlash. This movement pushed back
against the free will and individual-centered thinking that prevailed, focusing on marriage, the
prohibition of sexual activity outside of marriage, cohabitation, and childbirth out of wedlock
(Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001). The decline of traditional ideas surrounding marriage and
the family are especially important when addressing the response of the BSA to allegations of
sexual abuse during this time period. It stands to reason that individuals within the organization
who were married with families conformed to the traditional ideal the BSA were founded on and
as such allegations against these individuals were less likely to be viewed as credible. As the
BSA is an organization founded on these traditional ideals, this study addressed whether the
marital or family status of abusers influenced the approach taken by BSA officials when
responding to allegations.
3.4.3 Awareness of Child Sexual Abuse
Widespread awareness of child sexual abuse only dates back to the 1970s (Conte, 1994),
although the first focus on awareness of abuse of children in the industrial world is believed to
have begun in 1874 with the founding of the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children (Costin, 1992). During the 1920s and 1930s, the discovery of new types of child abuse,
such as neglect, resulted in sexual abuse being combined with these other types of physical and
emotional abuse. Lack of attention to CSA is also linked to the rise of psychoanalytic theory,
which disfavored the use of protective work, and ideological and service conflicts between
family-focused agencies (Conte, 1994; Myers, 2008).
The earliest literature on child sexual abuse focused on incest or the mental health
consequences for victims, with little to no information on actual prevalence rates. The 1960s
witnessed an increased interest in child abuse in general, but not child sexual abuse specifically.
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Awareness and increased scholarship on child sexual abuse is attributed to the child protection
system and implementation of mandatory reporting laws in the 70s and increased research on the
overall prevalence and harmful effects of CSA (Myers, 2008).
In 1979, Finkelhor’s survey of college students revealed that one of out of four females
and one out of five males experienced forced sexual contact before the age of eighteen
(Finkelhor, 1979). Later work on prevalence of CSA confirmed the importance of studying this
phenomenon, with 6-62% of females and 3-31% of males reporting sexual abuse in childhood
(Peters, Wyatt, Finkelhor, 1986). From 1978 to 1984, five books were published that are viewed
as the most influential in raising awareness and stimulating research on the occurrence and
prevention of child sexual abuse (Conte, 1994). These books include:


Conspiracy of Silence: The Trauma of Incest (Butler, 1978);



Sexual Assault of Children and Adolescents (Burgess, Groth, Holmstrom &
Sgroi, 1978);



Sexually Victimized Children (Finkelhor, 1979);



The Best Kept Secret: Sexual Abuse of Children (Rush, 1980); and



Sexual Exploitation: Rape, Child Sexual Assault, and Sexual Harassment
(Russell, 1984)

Despite increased awareness and concern for child sexual abuse, scholars argue that there
appears to be a cycle of discovery of CSA, a push for increased awareness, repression of the
abuse. This cycle is believed to be the result of both a historical and cultural use of denial,
minimization, and rationalization of CSA (Olafson, Corwin, & Summit, 1993).
In the early 1900s, discoveries of CSA were repressed due to a “long history of cultural
denial about criminal sexual behavior against children” (Olafson, Corwin, & Summit, 1993, p.
8). However, from the 1930s to the 1950s this repression shifted to a national panic about
pedophilic crimes and the establishment of sexual psychopath laws. During this same time, child
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sexual abuse was redefined to suggest that most sexual abuse occurred outside of the home. In
fact, “in American social work and popular culture between 1910 and 1940, the dominant
stereotype of the ‘stranger’ perpetrator, a rootless drifter or a ‘sexually degenerated old man,’
completed the reconstitution of the pedophile, thereby concealing the continued predominance of
sexual assault within the family” (Olafson, Corwin, & Summit, 1993, p. 14). The criminalization
of victims also occurred, with sexual modernism purporting that male violence is normal and that
child victims not only enjoy the sexual activity but also seduce adults (Bender & Blau, 1937),
and were thus “participating victims” (Olafson, Corwin, & Summit, 1993).
In the 1980s, the panic regarding pedophilic abuse shifted back towards repression of
CSA. Gardner (1991) notes that during this time there was a backlash against focusing on CSA,
with many opponents of this study claiming that CSA was most likely an “ancient tradition” and
an “overreaction to child abuse” (Gardner, 1991, pp. 115-116). Feminists also argued that focus
was turned away from CSA due to institutionalized patriarchy. These individuals argued that
since the majority of perpetration of sexual violence against children, especially incest, was
committed by men, patriarchal society was working to hide the criminal behavior of these
individuals (Herman, 1981). While the cycle of awareness and repression of CSA cannot be
easily explained, it does appear that “complex psychological, cultural, and political processes are
involved in recognizing and responding to childhood sexual abuse” (Conte, 1994, p. 227).
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Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework
This dissertation relied on the use of organizational theories in order to shed light on the
actions of the BSA when responding to allegations of child sexual abuse. Institutional theory
outlines how an organization develops in relation to its constituents and the larger environment,
detailing the actions an organization must take (or the actions they are perceived to have taken)
in order to be viewed as legitimate. Ultimately, this framework can provide a useful lens through
which to understand how the external environment of the BSA influenced its reaction to
allegations of abuse. Organizational theory also highlights rationalization tactics utilized by
organizations when addressing deviance. Similar to Sykes and Matza’s techniques of
neutralization for individual level deviance, rationalization tactics guided this dissertation in
understanding the rationalizations used by the BSA to justify the action, or lack of action, taken
against alleged offenders.
4.1 Institutional Theory
First introduced by Meyer and Rowan in 1977, institutional theory addressed why and
how organizations develop their policies and programs as well as the products and services they
provide (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Institutional theory is traditionally used to explain the
variation in structure and function among organizations (Child & Kieser, 1981). Dimaggio and
Powell (1987) in their expansion on institutional theory note that in fact organizations are more
homogenous than would be expected. They argue that organizational structural change is driven
by the desire to make organizations more homogenous, not by competition or to increase
efficiency.
Meyer and Rowan (1977) note that in order for organizations to be viewed by society as
legitimate, they must incorporate policies and procedures into their structure and functions.
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Institutionalization of policies occurs when “social processes, obligations, or actualities come to
take on a rulelike status in social thought and action” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 341).
Institutionalized rules are often built into society (Berger & Luckmann, 1967) and supported by
either public opinion or law (Starbuck, 1976). Conformity to institutionalized rules can conflict
with efficiency and in some cases undermine the organization’s structure and activities (Meyer &
Rowan, 1977).
Each organization has a formal structure which serves as a blueprint for how it should
function. This functioning is directly linked to the goals and policies of the organization. While
there is often the belief that organizations follow their formal structures, this is not always the
case. Within an organization, there can be a marked difference between its formal structure and
the actual day-to-day activities that occur. Ultimately, rules may be broken and formal structures
can be ignored as long as there is the appearance of conformity with the organization’s stated
formal structure (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

4.1.1 Organizational Myths

Often, in order to conform to institutionalized rules, organizations create products,
techniques, and policies which function as myths that these organizations maintain. These myths
reflect the institutional environment, not necessarily the activities of the organization, and allow
it to exhibit ceremonial conformity to institutionalized rules while building gaps between
structures and activities. Institutional myths usually have two main properties. The first property
is that they identify social purposes that organizations should treat as technical, and thus specify
appropriate methods of pursuing them. Secondly, myths become highly institutionalized and in
most cases become beyond the discretion of the organization (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
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Ultimately, these myths are used by those within organizations to create symbolic meaning that
can be easily digested by the outside world as well as providing the basis for an organization’s
culture (Pettigrew, 1979).
Eventually, these myths become institutionalized and lead to institutional isomorphism.
Institutional isomorphism promotes the survival of an organization by allowing the organization
to remain successful according to societal definitions. Institutional isomorphism occurs when
organizations incorporate elements that are legitimated externally and organizations use external
assessments to outline the value of their structure (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Institutional
isomorphism allows organizations to obtain institutional legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1987)
by resulting in an organization’s dependence on externally fixed institutions thereby reducing
tensions and providing for greater organizational stability (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

4.1.2 Organizational Legitimacy

Institutional theory can also be used to address how organizations come to be viewed as
legitimate. Organizational legitimacy is increasingly important in society, as legitimacy ensures
continued support of an organization (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). Organizational legitimacy is
largely based on the conformity of organizations to social norms, values, and expectations
(Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). Performance and efficiency of organizations in achieving socially
acceptable goals is not as important as the views of an organization’s constituents when
conferring legitimacy (Perrow & Perrow, 1970). Legitimacy is based on the conformity of
organizations to accepted formal structures, which can be based on public opinion and legal
rulings (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). It can be difficult for organizations to conform to the social
values and expectations of constituents because different constituents may have conflicting
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values or expectations or values that evolve over time (Shocker & Sethi, 1974; Ashforth &
Gibbs, 1990).
There are two main ways that organizations can work towards obtaining legitimacy. The
first is through substantive management, whereby real, material change is undertaken by an
organization. Substantive management is largely based on role performance, in which
constituents of an organization trade their support in exchange for expected performance.
Substantive management also incorporates the concept of coercive isomorphism, where
organizations seek legitimacy by conforming to the values, norms, and expectations of their
constituents. Coercive isomorphism is influential in determining why an organization exists and
how it should function (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). The second means of obtaining legitimacy,
symbolic management, occurs when organizations do not actually change structures or functions,
but instead appear to be consistent with social values and the expectations of constituents. Under
symbolic management, organizations may publically announce that they are following
acceptable goals, while in reality the organization is pursuing less acceptable goals behind closed
doors (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990).
There are several methods that organizations can use to symbolically conform to the
expectations and values of society and their constituents, including denial and concealment,
ceremonial conformity, and offering accounts (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). Denial and
concealment occurs when an organization suppresses information or activities that conflict with
the expectations of constituents and could thereby undermine legitimacy. Ceremonial conformity
occurs when organizations pretend to commit to the expectations of constituents; however, no
actual steps are taken. Under symbolic management and ceremonial conformity, organizations
may “formulate and publicize ethics policies but do not establish procedures for monitoring
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compliance or imposing sanctions” (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990: 180). This concept appears to
directly relate to the actions taken by the BSA in the late 1980s. Policies and procedures were
instituted which were designed to prevent child sexual abuse in accordance with larger society’s
call for action, with little attention paid to whether these policies were effective and little
oversight.
In addition to simply hiding unfavorable activities or procedures, organizations may also
rely on the use of accounts or apologies to either deny or minimize their responsibility. Accounts
are “explanations designed to remove one from a situation that may reflect unfavorably on one’s
image or claims to legitimacy” (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990: 181). The use of excuses and
justifications by organizations to preserve legitimacy are similar to those outlined by Sykes and
Matza (1957) when explaining deviant behavior. Ultimately, unfavorable outcomes resulting
from the failure of an organization to substantively conform to societal and consistent
expectations are attributed to external or uncontrollable causes. In this instance, the use of
justifications that blame outside causes is a useful tool in reducing negative consequences
(Bettman & Weitz, 1983). Ultimately, once legitimacy is obtained it is largely taken for granted
until it is challenged.
4.2 Organizational Stigma and Culture

There are many reasons why organizations may be unwilling to openly address child
sexual abuse occurring within their ranks. This may include fear of stigmatization of the
organization resulting from allegations of CSA by its staff or volunteers. While stigma has been
widely applied to individuals in both the sociological and criminological literature, more
recently, the concept of stigma has been applied to organizations. Organizational stigma applies
to both individuals within the organization and the organization itself, explaining how society
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views the organization, but also how organizations view themselves (Devers, Dewett, Mishina,
Belsito, 2009).
Organizational stigma is an important issue to consider, especially when addressing
institutional responses to child sexual abuse, as organizational victims of stigmatization can lose
both legitimacy and reputation in society. Organizations which are stigmatized as a result of
criminal behavior by its members may face disruption to its cohesiveness, effectiveness and
morale (Paetzold, Dipboye, & Elsbach, 2008).
The organizational culture may also impact an organization’s response to allegations of
abuse. While analyses of organizations have addressed the extent to which factors like gender,
sexuality, and violence influence an organization’s culture, little research has addressed how the
apparent culture distinct to the Boy Scouts of America influenced their response to allegations of
sexual abuse. Perhaps one of the greatest factors influencing an organization’s response to
allegations of sexual abuse by its members is financial liability and fear of resulting criminal
prosecution.
4.3 Organizational Change
While Meyer and Rowan suggest that societal values and expectations and legislation can
play a role in changing organizational structures, a large body of research exists outlining the
resistance of organizations to change (Agocs, 1997). Research suggests that many times
organization resist change because these changes represent threats to their values or beliefs or
merely because of their desire not to change (Tichy, 1983). Resistance to change is often seen as
being institutionalized and a central part of the organization’s structures and processes of
legitimization. Organizations can exercise their decision to change or not in numerous ways,
including:

56

decisions to provide or withhold resources, to adopt a new policy or change an
established one, or to implement or refuse to implement a policy. Such decisions
presuppose the power to command organizational resources, including…the authority to
act or to choose not to act, and the power to legitimate or to silence the voices of those
who advocate change. (Agocs, 1997, pg. 918).
This research suggests that organizational change may not be changed solely by the
passage of legislation or views of constituents. In the case of mandatory reporting of child sexual
abuse, legislation requiring individuals who have interaction with children to report, and
resulting policies for organizations serving children, may not have resulted in actual change.
Instead, mandatory reporting may function as an indirect force of change, whereby organizations
such as the BSA only undertook real, meaningful change after lawsuits were filed based on their
failure to conform to this legislation. In this sense, organizational change may be more the result
the consequences of failing to conform to mandatory reporting laws, and less a result of the
passage of these laws to begin with.
4.4 Formal versus Informal Sanctions

While traditional criminological research focuses on the use of formal and informal
sanctions as deterrents to criminal behavior, this research does not usually address why informal
or formal sanctions may be preferred by organizations dealing with deviant behavior. Studies
have addressed the difference between formal (i.e. management) and informal (i.e. co-worker)
sanctions on employee deviance and the deterrent effect of these types of sanctions (Hollinger &
Clark, 1982), however, they have not addressed why an agency may choose to rely on informal,
formal, or both types of sanctions.
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In this case, formal sanctions are considered the referral of offenders to law enforcement,
while informal sanctions are considered all actions taken by the Boy Scouts of America in which
the offender is removed from service, referred to mental health treatment, or no action is taken
by the BSA. Figure 1, a decision tree outlining the formal and informal options used by the BSA
when responding to allegations of child sexual abuse, can be found below.
Figure 1: Formal and Informal Responses

Ultimately, it is important to understand why the BSA favor informal or formal sanctions,
and if and how different CSA allegations impact their decision. It is very possible that the
organizational culture of the Boy Scouts of America and the organization’s desire to conform to
societal expectations has a greater impact on which type of sanction is used than the
characteristics of abuse.
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4.5 Institutional Responses and Rationalization Tactics

Based on a preliminary analysis of the case files released, the response by the Boy Scouts
of America to allegations of sexual abuse took numerous forms. These included ignoring
allegations, removal of the offender from the organization, referral of the alleged perpetrator to
mental health services, and/or reporting the allegation to law enforcement. In order to understand
the actions taken by the BSA when responding to allegations of child sexual abuse, it is also
important to address the underlying justifications and rationalizations used by the organization
when taking action towards offenders. As noted by Meyer and Rowan, under symbolic
management organizations often ceremonially conform to the formal structures and policies they
claim to be following. As part of this ceremonial conformity, organizations may deny or conceal
the discrepancy between their stated formal structure and the actions taken by the organization,
or offer accounts to justify their failure to implement these formal structures. The use of
techniques of neutralization (rationalization tactics) as applied to organizational behavior and
corruption is used to provide substantive examples of how the BSA may have denied, concealed,
or justified their behavior when responding to allegations of sexual abuse against members.
Techniques of neutralization, which are more commonly applied to criminal behavior at
the individual level, can also be used to address deviant behavior in general and could shed light
on how the organization reacted to allegations of abuse. Sutherland (1949), when studying whitecollar crime, argued that corporate misdeeds were in fact more harmful than street crime because
they were the result of actions of numerous individuals, not just one, and because they corroded
society’s trust in authorities and institutions. Corrupt acts can be defined as the “misuse of
authority for personal, subunit and/or organizational gain” in which misuse refers to the violation
of social norms and values (Ashforth & Anand, 2003, p.2).
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Corruption and deviance occurs within all organizations. When addressing organizational
deviance, the major questions posed center on how much corruption is occurring and how it can
be identified. Corruption within organization often requires the cooperation of numerous
individuals, individuals who are otherwise considered upstanding members of the community. In
order for corruption to occur while still maintaining the overall moral integrity of the
organization rationalization and socialization practices are sometimes undertaken by
organizations (Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2005).
Corruption can often become institutionalized or normalized in organizations, especially
when collective corruption or acts that require the cooperation of two or more individuals occur.
Ashforth and Anand (2003) note that three processes contribute to normalization of deviant
actions in an organization: institutionalization, rationalization, and socialization. The
institutionalization process occurs through three processes, the initial decision to act, embedding
the corruption in the structures and processes of the organization, and routinizing the corruption
(Ashforth & Anand, 2003). Institutionalization also occurs through the process of embedding
corrupt practices into an organization’s organizational memory. Organizational memory is the
process undertaken by an organization to acquire information about how to act and store this
knowledge for use in future situations (Anand, Manz, & Glick, 1998). If a corrupt act results in a
positive outcome, this act can ultimately be committed to organizational memory and repeated in
the future (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). Past acts are often routinely repeated because there is the
assumption that these actions were based on rational reasons and following the precedent set by
these actions legitimates current decisions (Henisz & Delios, 2001).
There is little research on the justifications used by organizations to rationalize their
behavior. However, the seminal work in this field by Ashforth & Anand (2003) notes that while
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organizational members involved in deviance may acknowledge that their behavior and the
behavior of the organization may conflict with societal norms, rationalizations are often used to
deny any criminal intent. In the case of organizational deviance, “rationalizations often capitalize
on the inherent complexity, ambiguity, and dynamism that pervade organizations” (Anand,
Ashforth, & Joshi, 2005, p.11). Eight types of rationalizations have been identified as accounts
used by organizations to normalize deviant or corrupt acts (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). While
Sykes and Matza’s (1957) techniques of neutralization occur prior to the criminal act,
rationalization tactics occur after the act (Green, 1997). In addition, Ashforth and Anand
modified the techniques of neutralization, changing them from explanations of individual
behavior to justifications for behavior at the organizational level. Rationalizations two through
six were originally identified by Sykes and Matza (1957) and have since been applied to
organizational behavior. These rationalizations include:
1) Legality;
2) Denial of Responsibility;
3) Denial of Injury;
4) Denial of Victim;
5) Social Weighting;
6) Appeal to Higher Loyalties;
7) Metaphor of the Ledger; and
8) Refocusing Attention.

The legality rationalization is fairly straightforward, as organizations claim that the
actions they are taking are not actually illegal. Thus, while they may violate social norms and
values, they are not actions that can be punished formally. Denial of responsibility relies on the
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claim that organizations/organizational members had no other course of action due to forces
beyond their control. Under denial of responsibility, organizations may also claim that the
organization and its members are morally responsible, but forced into unethical acts (Anand,
Ashforth, & Joshi, 2005). Under the denial of injury rationalization, organizations claim that no
individual was really harmed, thus eliminating any feelings of guilt or responsibility resulting
from deviant acts (Ashforth & Anand, 2003).
Denial of the victim has also been used to rationalize deviant acts by organizations.
Denial of the victim relies on the belief that victims deserved their victimization, or they were a
cooperating participant (Greenberg, 1998; Ashforth & Anand, 2003). For example, senior
officials in the U.S. Catholic Church argued that victims of CSA by priest often invited the
sexual advances of priests (Globe, 2003).
Social weighting (originating from Sykes and Matza’s condemnation of the condemners)
occurs when organizations question the legitimacy of those who call an act deviant or corrupt.
Under this rationalization, organizations may argue that a law is vague, complex, or rarely
enforced, and thus it cannot be used to condemn their actions. Social weighting also relies on
selective comparisons, during which organizations compare themselves to others who have
undertaken substantively worse actions in order to make their actions appear much less deviant
by comparison (Ashforth & Anand, 2003).
Appeal to higher loyalties argues that universalistic ethical norms sometimes have to be
sacrificed for higher or more important causes. This rationalization is often used to support the
claim that the ends justify the means (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). The metaphor of the ledger was
a rationalization identified by Klockars (1974) in which the good works committed by an
organization are used to offset any deviant behavior that has occurred. Under this rationalization,
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organizations are thought to have balanced their ledger, with the good acts committed by the
organization outweighing any deviant acts that may have occurred. The final rationalization,
refocusing attention, shifts focus from the stigmatized or deviant behavior or features of an
organization to more appropriate ones (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999). During the Catholic Church
scandal, attention was refocused through the removal of priests who had allegations of abuse
against them to other parishes (Globe, 2003).
Organizations rely on these rationalization tactics to eliminate the guilt or responsibility
for deviant/corrupt acts. In order for organizations to continue to use these rationalizations for
their behavior though, socialization of current and new organization members into deviant
practices must take place. Ultimately, socialization into corrupt practices occurs through cooptation (rewarding corrupt behavior), incrementalism (the gradual induction of new
organization members into corruption, and compromise (individuals engage in corruption
unknowingly) (Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2005).
Rationalization tactics and socialization procedures allow organizations to eliminate
responsibility and guilt resulting from deviant actions. However these behaviors are not isolated
from the culture of the organization and larger environment in which it functions. Some scholars
argue that corruption is a result of a larger permissive ethical climate at the societal or
organizational level (Brief, Buttram, & Dukerich, 2001). In fact, some factors of the
organization’s environment can enhance the likelihood that rationalization tactics are employed
by its members.
In order for corruption to occur, organizations can often develop a “social cocoon”. A
social cocoon is a “mirco culture created within a group where the norms may be very different
from those valued by society or even the wider organization” (Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2005,

63

p.16). The social cocoon allows the organization to compartmentalize its behavior from the
judgment of the outside society. Ultimately, the deviant culture within the organization can
normalize, and in some cases value, the corruption that occurs (Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert,
1994).
Sykes and Matza (1957) note that there are justifications for delinquent behavior, which
the individual, or in this case organization, may view as valid, but which the legal system or
larger society would view as inappropriate and criminal. In this case, rationalizations, including
denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of the victim, social weighting, appeal to higher
loyalties, metaphor of the ledger, and refocusing attention could explain the reaction of the BSA
to institutional child sexual abuse. Ultimately, rationalization and socialization tactics mediate
the tension between social norms and values and corrupt/deviant practices by organizations
(Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2005).
The BSA may have used several of the rationalization tactics mentioned above as a way
of avoiding stigmatization resulting from knowledge of child sexual abuse within its ranks and
maintaining the legitimacy of the organization. For example, the rationalization of refocusing
attention was used by simply removing individuals with allegations against them from service
without addressing the circumstances that led to the abuse. In addition, the removal of the
individual did not necessarily preclude them from serving in the BSA in a different BSA Council
or troop due to the ineffective nature of the organization’s ineligible members list. The use of the
rationalization tactics by the BSA could have been applied to the organization as a whole, or the
alleged abuser, as a means of justifying the action taken by the BSA. For example, under the
rationalization metaphor of the ledger, alleged abusers who served in the organization for long
periods of time and were assets to the organization could result in longer response times or less
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severe actions by the BSA. The BSA response could be due to the belief that the good the
alleged abuser did for the organization outweighed the reported instance of deviant behavior. The
aim of this dissertation was in part to assess which rationalizations were most apparent in the
responses of the BSA to allegations of child sexual abuse by members. This knowledge may be
used to ensure the accountability of youth serving organizations, while also better informing
youth protection policies.
Techniques of neutralization and rationalization tactics have been operationalized in
numerous different ways. Sykes and Matza’s (1957) techniques have been applied to deer
poaching (Elliason & Dodder, 1999), genocide (Alvarez, 1997), trafficking of women
(Antonopoulos & Winterdrk, 2005), abortion (Brennan, 1974), and shoplifting (Cromwell &
Thurman, 2003) among other things. Similarly, rationalization tactics used to normalize or
eliminate guilt have been operationalized to measure corporate corruption (Rabl & Kuhlmann,
2009) and organizational corruption (Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2005; Ashforth & Anand, 2003).
In each of these studies, the techniques of neutralization or rationalization tactics were measured
differently. A table listing how these techniques were operationalized in each study can be found
in Appendix B. While studies of rationalization tactics have outlined how these tactics could be
operationalized, the majority of these studies are theoretical in nature and do not provide
empirical examination of the measures. The current study applies the operationalizations offered
by Ashforth & Anand (2003) and Rabl & Kuhlmann (2009), although modified to apply to
BSA’s response to allegations of child sexual abuse, in order to provide support for these
empirical indicators of rationalization tactics.
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Chapter 5: Abuse Allegations in the Boy Scouts of America
This chapter examined the overarching patterns of abuse allegations against BSA
members, with special attention paid to the disclosure and reporting of abuse to answer the first,
second, and third research questions. These research questions asked 1) what are the
characteristics of abusers and abuse incidents in the BSA; 2) How did the BSA learn of abuse
and to whom did victims first disclose abuse; and 3) did the response of the BSA to allegations
of sexual abuse differ across council region. This chapter also tested several hypotheses as listed
below:
H1a) The majority of abuse incidents reported to the BSA featured older abusers who
hold a higher position of authority with children, such as assistant scoutmaster or
scoutmaster.
H1b) The majority of abuse incidents reported to the BSA were isolated abuse incidents
featuring some form of unclothed or clothed physical contact, but not explicit sexual
contact.
H2a) The majority of abuse allegations were made in person, rather than through phone
calls or letters sent to scouting officials.
H2b) The majority of victims first disclosed abuse to their parents, not the BSA.
H2c) In the majority of cases, the BSA was more likely to handle cases informally
through internal removal from the organization rather than through the use of formal
methods such as referral to law enforcement or referral to mental health treatment.
H3) The response of BSA officials to allegations of CSA against organization members
differed across council regions.
Due to the exploratory nature of this study, it is important to first gain a greater
understanding of the characteristics of abusers and abuse incidents in the BSA as well as how the
BSA first learned of allegations against BSA agents. In addition, this chapter addressed question
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three by examining the BSA’s response to abuse allegations across regions to determine if
significant differences existed in the time it took the BSA to respond. This chapter features a
section on the methods used, a results section, and a detailed discussion of the relevant findings.
5.1 Method
5.1.1 Variables
Dependent Variables
This dissertation featured numerous quantitative techniques, and as such had several
dependent variables. The time from reported abuse to removal was calculated by counting the
number of days between when abuse was first reported to the BSA and when the BSA created
the confidential file on the individual thereby removing them from the organization. This
variable was also recoded into a binary variable indicating if it took less than one year or more
than one year to remove the individual from the organization. In order to address the response
taken by the BSA, a categorical variable was created measuring the BSA action taken, featuring
the categories referral to law enforcement, referral to mental health treatment, and removal from
the organization. This variable was also recoded as a binary variable measuring whether informal
or formal action was taken by the BSA. When recoding the variable, referral to law enforcement
and referral to mental health treatment were both recoded as formal action while removal from
the organization was recoded as informal action. It was the decision of the researcher to include
referral to mental health organizations as a formal action because the decision of the BSA to
refer the offender for treatment resulted in informing individuals outside of the organization as to
the allegations made against the BSA agent. Finally, the number of reports made against BSA
members each month was created.
Independent Variables
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This study featured several independent variables. These variables were grouped into two
main categories: characteristics of the offender and characteristics of the abuse.
Characteristics of the Offender
Several variables measuring characteristics of the offender were obtained from the case
files. The age of the accused and the length of time serving as a BSA agent were measured both
in years. For each offender, a binary variable indicating whether they engaged in other types of
nonsexual criminal behavior was also created. In addition, a binary variable measuring whether
an offender committed sexual abuse prior to joining the BSA was included. Variables measuring
whether the offender was married (Y/N) and how many children the offender had at the time of
the allegation were also included. A measure indicating whether the offender tried to reregister
with the BSA (Y/N) after being placed on the confidential file was also included. Finally, the
role of the abuser in the BSA (scoutmaster, assistant scoutmaster, boy scout professional etc.)
was measured.

Characteristics of abuse
Characteristics of the abuse incident include the length of abuse measured in months and
number of victims. The length of abuse was calculated using the first and last known date on
which abuse occurred. This measure did not necessarily indicate that abuse was continuous
during this time period, but rather indicated the duration of the abuser’s offending history. In
addition, when available the age of victim was included. A categorical variable featuring 20
categories, such as photos, sexual games, and masturbation, measuring the type of abusive
behavior and a condensed five value variable were also included with the categories explicit
sexual relations, physical contact, unclothed physical contact, other, and no record. In addition,
this variable was recoded into a binary variable measuring whether explicit sexual relations
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occurred or some form of clothed physical or verbal contact. For each case, binary variables
were created indicating whether the abuse that occurred was incest and whether the victim was a
boy scout or child outside of the BSA organization. For all cases, information about the initial
disclosure of abuse and how it was reported to the BSA was included. Initial disclosure, a 13
category variable, indicated to whom abuse was first disclosed (parent, child, other BSA
member, etc.). In addition, a categorical variable measuring how abuse was reported to the BSA
was created. For each case, two variables recording the location of the council the alleged abuser
served were recorded. One measured the location by state, while the other measured the location
using four regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). Please refer to the BSA Codebook in
Appendix C for detailed information about how all key variables were measured.
5.1.2 Analytic Technique
Univariate (frequency distributions) were used to characterize the sample, the
overarching patterns of reports of offending in the BSA, as well as the response of the BSA
administration when addressing child sexual abuse allegations. In addition, descriptive statistics
were used to provide a larger picture of the patterns of abuse incidents reported to the BSA,
including features such as the number of victims, type of sexual abuse, status of the alleged
abuser within the organization, and length of abuse.
Chi-square statistics were used to determine if an association existed between the BSA’s
use of formal and informal responses and the categorical independent variables. In addition, chisquare statistics using the binary measure of how long it took to create a file were also
conducted. The chi-square statistics compared observed frequencies across categorical variables
to the expected frequencies if there was no association between the variables. Chi-square
statistics are only appropriate when variables are categorical with mutually exclusive and
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exhaustive categories. In instances where the chi-square test was significant, the appropriate
effect test (Phi or Cramer’s V) was used to determine the strength of the association between the
variables.
In addition to chi-square, a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was used to determine if
there was a significant difference between the four regions where abuse allegations were made
and the time it took the BSA to respond. Analysis of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality
revealed that the distributions of the three regions were not normal. The Levene’s test was not
significant, indicating that the Kruskal-Wallis test was appropriate. A traditional one-way
ANOVA test was not appropriate for the current analyses because the dependent variable (time
to creation of the file), did not meet the normality assumption required. Instead, the KruskalWallis test was used. This test is a non-parametric test, indicating that it does not assume a
normal distribution of the dependent variable. While the Kruskal-Wallis test can be used to
measure the association between a nominal and continuous variable, the test can only be
performed on ranked data. When using a continuous level variable, the original values must be
converted to ranked values. For example, the lowest value is ranked as 1, the second lowest
value ranked as 2, and so on. Information is lost when converting original values to ranked
values, which can sometimes make it a less powerful test than a one-way ANOVA. In addition,
many argue that a one-way ANOVA test is not very sensitive to deviations in normality, and thus
could be used in place of the Kruskal-Wallis (Khan & Rayner, 2003). As such, both a traditional
one-way ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis test were run and results were compared.
5.2 Results
In order to simplify the presentation of results, descriptive statistics are presented in three
tables. Table 1 presents descriptives for the dependent variables used throughout the dissertation,
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while Tables 2 and 3 present descriptive statistics for characteristics of the abuser and
characteristics of the abuse incident, respectively.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables (N=2379)
Mean/Percent
Stand Dev.
Time-to-removal (days)
147.86
539.61
Number of reports per month
5.99
5.96
Formal vs. Informal Response
Formal
4.7%
Informal
95.1%
-

Min-Max
0-10439
0-32
-

% Missing
8.9
0
.2

Table 1 above presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables used
throughout the dissertation. When measuring the time it took the BSA to respond to allegations
of sexual abuse against organization members, the average time it took was 147.86 days, or
roughly five months, from the BSA’s initial discovery of possible abuse to their creation of a file
for the individual on their list of Ineligible Volunteers. In some instances, it took the BSA less
than a day to create a file on the individual, while in the longest instance it took them almost 29
years. The data also measured the number of reports received each month, from November 1959
until November 1991. An average of approximately six reports were filed each month, with some
months experiencing no reports, and other featuring as many as 32 reports of allegations against
BSA agents. Finally, the data provided information about whether an informal or formal
response was taken by the BSA in regards to abuse allegations. An informal response indicated
that the BSA handled the report through internal channels, including internal investigations and
removal from the organization. Formal methods of addressing reported allegations included
referral of the individual to mental health services or referral to law enforcement from
prosecution. These categories were both considered formal responses because they required the
BSA to admit the possibility of abuse by one of their members to individuals outside of the
organization. Overall, 95 percent of the files only featured informal responses by the BSA, while
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4.7 percent featured either referral of the individual to law enforcement or mental health
treatment.
The next table, Table 2 below, presents descriptive statistics of characteristics of the
offenders in the data coded from the BSA’s confidential files. The average age of offenders was
35.5, although some offenders were as young as ten and one offender was 77 years old. When
data was available, it was determined that on average alleged offenders had been in the
organization for roughly five years. Some offenders had served in the organization for less than
one year, while others had served as many as 42 years in the organization. While the majority of
offenders, 53.4 percent, did not have a child, of those who did, the average was approximately
one child. The majority of individuals, 56.3 percent, were not married at the time allegations
were made against them.
As part of the data collection, the files were coded for evidence that the offender had tried
to re-register with the organization after allegations had been brought to the BSA’s attention.
While the majority, 66.6 percent, did not attempt to re-register, 13.9 percent did attempt
registration in the organization. Most often, this registration attempt occurred after they were
placed on the confidential file list. In some cases though, offenders moved from one location to
another, prior to the BSA’s closing of their case file, and successfully registered in another troop.
The majority of individuals served as either a Scoutmaster in the organization (34.4 percent) or a
BSA professional (33.4 percent). BSA professionals included positions such as Camp Directors,
Regional and Local Scouting Executives, and Committee Members. The distribution of reports
across the four regions was similar, 22.5 percent of reports occurring in the Northeast, 22.7
percent of reports in the West, 26.1 percent of reports in the Midwest, and 26 percent of reports
in the South. The percentage of reports unaccounted for occurred in areas outside of the US.
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While all of the files featured some allegation of sexual abuse against a BSA member, 20.5
percent of the files also featured some form of nonsexual criminal behavior committed by the
individual. This included allegations that the individual provided alcohol or illegal substances, or
evidence of other types of criminal behavior (both current and past convictions), such as theft,
weapons charges, kidnapping, and fraud. In addition, 18.6 percent of files featured evidence that
the abuser had convictions for sexual abuse against children prior to joining the organization.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Characteristics of the Offender (N=2379)
Mean/Percent Stand. Dev. Min-Max
Age (years)
35.5 (11)
11
10-77
Length of BSA Registration (years)
4.9 (6.2)
6.2
0-42
Children
.8
1.4
0-11
Binary Child
No
53.4%
Yes
29.3%
Reregister Attempt
No
66.6%
Yes
13.9%
Abuser’s Role in BSA
Scoutmaster
34.4%
Assistant Scoutmaster
18.5%
BSA Professional
33.4%
Other
4.6%
Nonsexual Criminal Behavior
Yes
20.5%
No
70.4%
Abuse pre BSA
Yes
18.6%
No
57.2%
Married
Yes
35%
No
56.3%
Region
Midwest
26.1%
Northeast
22.5%
West
22.7%
South
26%
-

% Missing
2.4
39.7
17.4
17.4
19.5
9.1

9.1
24.3
8.7
1.7

Table 3 below presents the final set of descriptives for the sample, focusing specifically on
characteristics of the abuse incident. On average, the abuser’s offending period lasted about two
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years, although in extreme cases abuse was reported to have lasted for up to 32 years. Most
allegations suggested the offender had victimized three children, although some allegations
named as many as 100 children victimized by the individual. The average age of victims was
twelve years old, although in some instances older victims were also present. Roughly 14 percent
of allegations featured female victims. It is important to note that these female victims could
have been youth outside of scouting, or girls within the BSA program. In 1969, girls were
allowed to participate in the BSA’s Explorer Scout program for older boys (15-21) as nonregistered members. In 1971, their participation was expanded to fully registered members.
Approximately 40 percent of reports featured more than three abuse incidents while the
rest reported one to three abuse incidents. When discussing the type of abuse, the majority of
reports, 49.4 percent, indicated that some form of sexual abuse occurred, but did not specify the
type of sexual abuse. Twenty percent featured explicit sexual contact, such as penetration of
some type, masturbation, or coerced group sex. The next largest category of abuse was touching,
15 percent. This included both clothed and unclothed touching of the victim or forcing the victim
to touch the abuser. Other types of abuse, such as taking photos of the victim, sexual games, or
verbal abuse, comprised 13.8 percent of allegations. Less than one percent of reports featured the
offender showing the victim some form of pornography. Drug or alcohol use by either the victim
or the offender were not common in the reports, with only 4.4 percent featuring alcohol or drug
use by the victim and 3.8 percent featuring alcohol or drug use by the offender. The majority of
reports did not feature allegations of incest. Scout related offenses made up the majority of
reports, 63 percent.
Reports were also coded for information about who the victim initially disclosed their
abuse to. The majority of victims, 21.1 percent, first disclosed their abuse to their parent or
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guardian. In 6.9 percent of cases, the victim disclosed their abuse to a member of the BSA
organization, while in 9.3 percent of reports they disclosed to other individuals, such as teachers,
friends, or clergy. In only three percent of cases did the victim first disclose their abuse to the
police. In 15.2 percent of cases, the police informed the BSA of allegations of child sexual abuse
made against a BSA member. While the police only reported allegations of abuse to the BSA in
15.2 percent of cases, in roughly 60 percent of cases the abuser was eventually criminally
charged. When determining the method used to inform the BSA of abuse incidents, the majority
of allegations, 17.9 percent, were made using a phone call. The second largest category, 13.8
percent, featured allegations reported in person. In 11.8 percent of cases the BSA were informed
of abuse allegations through media reporting, while in roughly equal percentages of cases (8.8
percent and 8.4 percent, respectively) the BSA learned of allegations by a letter or legal filing.
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Characteristics of the Abuse Incident (N=2379)
Length of Abuse (Years)
Number of Victims
Age of Victim
Female Victims
Yes
No
Number of Abusive Incidents
One to three times
More than three times
Type of Abuse
Explicit Sexual Contact
Touching
Pornography
Unspecified Sexual Abuse
Other
Incest
Yes
No
Scout Related Offense
Yes
No
Disclosure
Parent/Guardian
BSA Member
Police Officer
Doctor
Other Individuals
Police Reported Abuse to BSA
Yes
No
Abuser Charged
Yes
No
Victim used Drugs/Alcohol
No
Yes
Abuser used Drugs/Alcohol
Yes
No
Allegations Reported
Phone Call
Sent a Letter
In person
Media
Legal Filing
Others

Mean/Percent
1.8
3
12.2

Stand. Dev.
4.2
5.5
3.1

Min-Max
0-32
0-100
1-32

13.6%
69.5%

-

-

37.2%
38.9%

-

-

20.1%
15.1%
.9%
49.4%
13.8%

-

-

6.9%
86.8%

-

-

63%
28.1%

-

-

21.1%
6.9%
3%
.5%
9.3%

-

-

15.2%
76.3%

-

-

60.2%
37%

-

-

63.4%
4.4%

-

-

3.8%
62.9%

-

-

17.9%
8.8%
13.8%
11.8%
8.4%
2.6%

-

76

-

% Missing
84.9
34.5
81.7
16.9
23.8
.7

8.5
8.9
59.2

8.5
2.8
32.2
33.2
36.7

The above tables presented simple descriptives of the sample. To provide an indication of
the association between the independent variables and the dependent variables, chi-square
statistics were also run. Two sets of chi-square statistics were run, one featuring the dependent
variable of whether informal or formal action was taken by the BSA, while the other featured the
binary measure of the time it took the BSA to respond to allegations of child sexual abuse. This
binary measure split the data into reports that took one year or less and those that took more than
a year to elicit a finalized response by the BSA. The results for these chi-squares are presented in
Tables 4 and 5 below. When significant chi-square statistics were obtained, the appropriate
measure of association (Phi for 2x2 contingency tables and Cramer’s V for greater than 2x2)
were reported.
Table 4. Chi-Square Results of Formal or Informal Response by the BSA (N=2379)
Formal
Informal
χ2
Has Children
25.5%
36.2%
6.211**
Has Nonsexual Criminal Offense
37.9%
21.2%
23.801***
Abuse Pre BSA
27.8%
24.3%
.655
Married
27.6%
39.4%
9.702**
Female Victims
11.6%
16.9%
3.245†
One to Three Abuse Events
48.1%
49%
.037
Incest
4.3%
7.7%
2.860†
Scout Related
91.6%
67%
46.027***
Police Informed BSA
19.9%
16.3%
1.588
Charged
61.5%
62.1%
.023
Victim Used Drugs
9%
6.3%
1.297
Abuser Used Drugs
12.7%
5.2%
10.710**
Duty
9.727*
Scoutmaster
46.3%
37.1%
Assistant Scoutmaster
15.3%
20.7%
BSA Professional
31.1%
37.3%
Region
.588
Northeast
24.2%
22.9%
South
24.2%
26.6%
Midwest
27.4%
26.5%
West
23.2%
23%
†p<.10,*

P<.05, **P<.01, *** P<.000
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Analysis of the chi-square statistics revealed that there was a significant relationship
between whether the abuser had children and the BSA’s use of a formal or informal response, χ2
(1, N=1963) = 6.211, p < .01. While the chi-square suggested that there was a relationship, the
phi statistic (.056) indicated that this relationship was weak. Similarly, the chi-square was
significant for the relationship between the response taken by the BSA and whether they had
allegations of non-sexual offenses χ2 (1, N=2160) = 23.801, p < .000, however this relationship
was also weak (Phi=.105). The abuser’s marital status had a weak significant relationship with
the use of a formal or informal response χ2 (1, N=2169) = 9.702, p < .01, Phi=.067, as did
whether the abuser used drugs or alcohol χ2 (1, N=1588) = 10.710, p < .01, Phi=.082, and their
duty in the organization χ2 (1, N=2160) = 9.727, p < .05, Cramer’s V=.067. The BSA’s use of a
formal or informal response had the strongest relationship with the variable measuring if the
allegation of abuse was against a scout χ2 (1, N=2165) = 46.027, p < .000, Phi=.146. Although
not statistically significant, the relationship between the BSA’s use of a formal or informal
response and whether the victim was female or whether incest occurred approached significance.
Table 5 below presents the chi-square results when measuring the relationship between
independent variables and time it took the BSA to create a confidential record on the individual.
For these statistics, only two variables had a significant relationship to the length of time it took
the BSA to respond, whether the offender tried to re-register in the BSA and whether they had
been convicted for child sexual abuse prior to joining the organization. The relationship between
the time it took the BSA to respond and whether they tried to re-register was significant χ2 (1,
N=1735) = 5.706, p < .05, although this relationship was weak (Phi=.057). The relationship
between the time to response and whether the offender had a prior conviction was slightly
stronger χ2 (1, N=1649) = 12.315, p < .000, phi=.086. Although not significant, the chi-square
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statistics for whether the offender had nonsexual offenses, whether the allegation was scout
related, and the region in which the report occurred approached significance.
Table 5. Chi-Square Results of Time to Response by the BSA (N=2379)
One Year or Less More than One Year
Duty
Scoutmaster
38.7%
37.7%
Assistant
19.9%
21.4%
Scoutmaster
BSA Professional
37.1%
36.5%
Has Children
35.3%
36.8%
Re-Registered
17.1%
25.4%
Non-Sexual Offenses
22%
28.6%
Abuse Pre BSA
22.6%
36.6%
Married
37.9%
40.4%
Female Victims
15.6%
14.8%
One to Three Abuse Counts
48.5%
52.2%
Incest
6.6%
8.9%
Scout Related
70.4%
76.9%
Police Reported to BSA
16.5%
18.6%
Charged
61.2%
63.9%
Victim Used Drugs
6.6%
7.7%
Abuser Used Drugs
6%
6.9%
Region
Northeast
23.5%
20.2%
Midwest
26.4%
30.4%
South
26.7%
21.4%
West
22.5%
25.6%
†

χ2
.217

.097
5.706*
3.541†
12.315***
.341
.056
.687
1.270
2.956†
.501
.448
.197
.150
7.545†

p<.10,* P<.05, **P<.01, *** P<.000

The final analyses run is this chapter addressed whether the response of the BSA differed
across council regions. For this, a one way ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis test with the time to file
as the dependent variable and region as the independent variable were run. Results of both tests
suggested that there was no significant difference in the time it took the BSA to create a
confidential file across council regions (ANOVA: F (4, 2132) = 1.089, p=.360; Kruskal-Wallis:
χ2 (3, N=2116) = 1.171, p =.760).
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5.3 Discussion
This chapter examined the characteristics of the abuser and abuse incident of the sample
of BSA offenders in order to determine notable characteristics of allegations of abuse against
BSA members. In addition, this chapter addressed how the BSA learned of abuse allegations and
the patterns of disclosure of abuse incidents made by victims. Finally, the chapter examined
whether the BSA’s response to allegations of child sexual abuse against organization members
differed across council regions.
To answer the first research question, what the discernable characteristics of the abusers
and abuse incidents were, descriptive statistics and bivariate statistics were used. Hypothesis 1a
proposed that the majority of abuse incidents reported to the BSA featured older abusers with a
higher position in the BSA, such as scoutmaster or assistant scoutmaster. Results revealed that
the average BSA abuser was 35.5 years old, with 69.8 percent of abusers being under 40 years
old. When looking at the position held by the abuser in the organization, the majority 34.4
percent were Scoutmasters, but the second highest category of abusers were BSA professionals
(33.4 percent). These findings suggest partial support of the hypothesis. While abusers were not
necessarily older, they did appear to hold positions of higher authority with children in the
organization, such as a Scoutmaster. It was interesting to note that BSA professionals, who do
not necessarily have constant or unsupervised contact with scouts, had the second highest
percentage of allegations of abuse. This may suggest that the requirement for Youth Protection
training and application of these policies and procedures may not be equally enforced within the
organization. Training on youth protection policies is required for all volunteers in the program,
but this may not extend to BSA professionals such as committee members or scouting
executives. The failure of the BSA to extend its youth protection policies to all members of the
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organization suggests the organization’s desire to ceremonially conform to the expectations of
society in regards to youth protection. Under this ceremonial conformity, the BSA created
policies and procedures to protect youth that are either not fully enforced, or were not created
with careful thought on the strategies needed to ensure scouts are not victimized.
Hypothesis 1b argued that the majority of abuse incidents were isolated incidents
featuring some form of clothed or unclothed physical contact, but not explicit sexual contact.
Descriptives revealed that 37.2 percent of allegations reported one to three separate abuse
incidents. A further breakdown of this percentage shows that 17.8 percent of all files only
featured one abuse incident. The majority of cases, 49.4 percent, indicated that some type of
sexual abuse occurred, but did not provide accurate details of what type of abuse occurred. Of
those cases where this information was present, 20 percent featured explicit sexual contact, while
only 15 percent featured some type of clothed or unclothed physical contact. Hypothesis 1b was
partially supported because the majority of abuse incidents was isolated incidents, but in regards
to the type of abuse that occurred there is not support. While lack of information poses a
significant issue, those cases with detailed information suggest that the confidential files featured
more serious types of abuse. It is important to note, however, that those cases which only
mentioned that some form of sexual abuse occurred could feature explicit sexual contact or
clothed or unclothed physical contact.
The fact that so many cases did not feature specific information about the alleged type of
abuse does suggest a failure on the part of the BSA to appropriately investigate what abuse was
alleged to have occurred as part of their internal investigation of the events. While the BSA may
have claimed that investigations were being undertaken, the failure to determine what specific
abuse was alleged to have occurred suggests that these investigations were less rigorous than
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those outside of the organization may have expected. Under institutional theory, organizations
often create formal structures, policies, and procedures in line with the institutionalized rules and
regulations held by similar organizations; however adherence to these formal policies and
procedures can be symbolic (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In this instance, the BSA organization
claimed to be conducting internal investigations in line with what would be expected of them,
but in reality were doing the bare minimum to justify their response.
The second research question asked how the BSA learned of abuse allegations and who
the victims of this abuse first disclosed to. Hypothesis 2a stated that the majority of abuse
allegations were made in person to the BSA, rather than by phone calls or letters. This hypothesis
was not supported in the data because the majority of reports of child sexual abuse were reported
to the BSA via phone calls, not in person. While in person methods were not the most popular
method of informing the BSA, they were the second most popular methods. This finding could
be an indication of the individual reporting the abuse to the BSA. For example, parents or
individuals outside of the organization may rely more on phone calls or other methods of alerting
the BSA to possible sexual abuse allegations, while BSA members may be the most likely to
report their suspicions in person. The reliance of BSA members on more in-person methods of
reporting abuse allegations could function as a method of concealment of improper behavior by
the organization and its members. Reporting using phone calls or letters posed the potential risk
that an unintended party would learn of the abuse, while reporting in person ensured only the
intended party was informed and eliminated any paper trail. Reporting the allegations in person
would have allowed the reporting member and BSA officials to discuss the extent to which the
allegation warranted formal action or investigation, all while underlining the importance to
proceed cautiously so as not to bring undue attention to the allegations or alert the public to
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possible issues of child safety within the BSA.
The second hypothesis for question two argued that the majority of victims would
disclose their abuse to their parents, and not BSA members. This hypothesis was supported by
the data as 21.2 percent of victims first disclosed their abuse to their parent or guardian. This
finding is in line with prior research finding that victims of child sexual abuse usually first
disclose to an immediate family member or extended family member (Bradley &Wood, 1996).
This finding could indicate that youth may have viewed other BSA organization members as an
extension of the offender and were concerned with whether their claim would be taken seriously
or result in negative consequences for the offender. Research often suggests that fear of not being
believed (Goodman-Brown, Edelstein, Goodman, Jones, & Gordon, 2003) and fear that they will
be judged negatively are significant factors influencing the disclosure of child sexual abuse by
victims (Berliner & Conte, 1995; Gomes-Schwartz et al., 1990). In the case of the BSA, scouts
may have been even less likely to disclose to BSA members because of these fears and concern
about whether other organization members would believe allegations about a fellow BSA
member. In addition, the fear that their disclosure of abuse could result in their removal from the
troop or ostracization by other scouts likely played a role in determining who they first disclosed
to.
The final hypothesis for question two proposed that in the majority of cases, the BSA
were more likely to handle cases informally through internal removal from the organization,
rather than through the use of formal methods such as referral to law enforcement or mental
health treatment. This hypothesis was fully supported by the data as 95 percent of the reports
indicated that the BSA relied solely on informal methods to responds to allegations of abuse.
Only in 4 percent of files did the BSA refer the individual to law enforcement and in less than
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one percent of cases was the individual referred for mental health treatment.
An important part of an organization’s functioning is maintaining organizational
legitimacy as this ensures the continued support of the public (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990).
Dowling & Pfeffer (1975), note that organizations achieve legitimacy by conforming to society’s
values and expectations of the organization. In the case of the BSA, the organization’s founding
and first stated goals led society to view the organization and its members to be providing order,
discipline, and character building to young boys and men by teaching them the value of honor,
duty, and integrity (Mechling, 2004). The BSA’s apparent refusal to rely on formal methods of
responding to allegations of sexual abuse by members, and thereby limiting the number of nonorganization members aware of the allegations, appears to have been the method chosen by the
organization to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of society. Had the larger public been aware of
the number of allegations made against organization members, the legitimacy with which the
organization was viewed would surely have been damaged. In addition, in order to avoid the
stigma of being an organization allowing for or characterized by the sexual abuse of its youth
members, the BSA chose to hide allegations of child sexual abuse by members rather than report
these to law enforcement and risk their reputation or the support of American society.
Chi-square statistics testing the relationship between the organization’s use of informal or
formal responses and relevant independent variables did provide some interesting findings.
Whether the offender was married, had children, had evidence of non-sexual offenses, used
alcohol or drugs, their duty within the organization, and if the allegation was against a scout were
all found to have a significant, although weak relationship, with the type of response used. As
stated previously in the discussion, a major part of an organization’s legitimacy is the ability for
it to conform to societal standards and the formal structure that it has created. When the BSA
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organization was originally developed, it was created on the premise that young men were losing
their masculinity, and traditional values and ways of living needed to be upheld. Throughout the
organization’s lifetime, and especially from the 1960s to the 1980s, the traditional values that it
was originally based on, such as the importance of marriage and family and more puritanical
views on sexual behavior and the use of drugs and alcohol, were threatened by changing societal
norms and values (Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001; Turiel, 2002).
In response to these changing norms, the only recourse available to the BSA was to
uphold the importance of these ideals and values within their organization. This could be used to
explain why the BSA responded differently to allegations of abuse against individuals based on
their marital status, whether they had children, their use of alcohol or drugs, and their position in
the organization. Theoretically, a BSA member who was alleged to have victimized a youth yet
who was married with children, was not accused of using drugs or alcohol, and held a higher
position in the organization may have been viewed very differently than a similar unmarried
individual who did use drugs or alcohol and held a lower position. Because the former example
abuser conformed to the BSA’s ideals regarding marriage, family, and appropriate behavior, and
they had already earned the respect of the organization in the form of higher positions, the BSA
may have been less likely to believe allegations of abuse against these individuals and more
likely to give them the benefit of the doubt. In addition, by taking this stance, the BSA was
reiterating the importance of the founding principles of the organization and in effect reaffirming
the organization’s support of these traditional ideals and values.
Finally, the last research question addressed in the current chapter, question three, asked
whether there were differences in the response taken by the BSA across council regions. Because
of the decentralized nature of the BSA organization, local troops have relative autonomy when
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dealing with issues within their council. Hypothesis three stated that the response of BSA
officials to allegations of CSA against organization members would differ across council
regions. Surprisingly, this hypothesis was not supported by the results of the different analyses.
Chi-square statistics testing the relationship between the region and binary measures of formal or
informal responses and response times of less than one year and more than one year were not
significant. In addition, one way ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis tests of the relationship between
regions and the time to creation of a confidential file were also not significant. This suggests that
the decentralized nature of the organization may not play as great a role in differing responses as
was first thought, and instead concerns such as maintaining organizational legitimacy and
avoiding the large-scale stigmatization of the organization may have been more relevant in
determining local council actions.
While this chapter explored the characteristics of abuse allegations within the
organization and how the BSA responded to these allegations, the next chapter dove deeper into
the question of why the BSA responded the way that they did and what factors may have
influenced their response and the speed with which their response was determined.
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Chapter 6: Time and Pattern Differentials between Disclosure of Abuse and Removal from
the Organization
This chapter examined the time and pattern differentials between when the Boy Scouts of
America learned about abuse allegations against BSA members and when the individual was
removed from the organization. The BSA kept a record of all members deemed inappropriate to
serve as volunteers on their list of Ineligible Volunteers, and used this list to cross-reference all
registration applications. Ultimately, this chapter addressed research question four which asks
what disciplinary measures were taken by the organization and whether characteristics about the
abuser or abuse incident influenced the time differentials between initial reporting of abuse and
placement on this list of ineligible volunteers. This chapter tested the following hypothesis:
H4a) The length of time the alleged abuser served in the organization and their position
within the organization results in a longer period of time between initial disclosure and
removal from the organization.

H4b) Offenders with histories of sexual abuse against children prior to joining the Boy
Scouts who then offended in the BSA were more likely to feature law enforcement
involvement than offenders who abused solely while members of the BSA and were
removed from the organization more quickly.

H4c) In cases where abuse incidents featured explicit sexual relations, the time between
initial disclosure and removal from the organization was shorter.

H4d) Cases featuring several victims and/or law enforcement involvement will result in a
shorter time period between initial disclosure and removal from the organization.

H4e) In cases where the alleged abuser was married or had children, the time between
initial disclosure and removal from the organization will be longer.
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The chapter featured a section on the methods used, a results section, and a detailed
discussion of the relevant findings.
6.1 Method
6.1.1 Variables
Dependent Variables
This chapter featured several different analyses which use two main dependent variables,
the time it took the BSA to create a confidential file for each individual and a binary measure of
whether the action taken by the BSA was formal or informal.
Independent Variables
This chapter also used several of the independent variables. Analyses were broken down
into two main types, those which featured characteristics of the abuse and those that featured
characteristics of the offender. For analyses featuring characteristics of the abuse, the following
independent variables were included. The age of the abusers was used, however this variable was
logged to normalize the distribution. The region in which the allegation and BSA response
occurred was also used. In the analysis, this variable was split into three dummy variables for the
South, West, and Midwest, with the Northeast as a reference category. A binary measure of the
type of abusive behavior that occurred was also used. This variable measured abusive behavior
as either explicit sexual contact, including behaviors such as penetration, masturbation, and
unclothed touching, and clothed verbal or physical contact, including such things as hugs and
kissing, verbal abuse, and the sharing of pornographic material. The number of times abusive
behavior occurred was also used. Because the continuous variable featured an extremely nonnormal distribution that could not be normalized through any form of transformation, a binary
variable measuring the number of abusive events as either one to three times and more than three
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times was used. Analyses also featured binary measures of whether a non-sexual offense
occurred, whether the alleged abuser had a history of other crimes, whether he had been charged
with sexual abuse prior to entering the Boy Scouts, and if the offender was formally charged by
the police. Binary measures of whether the abuser or victims used illegal substances (including
alcohol), if feminine victims were present, and whether multiple victims were presented were
also used. Binary measures of whether the alleged abuse had children and was married were also
included. For analyses addressing the characteristics of abuse, additional variables measuring
whether formal or informal action was taken, as well as whether the alleged abuse was scout
related were included. Dummy variables measuring the alleged offender’s duty in the
organization (BSA professional and Assistant Scoutmaster, with Scoutmaster as the reference
category) were also included. A binary variable measuring whether the police informed the BSA
of possible abuse within the organization was also included.
6.1.2 Analytic Technique
Survival Analysis
In order to address research question two and determine the factors influencing the length
of time between the organization’s discovery of the abuse and its eventual response, survival
analysis was employed. In the majority of files, information about the time series of abuse,
namely the time from when abuse was reported to the BSA to their placement in the ‘ineligible
files’ list and removal from service, was present. The time from reported abuse to removal was
calculated in days in order to accurately determine the time it took the BSA to respond to
allegations of abuse.
Survival analysis was used to analyze data where the outcome variable is the time to the
occurrence of a specific event. The dependent variable in survival analysis was split into two
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parts, the time to event and a status variable indicating whether the event of interest occurred. In
the present study, the dependent variable was the time to creation of a confidential file and a
status variable measuring whether the file was created. Survival analysis can also be used to
calculate that survival and hazard functions. Survival functions provide the probability of
surviving, or not experiencing the event of interest, at the specified time. In contrast, the hazard
function gives the potential that the event of interest will occur, given that an individual has
survived up until that time. Survival analysis can also be used to describe the relationship of a
factor of interest to the time to event (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & May, 2008).
When conducting survival analysis, it is important to determine how many cases are
either right or left-censored. Censoring can take the form of either right censoring or left
censoring and occurs when information about the complete survival time is not known. Right
censored data does not experience the event that is used to determine the survival time, while left
censored data does not feature the initial event of interest used to calculate the survival time. For
the current study, there is the possibility of both types of censoring; however left censoring is
more likely. Within the current data set, 72 cases (3 percent) were left censored, while 150 cases
(6.3 percent) were right censored. The small percentage of censoring did not pose a significant
challenge when conducting survival analysis. Comparisons of survival times between the
different duties held by the offender, whether the offense was scout related, whether the offender
was married or had children, whether multiple victims were present, whether the offender and a
prior history of child sexual abuse, whether explicit sexual contact occurred, whether abuse
events occurred less than or more than three times, and the region in which the allegation was
made were also conducted using the non-parametric Wilcoxon statistic. Due to the fact that all
individuals in the study had a file created by the BSA, it was not feasible to compare those
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individuals who did not have a file created and those individuals who did have a file created
using a Cox regression model.
Logistic Regression
Logistic regression was used to answer research question two. Logistic regressions were
run to determine which features of the abuse incident and the offender will increase or decrease
the odds that the BSA relied on informal or formal responses to allegations of abuse. Logistic
regression is a useful technique to use when analyzing a dichotomous dependent variable with
both binary and continuous independent variables. Traditional OLS regression was not
appropriate in these cases because the response variable is not measured at the ratio level and the
error terms are not normally distributed (Czepiel, 2002).
Logistic regression is used to predict the probability of an event occurring y given known
values of x and can be modeled using the following equation:
1

P (𝑦) = 1+e(𝑏0+𝑏1𝑋1 +𝑏2𝑋2 …𝑏𝑛𝑋𝑛)
Logistic regression has four main assumptions, namely that the dependent variable is
dichotomous, there are one or more independent variables, observations should be independent
and the dependent variable is mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and there is a linear
relationship between any continuous variables and the logit transformation of the dependent
variable. Logistic regression relies on maximum likelihood estimation to solve for parameters
that best fit the data based on finding a set of parameters for which the observed data is the
greatest (Czepiel, 2002). Logistic regression also allows for the interpretation of both log odds
and odds ratios (the exponentiated coefficient). Odds ratios can be used to compare the odds that
the event of interest will occur given exposure to the variables of interest (Szumilas, 2010). For
the current analyses, the odds ratios are reported.
91

Negative Binomial Regression
Finally, negative binomial regression was used to address the factors of the abuse
incident and the offender which influence how the BSA responded and the time it took them to
take disciplinary action. For this analysis, the dependent variable of interest was the length of
time it took the BSA to create a file on the Ineligible File list after the initial allegation report
was received. This variable represented a count variable, indicating the number of days it took
the BSA to respond to allegations of abuse. Count data should be viewed as discrete, and not
continuous, making traditional OLS regression inappropriate (Long, 1997). In this case, count
models, such as Poisson, should be used.
While Poisson regression can be used to model count data, this type of model has strict
requirements that most data usually do not meet. The most important of these, equidispersion of
data, maintains that the conditional variance is equal to the conditional mean. When this
assumption is not met, a negative binomial model should be considered. For the current analyses,
the conditional mean and variance were not equal, suggesting that a negative binomial model
should be used. Negative binomial models don’t require equidispersion, and thus can be used
when data are overdispersed (Long & Freese, 2006). When running negative binomial models,
the likelihood ratio test, which tests for overdispersion of the data, can be used to determine if a
negative binomial model provides a better fir for the data than a traditional Poisson model. If the
test is significant, this indicates that the negative binomial model is more appropriate. For each
of the models run, the likelihood ratio test was consulted to confirm the use of the negative
binomial model.
Before examining the results of the above analyses, some attention must be paid to the
issue of missing data within the current data set.
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Addressing Missing Data: Multiple Imputation Through Chained Equations
In the current study, missing data posed a limitation to analysis of the data. In order to
address this, imputation of missing data was conducted. All methods of addressing missing data
rely on the assumption that data is missing completely at random (MCAR), or that the
probability that data is missing on the dependent variable is not related to the independent
variables or other values of the dependent variable.
While listwise and pairwise deletion are the most common methods used to address
missing data (Peugh & Enders, 2004), there are substantial drawbacks to these methods. Listwise
deletion works by removing a case from the analysis if it is missing data for any of the variables
included in the analysis. This method would be especially detrimental to the current study
because some of the variables are missing a substantial number of values. By deleting these
cases, the sample size would be significantly reduced thereby limiting the statistical power of the
current analyses. Pairwise deletion works differently than listwise deletion by only removing the
missing values from the analysis, not the entire case. Pairwise deletion is not appropriate when
the dependent variable is categorical or a count variable, and also lead to underestimated or
overestimated standard errors. As such, it is not appropriate for the current analyses.
Additional “ad-hoc” measures that can be used to address missing data include dropping
variables completely from the analysis that have a large proportion of missing data, or in the case
of continuous variables recoding the missing values to a common value and including an
indicator of missingness as a new variable (Horton & Kleinman, 2007). Dropping variables from
the analyses that have a large percent missing could result in the exclusion of important factors,
and the recoding of missing values for continuous variables and inclusion of an indicator of
missingness can create bias and is generally not recommended (Jones, 1996).
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Several methods exist to impute missing data, including the imputation of missing values
using mean imputation, but these can induce bias and understate variability (Jansen, Beunckens,
Molenberghs, Verbeke, & Mallinckrodt, 2006). Multiple imputation is one of the most popular
methods for dealing with missing data in multivariate analysis and is based on a three step
process. In the first step, plausible values for missing observations are created. These values are
used to impute missing values and the process is repeated. This results in the creation of a
number of completed datasets. The second step occurs when each completed dataset is analyzed
using the imputed datasets. The final step combines these results to provide overall parameter
estimates. Typically, five to ten imputations are used (Horton & Kleinman, 2007), although
White, Royston, & Wood (2011) suggest that the number of imputations should be roughly equal
to the percentage of cases with missing values. This guideline was followed in the current study.
Multiple imputation has several advantages, including the ability to create unbiased
estimates of parameters due to the introduction of random error and the ability to get good
estimates of standard errors because of the repeated imputation process (Allison, 2002). The
current study uses conditional imputation, also known as multiple imputation through chained
equations (MICE) to impute missing values. This method is a variable by variable approach
whereby an imputation model is specified separately for each variable using the other variables
as predictors. At each stage, an imputation is generated for the missing variable. This imputed
value is then used in the imputation for the next variable. Imputed values are randomly drawn
from these datasets based on the observed values of the variable. When conducting MICE, the
method of imputation is specified based on the measurement of the variable. Multiple imputation
models for continuous variables can be modeled using predictive mean matching or regression,
while multiple imputation models for categorical variables can be modeled using logistic

94

regression (Horton & Kleinman, 2007). Most research on MICE suggests that variables with
small amounts of missing data do not require multiple imputation because compete case analysis
and the imputed dataset would yield the same results. In addition, imputation should not occur
when more than 50 percent of a variable is missing. In the current study, only variables with less
than 50 percent missing data were imputed to conform to this suggestion. In addition, there is
considerable debate about whether missing values on the dependent variable should be imputed
(Allison, 2002). For the logistic regression models, less than one percent of the dependent
variable was missing, while less than ten percent of the dependent variable was missing in the
negative binomial regression. In the current analysis, and in line with current practices, the
dependent variable was included in the imputation model to provide information needed to
impute values for independent variables, but the imputed dependent variable was not used in
analysis.
To determine appropriately specified logistic and negative binomial models that
converged, models for characteristics of the offender and characteristics of the abuse were first
run on the original data set without imputed values. These models were saved and compared to
the models run with imputed data. All logistic regressions and negative binomial regressions
presented in this chapter were run using the imputed dataset.
6.2 Results
Table 6 and 7 below present the results of the survival analysis. Survival analyses
examining the proportion of offenders surviving after twelve months were conducted. In
addition, due to the fact that for a large proportion of the sample the BSA took more than one
year to respond with the creation of a confidential file, survival analysis examining the
proportion of offenders surviving after twelve years was also conducted. Analysis of the twelve
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month survival analysis revealed that one month after the initial reporting of allegations of abuse
to the BSA, there was a 15 percent chance that the offender would have a file created by the BSA
on their Ineligible Volunteer list. The hazard rate dramatically decreased after the first month,
with offenders facing only a 3 percent chance of having a file created in the third and six months
after initial reporting, and this chance dropping to 2 percent by month twelve. Twelve months
after the initial allegation was received by the BSA, 65 percent of offenders had still not had a
file created by the Boy Scouts.
Table 6. Twelve Month Survival Analysis of Time to File (N=2379)
Cumulative Survival
1-month
.86
3-month
.81
6-month
.74
12-month
.65

Monthly Hazard Rate
.15
.03
.03
.02

While the previous table addressed the twelve month survival times, due to the fact that
in many cases the BSA took more than one year to create a file on the individual, a twelve year
survival analysis was run. The results of the analysis revealed that the median survival time for
offenders was 24.6 months, or roughly two years. During the first year, abusers faced a 4 percent
chance of having the BSA create a confidential file. This hazard rate dropped significantly after
the first year and twelve years after the initial allegation there was no significant threat that a file
would be created. Surprisingly, 17 percent of abusers still had not had a file created twelve years
after the BSA first learned of allegations.
Table 7. Twelve Year Survival Analysis of Time to File (N=2379)
Cumulative Survival
1-Year
.50
3-Year
.42
6-Year
.28
12-Year
.17
Median Survival Time = 24.60 months
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Yearly Hazard Rate
.04
.01
.01
.00

Finally, comparisons of survival times between the different duties held by the offender,
whether the offense was scout related, whether the offender was married or had children,
whether multiple victims were present, whether the offender and a prior history of child sexual
abuse, whether explicit sexual contact occurred, whether abuse events occurred less than or more
than three times, and the region in which the allegation was made were conducted. While none of
these comparisons were significant, the comparison of scout related and non-scout related did
approach significance (Wilcoxon (df=1) =3.434, p=.064) indicating that whether the allegation
of abuse was against a scout or non-scout youth may have influenced their survival time.
Table 8 below presents the results of the logistic regression of the characteristics of the
offender1. In this model, variables measuring aspects of the offender and their situation within
the organization were included. The overall model was significant (F=3.75, p<.000). Within the
model, the age of the offender was a significant predictor (p<.05) of the organizations use of a
formal response. The offender’s age appears to have had a negative relationship, such that older
offenders had a 44 percent smaller likelihood of the BSA relying on a formal response. Whether
the victim was a scout was also a significant predictor (p< .000) of the organizations response.
For offenders whose allegation was against a scout, the risk of a formal response was 4.58 times
greater than those who victimized a youth outside of the organization. Finally, the offender’s
duty within the organization approached significance (p<.10). Those offenders who were
Assistant Scoutmasters had a 34 percent smaller likelihood of the BSA using a formal response
compared to Scoutmasters who also had allegations against them. The findings of this model
suggested that when determining whether to use a formal or informal response when addressing

Results from the non-imputed logistic regression model were not significantly different. The model featured
a sample of only 855 and was significant. Similar to the imputed model, the offender’s age and whether the
offense was scout related were significant predictors. The only difference was that whether the offender was
an Assistant Scoutmaster was not significant in the non-imputed model.
1
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allegations of sexual abuse by organization members, the abuser’s age, their duty within the
organization, and whether victims was a scout all influenced the BSA’s decision to either refer
the offender to law enforcement or mental health treatment.
Table 8. Logistic Regression of Formal or Informal Response using Characteristics of the
Offender (N=2311)
Coef. (SE)
OR
*
Logged Age
-.58 (.29)
.56
Length of BSA Registration
-.14 (.18)
.87
Less than one yearr
More than one year
BSA Duty
Scoutmasterr
BSA Professional
-.19 (.19)
.83
†
Assistant Scoutmaster
-.41 (.24)
.66
Region
Northeastr
West
.11 (.23)
1.11
South
-.13 (.22)
.88
Midwest
.04 (.22)
1.04
Abuser has Child
Yes
-.06 (.29)
.95
r
No
Allegation Scout Related
Yes
1.52 (.29)***
4.58
r
No
Abuser Charged
Yes
.20 (.17)
1.22
Nor
Police Reported to BSA
Yes
.25 (.20)
1.28
r
No
Female Victims Present
Yes
.22 (.27)
1.25
Nor
Abuser Married
Yes
-.18 (.26)
.83
r
No
F Statistic
†

*

3.75***
**

***

p<.10, P<.05, P<.01, P<.000
indicates reference category

r
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A logistic regression model featuring variables of the abuse incident was also analyzed to
determine the influence of these variables on the organization’s type of response. The results of
this model are presented in Table 9 below2. The overall model was statistically significant
(F=2.65, p<.05). Within the model, only two variables, the age of the offender and whether there
was evidence of non-sexual offenses present, were significant predictors (p<.01 and p<.000,
respectively). Similar to the previous model, the offender’s age had a negative relationship, such
that older offenders had a 54 percent smaller likelihood of the BSA relying on a formal response.
In addition, allegations against individuals that did not feature evidence of non-sexual offenses
had a 52 percent smaller likelihood of resulting in a formal response. The overall results of this
model suggested that the only relevant abuse level factor influencing the BSA’s response was
whether the allegation featured solely claims of sexual abuse or also featured allegations that
non-sexual offenses has occurred.

The logistic regression model featuring non-imputed data had a sample of 1218 and was not significant. In
this model, age was again a significant predictor, although in the non-imputed model offenders who were
formally charged was negatively related to whether a formal response was used. The presence of non-sexual
offenses was not significant in the model.
2
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Table 9. Logistic Regression of Formal or Informal Response using Characteristics of the Abuse
(N=2311)
Coef. (SE)
OR
**
Offender’s Age (logged)
-.77 (.25)
.46
Region
Northeastr
South
-.15 (.22)
.86
West
-.01 (.22)
.99
Midwest
-.00 (.21)
.99
Abusive Behavior
Explicit Sexual Contactr
Clothed Verbal or
-.03 (.16)
.97
Physical Contact
Abuse Incidents Count
One to threer
More than three
.04 (.18)
1.04
Nonsexual Offenses Present
Yesr
No
-.73 (.21)***
.48
Prior CSA Abuse
Yes
.06 (.22)
1.06
r
No
Abuser Charged
Yes
-.10 (.16)
.91
Nor
Abuser Used Drugs
Yes
.53 (.38)
1.70
r
No
Victim Used Drugs
Yes
-.34 (.40)
.71
r
No
Evidence of Multiple Victims
Yes
-.03 (.90)
.97
Nor
F Statistic
†
r

*

2.65**
**

***

p<.10, P<.05, P<.01, P<.000
indicates reference category

The final analyses run in this chapter were negative binomial models. As previously
stated, the likelihood ratio test was run on each model to confirm the use of a negative binomial
model over a traditional Poisson model. Results for these tests confirmed that the negative
binomial model was appropriate because the test was significant for both models. Table 10
100

below presents the results of the model measuring the relationship between offender level
characteristics and the time it took the BSA to create a confidential file3. The overall model was
significant (F=4.00, p<.000). Similar to the logistic model including characteristics of the
offender, both the offender’s age (p<.000) and whether the victim was a scout (p<.000) were
significant predictors of the time it took the BSA to respond. As the age of the offender
increased, the number of days until a file was created also increased by a factor of 2.33. In
addition, when the offender victimized a scout the BSA’s response also increased by a factor of
1.64. When allegations were made in councils located in the western region (p<.05), the length
of time between the initial report and creation of the confidential file increased by a factor of
1.37. The relationship between whether the BSA were informed of possible abuse allegations
and the length of time until their response approached significance (p<.10), indicating that when
police reported these allegations the reaction time was shorter.

The non-imputed model had a sample of 801 and was significant. In the model, more variables were
significant predictors, including the western and southern regions, whether the offender was an assistant
scoutmaster, if the abuser had a child, if they were formally charged, and whether the offender was married.
These findings could suggest that the cases which featured complete information were substantially different
from those that were not. However, due to the imputation of values based on those cases with complete data,
the imputed model was considered more appropriate.
3
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Table 10. Negative Binomial Regression of Time to File using Characteristics of the Offender
(N=2112)
Coef. (SE)
IRR
***
Age (logged)
.84 (.19)
2.33
Length of BSA Registration
Less than one yearr
More than one year
-.09 (.14)
.92
BSA Duty
Scoutmasterr
BSA Professional
-.10 (.11)
.90
Assistant Scoutmaster
.00 (.14)
1.00
Region
Northeastr
West
.32 (.12)**
1.37
South
-.03 (.12)
.97
Midwest
.07 (.12)
1.08
Abuser has Child
Yes
.21 (.22)
1.23
Nor
Allegation Scout Related
Yes
.50 (.14)***
1.64
r
No
Abuser Charged
Yes
-.04 (.10)
.96
Nor
Police Reported to BSA
Yes
-.19 (.12) †
.83
r
No
Female Victims Present
Yes
.06 (.22)
1.06
r
No
Abuser Married
Yes
-.20 (.23)
.82
Nor
Type of Response
Formal
.27 (.16)
1.31
r
Informal
F Statistic
†
r

*

4.00***
**

***

p<.10, P<.05, P<.01, P<.000
indicates reference category

The final negative binomial model addressed the factors of the abuse that significantly
influenced the BSA’s response time to allegations of sexual abuse by organization members. The
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results for this analysis are presented in Table 11 below.4 The overall model was significant
(F=2.65, p<.05), in addition to several variables within the model. As in the previous model, age
had a significant positive effect (p<.000) on the length of time it took the BSA to create
ineligible files. Similarly again, when including factors related to the abuse incident, in the
Western region the length of time between the initial report and creation of the confidential file
increased by a factor of 1.39, indicating that in this region it took the BSA significantly longer to
create confidential files. When the allegation of abuse featured more than three incidents (p<.05),
it took the BSA less time to create the file, as well as when the abuser was formally charged,
although this relationship only approached significance (p<.10). The relationship between
whether the allegation featured female victims and the time to response also approached
significance (p<.10) indicating that when female victims were present their response time was
shorter. Finally, whether the abuser had prior allegations or convictions for sexual abuse was a
significant factor in the time it took the BSA to respond (p<.05). Interestingly, those individuals
who had prior sexual abuse histories experienced a longer time, by a factor of 1.34, between the
initial allegation and their placement on the confidential file.

The non-imputed model had a sample of 1078 and was significant. Similar to the imputed model, age and
prior abuse history were significant predictors, although the type of abusive behavior, whether non-sexual
offenses were present, and evidence of multiple victims were also significant predictors of the time to
creation of a confidential file. As stated previously, due to the imputation of values based on those cases with
complete data, the imputed model was considered more appropriate.
4
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Table 11. Negative Binomial Regression of Time to File using Characteristics of the Abuse
(N=2116)
Coef. (SE)
IRR
***
Age (logged)
.94 (.16)
2.57
Region
Northeastr
South
.03 (.12)
1.03
*
West
.33 (.13)
1.39
Midwest
.10 (.12)
1.10
Abusive Behavior
Explicit Sexual Contactr
Clothed Verbal or Physical Contact
-.12 (.10)
.88
Abuse Incidents Count
One to threer
More than three
-.27 (.12)*
.76
Nonsexual Offenses Present
Yesr
No
-.33 (.21)
.72
Other Offenses Present
Yes
.02 (.24)
1.02
Nor
Prior CSA Abuse
Yes
.29 (.14)*
1.34
r
No
Abuser Charged
Yes
-.18 (.10) †
.83
Nor
Abuser Used Drugs
Yes
.12 (.28)
1.13
r
No
Victim Used Drugs
Yes
-.01 (.31)
.99
r
No
Evidence of Multiple Victims
Yes
.21 (.12)
1.24
Nor
Female Victims Present
Yes
-.25 (.14) †
.78
r
No
F Statistic
2.65**
†
r

p<.10,* P<.05, **P<.01, *** P<.000
indicates reference category
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6.3 Discussion
The current chapter analyzed the method used by the BSA (formal vs. informal) when
responding to allegations as well as the time it took the BSA to respond to allegations of sexual
abuse against organization members. Using survival analysis, logistic regression, and negative
binomial regression, analyses addressed the factors of the abuser and the abuse incident which
may have influenced the direction taken by the Boy Scouts and how quickly they investigated
allegations and made decisions regarding the offender.
Results of the survival analysis revealed that one year after allegations were made, 50
percent of the sample had yet to have their file created, thereby eliminating them from the
organization and ensuring that they could not register in any other region or council. In addition,
the median survival time for the sample was 24.6 months, suggesting that most individuals had a
two year period during which the BSA was investigating allegations prior to their placement on
the confidential file. Similar to findings in the previous chapter, the fact that the BSA took such
long amounts of time to conduct investigations and ultimately ensure that the individual could
not be registered in the organization suggests that they symbolically conformed to the
expectations of society that child sexual abuse allegations should be appropriately and quickly
dealt with. In addition, that the BSA took so long could have been a method of denial and
concealment of the issue, conforming to Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) proposition that
organizations suppress information that could undermine their legitimacy. By taking such a long
time to respond to the allegations, the BSA could have in effect been trying to move attention
away from the possible allegations, rather than conduct an in-depth and comprehensive
investigation that would have surely led to greater awareness of the allegation. In instances

105

where individuals may have discovered that allegations were pending against an individual in the
organization, the BSA always had the option of saying that an investigation was currently
underway and that they were looking into the matter. While it is difficult to determine this solely
from quantitative analysis of the data, Chapter 8 provides qualitative analysis of the BSA’s
response as a means of addressing these suggestions.
The next set of analyses addressed whether the BSA used formal methods of addressing
child sexual abuse, such as referral to law enforcement or mental health treatment, or informal
methods, such as simply removing the individual or conducting an internal investigations of the
abuse. Analysis of the factors related to the offender revealed that older offenders and those who
were Assistant Scoutmasters were less likely to be dealt with formally, while those individuals
who had allegations against scouts were at greater risk for formal action. Based on these
analyses, hypothesis 4b, which argued that offenders with prior child sexual abuse histories
would be more likely to feature law enforcement involvement than those who solely offended
while in the BSA, was not supported. The model revealed that the alleged abuser’s prior criminal
history for child sexual abuse was not a significant factor in determining if formal action was
taken. When addressing the factors of the abuse that influenced the BSA’s response, only the
presence of non-sexual offenses was significant, with those offenders who had no allegations of
non-sexual offenses having a smaller likelihood of a formal response by the organization.
The fact that older offenders were less likely to be referred for formal responses could be
an indication of the BSA’s view of these individuals as less problematic than younger individuals
who faced similar allegations, or merely a result of the fewer numbers of older offenders
represented in all of the BSA files. In addition, older members may had conformed more to the
ideals of the BSA, as individuals are more likely to marry and have children as they age and as
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such the organization may have been more likely to rely on informal responses rather than
involve law enforcement or medical professionals. The organization’s more lenient response to
allegations against Assistant Scoutmasters could also be a result of the organization’s own lack
of training regarding appropriate and inappropriate behavior by adult leaders. Based on the
hierarchical structure of the organization, Assistant Scoutmasters are more likely to be
individuals who have served less time in the organization, and thus their behavior could have
been explained as lapses of judgement based on their lack of experience in the organization.
While difficult to determine based solely on quantitative data, this concept appears to have some
merit as explained in Chapter 8. The result that individuals with no allegations of non-sexual
offenses had a smaller likelihood of a formal response conforms to logical thinking that since the
only allegation was of some form of sexual abuse, formal involvement of law enforcement may
not have been deemed necessary. In addition, in these cases the BSA may have questioned the
legitimacy of these claims and without further accusations of other non-sexual offenses decided
that withholding this information from the police or medical professionals was appropriate based
on the available evidence. By refusing to use formal methods in cases that did not feature
additional non-sexual allegations of offending, the BSA avoided the stigma that the organization
allowed criminals as members that could have resulted had these allegations been made public.
As such, the relatively small number of cases that featured allegations or evidence of non-sexual
offenses that would warrant formal intervention also limited the police and public’s awareness of
the true extent of child sexual abuse allegations within the Boy Scouts.
Surprisingly, the finding that individuals who had allegations against scouts were more
likely to experience formal action is contrary to what was expected. In accordance with
institutional theory and its description of how organizations symbolically conform to maintain
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organizational legitimacy, it would have made more logical sense for the BSA to rely exclusively
on informal methods when addressing allegations against organization members by scouts. When
allegations were made against individuals by youth outside of the organization, this represented
the perfect opportunity for the BSA to refer individuals to the police, making it known that they
were doing all that was required of them in terms of reporting of child sexual abuse. In addition
though, the fact that the alleged victims were outside of the organization provided further support
for the organization’s claims that all necessary measures were taken to ensure that scouts were
kept safe, with the victimization of a child outside of the organization supporting this claim. That
the BSA was more likely to rely on formal responses when scouts were the alleged victims could
be directly related to the role that the parents of the scout played in the investigation and
response to allegations. It is feasible to think that parents with children in the organization would
be more adamant about the abuser being brought to justice and may have spurred the
organization to take more formal methods.
This finding could be incredibly important in the development of institutional theory,
illustrating the influence of non-organization members on organizational practices. Technically,
parents in the BSA were not members or volunteers of the organization unless they registered to
be one. Their only connection to the BSA was through their child, and thus their primary concern
was protecting their children, not the organization. Because of this, parents may have been less
likely to conform to organizational practices to not report abuse allegations to law enforcement,
in exchange for saving the organization from outside criticism. Institutional theory has generally
examined the steps taken by organization members to maintain organizational legitimacy.
However, these studies have focused solely on the actions of organizational members, without
addressing how individuals who are connected to organizational members or the organization
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may also influence this process. In the case of the BSA, the organization may have wanted to
keep allegations of abuse made by scouts confidential in order to reduce the stigma attached to
the organization, but they also had to conform to the expectations of the parents of abuse victims.
Because parents were directly connected to the BSA, in instances where parents were vocal
about the abuse, the BSA had fewer options. They could either report allegations to law
enforcement or face even greater public criticism if these parents brought their claims to more
public venues, such as the media. This finding suggested that organizational practices may be
influenced not only by the expectations of society, but also by the ability of individuals outside
of the organization to call into question the organization’s legitimacy.
The final set of analysis addressed the time it took the BSA to create confidential files on
alleged abusers after initial reporting using negative binomial regression. Hypothesis 4a stated
that the length of time the alleged abuser served in the organization and their position in the
organization resulted in a longer period of time between initial disclosure and removal from the
organization. Based on the results of the analyses, this hypothesis was not supported because
neither the amount of time the alleged abuser served in the organization nor their position were
significant variables predicting the length of time it took to respond. The failure to support this
hypothesis was surprising given research on institutional theory which states that organizations
often offer accounts, or explanations designed to minimize their responsibility (Ashforth &
Gibbs, 1990). If the BSA had taken substantially more time to process the cases of individuals
who had been in the organization for a long time or had moved through the organization and held
higher positions, justifications for their behavior could very well have been based on the claim
that these individuals were long-standing and contributing members of the organization and thus
careful attention needed to be paid when determining how to address these allegations.
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Hypothesis 4c proposed that cases that featured explicit sexual relations would have a
shorter time frame from initial report to removal while hypothesis 4d argued that cases featuring
several victims or law enforcement involvement would result in a shorter time until action was
taken. While hypothesis 4c was not supported by the results, hypothesis 4d was partially
supported. In the analysis, the type of sexual abuse allegation was not a significant factor in
determining the length of time it took the BSA to respond. In the model including the
characteristics of the abuse incident, offenders who had allegations of more than three abuse
incidents, those who had female victims, those who were formally charged, and those cases
where the police informed the BSA about possible allegations all resulted in a shorter time from
initial reporting to placement on the confidential file. The fact that the BSA acted faster when
there were either formal charges pending or the police had informed them of allegations
supported part of hypothesis 4d. The faster response time by the BSA in cases where the police
had either informed them of allegations or the abuser was formally charged conform to claims of
institutional theory that organizations have to act in such a way so as to maintain the expectations
of greater society thereby keeping the organization’s legitimacy intact. Ashforth and Gibbs
(1990) noted that one way organizations can obtain and maintain legitimacy was through
substantive management, whereby organizations conform to the expectations of their
constituents. In the case of instances where the police had some type of involvement, the speed
with which the BSA investigated the allegations and removed the offender signified that they
took the allegations of child sexual abuse seriously and were not willing to tolerate this type of
behavior by members.
Cases which featured allegations of more than three abuse incidents and female victims
also may have resulted in shorter time periods because the greater number of incidents and
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possibility of victims outside of the organization (female victims) could have drawn more
attention to the organization. If outsiders were aware that organization members were accused of
repeatedly abusing children or abusing children outside of the organization and the BSA did not
respond quickly this could have harmed the legitimacy of the BSA and possibly stigmatized
them as an organization that allowed members who victimized children.
Finally, hypothesis 4e claimed that cases were the alleged abuser was married or had
children would have a longer time from initial disclosure of the abuse to removal of the
organization. Again, this hypothesis was not supported as neither the marital status of the abuser
nor whether they had offspring were significant predictors. Despite this, there were some
additional results not hypothesized that are of note. Older offenders, those who had allegations
against a scout, those allegations in councils in the Western region, and those individuals who
had prior child sexual abuse histories all resulted in longer response times by the BSA. Taking a
longer amount of time to address claims of abuse against scouts could have been strategic in the
sense that only individuals within the organization, and in some cases the parents of the victim,
were aware of the abuse. In these cases, there would have been no outside entity checking to see
that investigations were actually taking place and action was being taken. Thus, while the BSA
claimed to have formal policies and procedures in place to address allegations of abuse, these
policies and procedures did not have to be strictly followed. The decentralized nature of the
organization could also be used to explain why allegations in troops in the Western region took
longer to address abuse allegations. While the organization notes that policy and procedure
decisions are made on the National Council level and are disseminated to Regional and Local
levels within the organization, the BSA has no formal method of ensuring implementation of
these policies and procedures occurs.
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Perhaps surprisingly, when the individual also had prior allegations or convictions for
child sexual abuse, the BSA took a longer time to remove the individual from the organization.
While this appears to conflict with what should be done on a logical basis, when functioning as
an organization trying to maintain legitimacy and standing within the larger social environment,
this course of action is less surprising and conforms to the symbolic management perspective of
institutional theory. Immediate removal of the offender would have required the organization to
take responsibility for the fact that they allowed an individual into the organization who was
clearly not suitable, calling into question the methods they used to screen volunteers and
registered members and how strictly they adhered to these methods. In addition, this could have
resulted in publication of the offender’s removal by individuals aware of the allegations who
were either in support of or against the alleged abuser. As a means to avoid taking responsibility
for allowing in individuals who had a history of preying on children and the stigma that could
result, the BSA likely took longer to conduct investigations and place the individual on the
confidential file. This allowed the organization to symbolically conform to societal expectations
of volunteer screening, maintaining the shroud of suspicion over whether allegations of abuse
were substantiated and if the BSA had violated their duty to protect scouts.
The current chapter addressed the characteristics of the abuse and the offender that may
have influenced how the BSA responded and how long it took them to respond. The existence of
allegations of child sexual abuse against organization members dating from 1959 to 1991
suggests that this is not a new phenomenon within the organization. In order to try to protect
youth within their organization, measures were taken by the organization to implement training
on what behavior was appropriate in interactions between adult members and scouts and develop
policies to reduce the opportunity for abuse. The next chapter examines whether one of these
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policies, the two person leadership policy, impacted the number of allegations made against
members of the BSA.
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Chapter 7: Two Leader Policy Intervention
Throughout its functioning, the BSA instituted several policies designed to protect youth.
One of these policies, a two-deep leadership policy, was instituted in 1987 and required that two
adults had to be present at all scouting events, including camping trips. This policy was created
based on the idea that if there were never instances where scouts were alone with adult leaders,
incidents of sexual abuse could not occur. The current chapter used intervention analysis to
address the influence of the two person leadership policy on the prevalence of reports of CSA in
the Boy Scouts as outlined in research question three. This chapter addressed research question
five which asks: Are there differences in the prevalence of child sexual abuse reports pre and
post two-person leadership policy implementation? The chapter tested hypothesis 5 which
purports that the prevalence of reports of CSA after the implementation of the two person
leadership policy in 1987 will be less than the prevalence of reports prior to the implementation
of this policy. The chapter featured a section on the methods used, a results section, and a
detailed discussion of the relevant findings.

7.1 Method
7.1.1 Variables
Dependent Variable
For this analysis, the number of reports per month prior to the passage of the BSA’s two
deep leadership policy in January of 1987 were compared to the number of reports per month in
the months after the policy. In the current dataset, there are 324 months prior to the passage of
the policy and 60 months after the passage of the policy.
Independent Variable
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For this analysis, the only independent variable included was the average age of the
offenders for each month. Because of the exploratory nature of the study and issues with missing
data on relevant variables (such as length of abuse and length of registration) the analysis was
restricted to only this independent variable.
7.1.2 Analytic Technique
Time Series
Time series analysis analyzes a sequence of observations on a single entity which is
measured at regular time intervals. When analyzing time series, the order of observations is
incredibly important as this temporal ordering allows researchers to address questions as to how
variables behave in the past and how they might behave in the future (Ostrom, Jr., 1990). The
ordering of observations is also important as this provides information about the trend of the
data, and whether the variable of interest is increasing or decreasing over time. Thus, time series
is especially useful as “first, it must inform us about the particular mechanism which describes
the evolution through time and second, it allows us to put that mechanism to use in forecasting
the future” (Nelson, 1973, 19). Within time series, observations are also not necessarilly
independent, as the same variable is measured over and over again.
Time series is especially useful as it allows a causal model to be specified in which one
variable influences another at some time in the future. Due to the nature of time series data, one
can learn more about the direction of causality. This is not so for cross-sectional data, in which
causality must be assumed or inferred based on the assumptions of the statistical procedures.
Missing data poses a particular problem with time series analysis, as mean substitution or
deletion of these datum can skew the data, throwing off the overall trend of the data and
subsequent findings.
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While time series deals with a sequence of observations ordered by time and thus requires
a different set of statistical methods, the multiple regression model still forms the foundation of
this analytic method. The major difference in these regression models is that time is the unit of
analysis instead of different variables. Each time at which a case is observed represents an
additional unit. Time series is also unique as it can feature periodicity, in which variables change
with the seasons, months, weeks, or even from day to day.
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression can be used to analyze time series and produce
unbiased estimates, but only if certain assumptions are met. These assumptions include the
stationarity of the variables (i.e. the variance and covariance of the variable does not change over
time) and that the data should be “weakly independent.” This implies strict exogeneity, in which
the values of the variable do not depend upon past or future values of the error term (Verbeek,
2008). Regression techniques can be misleading however, as it is common in time series analysis
for regression models to have high explained variances. This can be problematic, as this can
result from a common trend between the two variables, and represent a spurious correlation
instead of an actual relationship.
While effects can occur instantaneously in time series, there can also be lagged
exogenous variables, where the impact of the variable persists for a specific amount of time or is
not exhibited until a period of time has elapsed. Thus, lagged dependent variables may be
required as the dependent variable may not exhibit an immediate response to a change in the
predictors (Ostrom, Jr., 1990). In addition to lagging exogenous variables, endogenous variables
can be lagged in order to remove the serial correlation of errors. This allows the regression
equation to be estimated without violating the assumption of independence of residuals. Lagged
endogenous variables can also be present as they are part of the causal model. While there are
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numerous approaches to time series analyses that can be conducted, the present study focuses on
a specific type, Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models.
ARIMA
Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) is a specific approach to time
series analysis. ARIMA analysis rests on the assumption that there is an internal dynamic within
the time series data that needs to be taken into account. ARIMA modeling estimates the linear
relationship for a single variable or set of variables with autoregressive lags and serial correlation
of errors. ARIMA modeling thus consists of identifying what type of model to estimate,
estimating the model, diagnosing how well the model fits, and then modifying the model if this is
required. Similar to regular regression models, in stationary ARIMA models, the r square
indicates how much of the dependent variable is explained by the independent variable.
Interpretation of this value must be undertaken carefully however, as it can be affected by the
overall trend of the data.
ARIMA analysis requires that the data are stationary, or that the mean, variances and
covariances do not change over time. ARIMA modeling assumes that there are no missing
values. In the case that missing values are present, recursive smoothing can be used. ARIMA
models take the form arima (p, d, q), in which p is the number of autoregressive terms, d is the
number of non-seasonal differences, and q is the number of moving averages within the
prediction equation (Ostrom, Jr., 1990). Thus, models involving serial correlation of errors are
called moving average models and models with lagged dependent variables are referred to as
autoregressive models. These models represent ARMA (p, q) models and take the form of
Equation 1 below.
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Equation 1
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜑1 𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜑2 𝑌𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝑒𝑡 − 𝜃1 𝑒𝑡−1 − 𝜃2 𝑒𝑡−2
In the above equation, α represents the constant term, while the phi coefficients signify
the strength of the autoregressive terms of the different lags, the theta coefficients represent the
strength of the moving average terms and et represents a random shock. The random shocks are
assumed to be independent and identically and normally distributed (Ostrom, Jr., 1990). In
addition to the ARMA (p, q) model, ARIMA models feature seasonality, as many time series
have cyclical components to their trends. With seasonal data, there can be non-stationarity due to
the trends, which may require seasonal differences. Seasonal ARIMA models usually take the
form ARIMA (p, d, q)(P, D, Q) where p, d, and q represent the same terms, while P represents
the number of seasonal autoregressive terms, D is the number of seasonal differences, and Q is
the number of seasonal moving average terms. In order to address the effect of the BSA’s twodeep leadership policy on the number of reports of allegations of sexual abuse, a specific
approach to ARIMA modeling, intervention analysis, was utilized. This technique was described
in more detail below.
Intervention Analysis
Intervention analysis is a type of multivariate ARIMA model. Intervention analysis can
be used to test the effect of exogenous influences, such as the passage of legislation, upon a time
series. Box and Tiao (1975) note that ordinary t tests for estimating the change in mean are only
valid if the observations before and after the intervention vary about the means μ1 and μ2 and if
the observations are independent. As time series data often have successive observations which
are serially dependent and non-stationary, traditional parametric and non-parametric statistical
procedures relying on independence or symmetry in the distribution are not appropriate (Box &
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Tiao, 1975). In addition to the intervention, additional explanatory variables can be added to the
analysis of the impact of the intervention on the outcome variable.
Intervention analysis is considered a type of multivariate ARIMA modeling as one or
more explanatory variables can be introduced to determine their impact on the outcome variable.
In intervention analysis, it is assumed that there is no reciprocal causation between the predictors
and dependent variable. In intervention analysis, the event in question can occur for only a short
duration, representing a change for one time period. The event can also last for more than one
time period and then disappear. Finally, an event can take the form of a permanent change in the
level of a variable. Outliers can be especially problematic in intervention analysis, as an outlier
can affect subsequent observations similar to an intervention. Due to this, the residuals plotted
against time should be observed prior to estimating the model. These outliers can either be
removed from the analysis, or in the case of a single outlier, it can be treated as an intervention.
When conducting an intervention analysis, it is common procedure to first plot the
original data set against time to observe the trend of the data and what type of effect the
intervention had on the outcome variable. The pre-intervention series for the dependent variable
can then be fit to an ARIMA model. After this estimation, diagnostics can be run to determine if
there is an appropriate model. Following this, and provided there are enough post-intervention
observations, the same thing can be done for the post intervention series. The full data set can
then be returned to for fitting the combined intervention and noise to the model. In instances
where there are more post intervention observations than pre-intervention observations, an
ARIMA model can be run for the post-intervention years and then applied to the full time series.
Diagnostics
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In order to determine which type of ARIMA model to run a set of diagnostics can be run
prior to estimation to determine the optimal model specifications. It is important to test for the
serial correlation of errors in time series, as this can suggest that there is an omitted variable
which is stable over time, but results in positive correlation of the errors. Trends can also
produce strong serial correlation of the errors. In order to test for serial correlation, the DurbinWatson test can be run. This statistic tests for first order serial correlation, in which the inertia of
a variable, or the tendency of a variable to continue at the level it was previously, carries over
part of the residual from one time period to the next (Ostrom, Jr., 1990). The test assumes that
the constant term in the regression equation is being estimated. The Durbin-Watson statistic is
calculated after first running an OLS regression. The statistic should be close to two if there is no
significant serial correlation of the residuals. A statistic close to zero indicates that there is strong
positive correlation, while a value close to four signifies that there is strong negative serial
correlation of the residuals.
In addition to the Durbin-Watson test, the Breusch-Godfrey test extends the DurbinWatson test by developing a Langrange multiplier test to determine if there are more general
patterns of serial correlation. The Breusch-Godfrey test can also be used to determine if there are
autoregressive lags (Breusch, 1978; Godfrey, 1978). If the test is significant, then one can
conclude that the errors are serially correlated. Residuals can also be predicted and then
regressed on their lagged values in order to determine how many lags should be included in the
test. When the additional lags are no longer significant, this indicates the optimal number of lags
to include in the test. The presence of serial correlation can indicate that the model is incorrectly
specified, and thus the incorporation of time lags on the exogenous variable can correct serial
correlation (Ostrom, Jr., 1990).
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Correlograms can be used to interpret the autocorrelation of a time series. From a
correlogram, one can determine if the data is stationary or non-stationary, or whether there are
seasonal fluctuations. For a stationary series, the correlogram would feature large values which
tend to get smaller, while a non-stationary series would be characterized by values for the
correlogram which would not decrease to zero. If a time series is seasonal, the correlogram will
feature oscillation at the same frequency, indicating the pattern of seasonality.
In order to test for stationarity, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests can be
performed. This test tests the null hypothesis that there is a unit root process present in the data.
If the test statistic is not significant, this indicates that there is a unit root process (i.e. the data is
not stationary). Similar to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, the Phillips-Perron unit-root test
can be used to test for stationarity. The Phillips-Perron test differs from the ADF test as the
Phillips-Perron test ignores serial correlation in the regression, while the ADF test uses a
parametric autoregression to approximate the ARIMA structure of the errors (Phillips & Perron,
1988). The null hypothesis for the Phillips-Perron test, similar to the ADF test, holds that there is
a unit root process. The alternative hypothesis is that the process is stationary.
In order to assess the adequacy of the model, the residuals can be predicted and the BoxLjung portmanteau Q statistic can be obtained. This test is a global test of structure among the
error terms, making no assumptions about the structure of the errors. The Q statistic is a test of
the null hypothesis that the autocorrelation (ACF) does not differ from zero, up to lag k. If a
model is satisfactory, the residuals should be consistent with white noise. This can be tested by
examining the pattern of correlograms or running Bartlett’s periodgram-based test for white
noise.
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7.2 Results
Prior to beginning analysis of the relationship between the number of reports of
allegations of child sexual abuse and the implementation of the two-deep leadership policy, it is
important to observe the relationship between the number of reports and time. Figure 2, found
below, depicts this relationship. From the graph, it appears as though there is a curvilinear
relationship between time and the number of reports. While visual observation may suggest that
the series is not stationary and a trend may be present, unit root tests can be used to get a more
definitive answer when assessing stationarity.
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Figure 2: Number of Reports over Time
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests revealed that the data was in fact trend-stationary. The
Phillips-Perron test produced the same results indicating that no differencing is required when
specifying the arima model. Following examination of the stationarity of the data, the serial
correlation of errors was also addressed. Observation of a scatter plot of the residuals suggests
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that there is positive serial correlation of the error terms. This was confirmed by the DurbinWatson test. This suggests that an AR(1) or AR(2) model may be useful. The correlogram and
ACF and PACF plots can be used to determine the p and q values in the ARIMA model.
Observation of these suggests that the model may require one or two autoregressive terms and
one moving average term. Based on the above analysis, two arima models were decided upon,
one model featured one autoregressive term and one moving average term, and the other model
featured two autoregressive terms and one moving average term. Results from the two models
are presented in Table 12 below.
Table 12. ARIMA Models for Number of Reports after Two-Deep Leadership Policy (N=384)
Model 1
Model 2
AR (1,0,1)
AR(2,0,1)
Coef
Coef
**
Mean_age
.07
.07**
Two-Deep
1.82
3.42***
ar L1
.99***
1.15***
ar L2
-.16***
ma L1
-.82***
-.88***
Log-Likelihood
-995.21
-991.87
***
Likelihood Ratio
31526.56
45388.68***
*p≤.05 **p≤.01 ***p≤.001

Both models were significant, although only in the second model featuring two
autoregressive terms was the two-deep leadership policy significant. Because both autoregressive
terms and the moving average term were significant in the second model, this would suggest that
model 2 is more appropriate based on the diagnostics of the data. The average age of offenders in
the dataset was significant (p<.05) and had a positive effect on the number of reports each
month. As the average age of alleged abuser’s increased over time the number of reports also
increased. Most surprisingly, the two-deep leadership policy appeared to have a strongly
significant (p<.000) positive impact on the number of the reports made to the BSA, indicating
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that after the two-deep policy went into effect, the number of allegations of child sexual abuse
reported to the BSA increased.
It is important to note that diagnostics were run on the models and indicated that in fact
these models were not the best fit for the data. Several variations on the models using differenced
versions of the number of reports were run and none provided models of better fit. Based on this
there may be other omitted variables that are relevant to the impact of the implementation of the
two-deep policy that were not available based on the information in the files.
7.3 Discussion
This chapter addressed the impact of the BSA’s implementation of their two-deep
leadership policy on the number of reports received by the organization. Hypothesis 5 proposed
that the prevalence of reports of CSA against organization members would be less after the
implementation of the two-deep leadership policy. Results of the analysis do not support this
hypothesis as the model suggests that the implementation of the two-deep leadership policy
actually resulted in an increase in the number of reports of child sexual abuse allegations
reported to the BSA.
It is important to note that the dependent variable was a measure indicating when abuse
allegations were reported to the BSA, not necessarily when abuse occurred. The BSA’s two-deep
leadership policy was designed as a method of reducing the occurrence of child sexual abuse by
organization members, not specifically to increase reporting. However, based on the available
data, the time of when abuse was reported to the BSA represents the best available proxy for
when abuse actually occurred. For the most part, the dates of abuse reported in the files were
close in time to when allegations were reported to the organization, representing current cases at
the time abuse allegations were reported.
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Between 1959 and 1987, the organization received roughly 1300 reports of allegations of
abuse against organization members. As such, the BSA’s policy requiring two leaders was
related to the organization’s realization in 1987 that reports of allegations of child sexual abuse
were an issue that needed to be addressed as well as increased attention to research on strategies
for preventing child sexual abuse (Macmillan et al., 1994).
The fact that the implementation of the two-deep leadership policy did not result in a
reduction in the number of reports of allegations of child sexual abuse by organization members
could be explained in several ways. First, the organization’s implementation of this policy and
surrounding explanation and training on why two adult leaders should always be present with
youth could have raised awareness of child sexual abuse among organization members, thereby
increasing the reporting of suspected abuse by members. As part of the implementation of the
two-deep leadership policy, the BSA also had to develop standards of when it was acceptable for
adults and scouts to be alone. The expansion of the policy to include the elimination of all oneon-one contact between adult leaders and scouts and the requirement that scouts and adult
leaders have separate accommodations on camping trips likely led to greater awareness of when
these regulations were being violated and whether this could constitute some form of abuse.
The increase in reporting after the implementation of the two-deep leadership policy
could also relate to situational crime prevention (SCP) concepts. Situational crime prevention has
been used to implement prevention techniques for specific crime problems, including child
sexual abuse (Marshall, Serran, & Marshall, 2006; Wortley & Smallbone, 2006). Situational
crime prevention argues that crime results from the interaction of motivation of an offender and
the situation in which the offender finds themselves (Clarke, 1980). Crime is viewed as a choice
with opportunities providing the temptation and provocation for crime (Wortley, 2001). In order
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to reduce crime, situational crime prevention argues that there has to be a focus on a specific type
of crime and the situational components associated with this crime type. By understanding the
crime and how it is committed, points are determined at which intervention can increase the
effort or risk of offending (Clarke, 1980).
Wortley and Smallbone (2006) argue that SCP techniques can be used to reduce CSA in
institutional settings. They note that because sexual abuse against children usually occurs in
private or in the offender’s house, methods can be taken to limit opportunities for offending.
Four opportunity reducing techniques are proposed, including increasing effort, increasing risk,
controlling prompts, and reducing permissibility. Based on these concepts, the implementation of
the two-deep leadership policy could serve as a situational crime prevention technique. This
policy required that two adult leaders always be present with scouts, eliminating one-on-one
interaction. By doing this, the organization increase the effort required to offend and the risk of
being caught. Additionally, this policy aided in controlling prompts by reducing the formation of
emotional bonds and attachment to children that could develop when one-on-one interaction
occurs. Finally, the implementation of the policy made it clear that this type of behavior was not
appropriate and would not be tolerated, reducing the permissibility of this behavior.
The increase in reporting of allegations could also be explained using concepts from
institutional theory. While the BSA claimed that they instituted a policy designed to protect
youth from being victimized by adult leaders, this policy may not have actually been strictly
enforced, thereby resulting in a greater number of allegations of sexual abuse. Meyer and Rowan
(1977) note that organizations often create formal structures which dictate to the outside
environment how the organization is supposed to function. In reality, the day-to-day functioning
of an organization can be very different as long as there is the appearance of conformity with the
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organization’s formal structure. In this case, the two-deep leadership policy could have
functioned as an institutional myth, exhibiting conformity to the idea that the BSA was working
to protect youth within the organization, when in reality the organization was not enforcing the
policy as strictly as needed in order to effect actual change.
Finally, the increase in reporting of allegations against BSA members after the
implementation of the two-deep leadership policy could be related more to trends in reporting of
child abuse more generally and not necessarily related to the policies instituted by the Boy
Scouts. The data featured a slight increase in the number of reports per month beginning in 1983
and a relatively steeper increase towards the end of the 1980s, corresponding to research on
reporting of child sexual abuse finding that reports substantially increased in the 1980s and
1990s (Myers, 2008). Based on this, the increase in reports may have been related to more
general awareness of the possibility of child sexual abuse and an increase in reporting in general,
rather than the result of increased occurrence of child sexual abuse within the organization.
This chapter addressed the influence of the BSA’s two-deep leadership policy on the
number of reports of child sexual abuse allegations against members, finding that the number of
reports actually increased after the policy was implemented. While this chapter and the previous
chapters all addressed the extent of child sexual abuse allegations in the Boy Scouts of America
and how the organization responded to these allegations, the analyses were based solely on
quantitative data pulled from the files. While quantitative data analysis does provide useful
information about the phenomenon under study, the pairing of these results with qualitative
analysis can provide a deeper and richer understanding of how the BSA responded and why this
response was taken, according to the organization. The next chapter, Chapter 8, takes this exact
approach, relying on qualitative content analysis and case study analysis to delve further into
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understanding how the BSA responded to allegations of child sexual abuse and what methods the
organization used to justify their behavior.
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Chapter 8: Institutional Rationalization Tactics and the Boy Scouts of America
While the previous chapters relied on quantitative data to examine characteristics of
abuse allegations against BSA members, how the Boy Scouts learned of abuse allegations, and
the methods they employed to respond to allegations, these analyses did not focus on how the
BSA justified their responses to abuse allegations. In order to understand how the BSA
rationalized the actions taken by local councils and the National council when dealing with abuse
allegations, qualitative analysis was required. The current chapter used qualitative content
analysis and case study analysis to examine the files of the BSA to answer question six, namely
whether rationalization tactics were used by the organization to frame their understanding and if
so, which rationalizations were most frequently used. This chapter tested hypothesis six which
argues that rationalization tactics, especially appeals to higher loyalties and metaphor of the
ledger, were employed by the Boy Scouts to justify their response to allegations of abuse. The
chapter featured a section on the methods used and a results section featuring a detailed
discussion of the relevant findings.
8.1 Method
8.1.1 Analytic Technique
Content Analysis
Qualitative content analysis was used to provide more in-depth understanding of select
instances of organizational responses to allegations of child sexual abuse, as well as to address
the applicability of rationalization tactics to these institutional responses as outlined in research
question five. Qualitative content analysis focuses on analyzing textual material, using categories
that can be brought to the material from theoretical models or derived from the text. This
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procedure “produces a uniform schema of categories, which facilitates the comparison of the
different cases to which it is applied throughout” (Flick, 2009, 328).
The content analysis for this dissertation relied on both inductive category development and
deductive category application. Mayring (2000) notes that inductive category development
occurs when categories are determined out of the material obtained, while deductive category
application entails the use of explicit definitions, examples and coding rules for each category in
order to determine when a portion of text would be coded within that category. For the current
analysis, the deductive categories were the eight rationalization tactics outlined above. Inductive
category development will also be used to determine if additional responses to abuse allegations
that do not fit into one of the proscribed categories are present in the files. Following Hagan’s
(2014) suggestion, criteria for inclusion into each category were developed in order to ensure
replication is possible. These criteria were applied to a sample of the total dataset, after which the
coding criteria were modified if necessary. This classification scheme was used when analyzing
all files. It is important to note that the lack of information found in the files could indicate that a
rationalization tactic was not used, or it could indicate that there is not information contained
within the file about the tactic that may have been used.
The sample for the content analysis portion of the study included a total of 200 cases, 50
chosen from each of the four time periods (1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s). In order to ensure that
all cases chosen for content analysis featured information about the BSA’s response to
allegations of CSA by scout members, all 2379 files underwent an initial assessment to
determine if there was adequate information present about the BSA’s response. From this
purposive sample, 50 cases from each time period were randomly selected for content analysis.
Those case files chosen for qualitative content analysis were coded for any rationalization
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tactics used by BSA officials in correspondence regarding the abuser and what action should be
taken. In order to operationalize the different rationalization tactics, the files were coded for
words or phrases that fall under the categories outlined in Table 13 below. These operationalized
rationalizations are based on the measures used in Ashforth & Anand (2003) and Rabl &
Kuhlmann (2009) (found in Appendix B) with modifications made in order to apply the concepts
to organizational responses to deviance, or more specifically the BSA’s response to allegations
of abuse. Those files chosen were coded to determine the presence of a rationalization tactic,
measured as yes, no, or unknown. If yes, the specific rationalization tactic used was recorded.
Table 133. Operationalization of Organizational Rationalization Tactics
Rationalization Tactic
Legality

Denial of Responsibility

-

Denial of Injury
Denial of Victim

-

Social Weighting

-

Appeal to Higher Loyalties

-

Metaphor of the Ledger

-

Refocusing Attention

-

Operationalization
The organization is not mandated to report allegations of abuse
There is a question as to whether the allegation is substantiated,
thus no action other than removal is necessary or warranted
Removal from the organization and failure to report to law
enforcement was the best available option
Although allegations appear to be legitimate, there is not enough to
warrant formal action
The parents of the youth do not want formal action to be taken
The youth appears to be ok, thus taking further action could cause
greater harm
The relationship, although against policy and law, was consenting
The youth solicited abuse
Alleged abuser did not seek out scout for abuse, “just happened”
The BSA is compared to another organization that has had worse
incidents of abuse
It is important to deal with this quickly to save the organization
from criticism
The alleged abuser has done a lot for the organization or been an
asset
The BSA have never had issues with the offender
The alleged abuser has done more good for the organization
Removal of the offender without addressing abuse
No discussion/overlooking what abuse was alleged to have
occurred, only focus on what action should be taken

Case Study Analysis
In order to examine the response of the BSA to allegations of child sexual abuse in
greater depth, case studies were conducted. The case study approach identifies exemplary
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examples of the phenomenon under study allowing one to conduct an in-depth analysis of the
phenomenon and related factors (Travis, 1983). Creswell argues that case studies are a
comprehensive research strategy and method of study (Creswell, 2007). Ultimately, case study
analysis allows the researcher to explore organizations or individuals by both reconstruction and
deconstruction of a phenomenon (Yin, 2003).
Research suggests that there are two key approaches to case study analysis, those
presented by Robert Stake and those by Robert Yin. Both methods of case study are based on a
constructionist paradigm where truth is relevant and dependent upon one’s perspective (Baxter &
Jack, 2008). Yin suggests that three are several times when case study analysis is useful,
including when the researcher is asking how or why questions or when the researcher wants to
address contextual conditions because these may be relevant to the phenomenon. In the case of
the BSA, the decision on how to address allegations of abuse was based on the local unit, context
of the allegation, and individual actors, thus case study analysis could shed more light on the
factors influencing their response. In addition, multiple case studies can be used to explore
differences between and within cases. When conducting multiple case studies, the goal is to
replicate findings across cases. Because of this, cases have to be chosen carefully so that similar
or contrasting results across cases can be analyzed according to theory (Yin, 2003).
While there are different types of case study methodologies, this project will utilize a
collective case study approach. This type of case study features one issue which is illustrated by
several different cases (Creswell, 2007). This approach allows one to observe how events take
place and what factors affect these events in real-life situations (Travis, 1983). In the case of the
BSA, multiple cases were analyzed to determine differences between unit responses and the
process to determine the appropriate response to allegations of abuse by BSA members.

132

For the current study a sample of ten cases was chosen for analysis. Two case studies
were chosen from the 1960s, three from the 1970s, three from the 1980s, and two from the
1990s. These cases featured enough information from police records, newspaper accounts, and
letters from parents, victims, and BSA officials to provide a detailed account of the alleged abuse
incident and the BSA’s response to the allegations. Most importantly, the case studies used in
this research were selected for their ability to outline the patterns and relationships between the
BSA response to allegations of child sexual abuse and factors of the offender and incident.
8.2 Results & Discussion
Results from the qualitative content analysis were presented first. Out of the 200 cases coded
for evidence of rationalization tactics used by the BSA, 67 cases featured two unique
rationalization tactics while only 10 cases featured three different rationalization tactics. A
breakdown of the rationalization tactics used in the files is presented in Table 14 below.
Table 14. Organizational Rationalization Tactics Used in BSA Files (N=250)
Rationalization Tactic
Percentage in Files
Legality
12.6%
Denial of Responsibility
46.9%
Denial of Injury
1.4%
Denial of Victim
10.8%
Social Weighting
0%
Appeal to Higher Loyalties
10.1%
Metaphor of the Ledger
14.1%
Refocusing Attention
4%
Note: Rationalization tactics are not mutually exclusive

Overall, content analysis of the files revealed that in the majority of cases (46.9 percent)
denial of responsibility was the rationalization tactic used by the BSA. When denying their
responsibility, the justifications included noting that removal from the organization and failure to
report to the police was the best option, that there was not enough evidence to warrant formal
action, or that the parents did not want to press formal charges. Many cases noted that parents
were “unwilling to prosecute” or that parents would not prosecute as long as the organization
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took some action against the offender. In some instances, the BSA denied their responsibility by
blaming the victim or parents of the victim for not bringing allegations of abuse to them sooner.
One file featured the National Council refusing to place the individual on the confidential file
because there had been no scout or parents complaints, and the only concerns voiced were those
by other leaders who were believed to have personal issues with the alleged abuser.
In some cases, the BSA National Council noted that they were unable to determine if
abuse was substantiated and because of this they could not take action to remove the individual.
In one file, when conferring with the local council, the National Council stated “We are unable to
take any action until we receive from you a complete detailed report, together with any
substantiating documents or newspaper clippings that may be available pertaining to this
situation,” while another file noted “there was never any specific information given that would
be of such consequence to give us reasons for refusing registration.” This was a frequent
justification featured in those files using the denial of responsibility rationalization tactic. The
lack of substantiating evidence was used to explain why the organization was not able to remove
the offender from troop activities, with one such file noting “unfortunately, we have no
conclusive evidence in our file and do not feel justified in refusing his registration.”
The second rationalization most often used by the BSA when justifying their actions was
metaphor of the ledger. This rationalization was used in 14.1 percent of the files. Using this
rationalization, the BSA noted that the alleged abuser had done more good for the organization
or had been an asset, and that they had never had difficulties with the individual. Files often
featured statements made by local and national representatives describing the esteem with which
the abuser was held, such as statements like “it has been clear that his behavior and conduct has
been nothing but the utmost, and is a strong force in the success of the units,” “No doubt about it,
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he is a man of tremendous energy,” “been known to all the committee for many years, was very
much liked by them and respected by them as an excellent Scoutmaster,” and “has been an
exemplary staff member and good friend.”
In many instances, character references were included in these files detailing how the
abuser either could not have done the actions they were accused of, or advocating for lenient
treatment based on their outstanding performance prior to this allegation. In one such file, the
BSA National Council went so far as to admit that referral to law enforcement would not occur,
stating that the abuser had done “fine and dedicated work with Scouting and [they] would
prosecute only if it were the only way he could get needed treatment.” While this was not a
common feature of the files, it does suggest that in many cases the BSA were aware that
reporting to law enforcement was the required action, but they refused to use this in order to
protect the organization or BSA member.
In 12.6 percent of files, the BSA used the rationalization tactic legality to justify how
long it took them to create the confidential file on the individual. These justifications were
largely based on the claim that an investigation by police revealed no abuse had occurred or the
legal action had exonerated the individual or was still pending. In multiple cases, the BSA
specifically noted that lack of evidence discovered by formal police investigations, including
statements like, “the investigating police officer was satisfied that there were no physical
contacts between him and the boys,” that a police officer “concluded he was unable to uncover
any criminal activity and, therefore, terminated his investigation,” and that there was no evidence
of abuse because “boys [were] interviewed [they] claimed nothing sexually occurred.”
Ultimately, it appears as though the BSA used the lack of support of the criminal justice system
by way of charges or a conviction as a reason to support their own response to the allegations.
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The rationalizations of appeal to higher loyalties and denial of the victim were used
roughly the same amount (10.1 and 10.8 percent, respectively) by the BSA to justify their
removing the individual from the organization and failure to report the allegations to the
authorities when appropriate. When appealing to higher loyalties, the BSA mentioned it was
important to deal with things quickly to save the organization from negative publicity, noted it
was important to keep things quiet, and focused on being prepared for any potential legal issues
that could arise from the allegations. The desire to keep allegations quiet was frequently noted by
National Council and local council members, with one such member admitting that “some of the
parents are aware of what is going on, but we are trying to hush it up for the benefit of the
program,” while another noted that “every effort is being made to keep this quiet.”
In one file, the BSA noted that “since this person is removed from the program at present
and to date no mention had been made of his association with Scouting, it is felt that we should
simply allow the registration to continue until charter time and then not renew it.” In this case,
the BSA didn’t even remove the individual as this may cause greater publicity of the allegation,
but rather waited for the offender’s registration to expire and then refuse any future registration.
Sometimes the BSA made public statements to the press in an attempt to provide damage control
after allegations were discovered. For example, one file quoted a scouting executive as saying “I
would like to add that as far as we know all of Mr. Dailey's activities were outside of Scouting
circles and therefore brought no disgrace to the Boy Scouts, other than his being currently
registered.” In all of these instances, the BSA tried to distance themselves from the abuser and
alleged incidents of child sexual abuse in order to maintain the organization’s reputation and
legitimacy in society.
The BSA’s use of the denial of the victim rationalization often revolved around the idea
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that the abuser did not seek out the abuse. These claims were often supported by the abuser’s
claim that abuse never happened or was “due to circumstance beyond my control.” In some
instances, the victim was actually blamed for abuse, with certain files suggesting that the scout
was unstable or legally old enough to consent to the sexual activity. In many instances, the files
featured information which suggested the abuser was actually a victim because their behavior
was out of their control and was a result of an underlying psychological problem. One BSA
official noted that the alleged abuse may even be understandable, noting that “I personally feel
that this was an experimentation.” In these cases, the BSA often suggested the offender receive
medical treatment or played a role in providing treatment to the offender.
Finally, refocusing attention and denial of injury were the two rationalization tactics used
the least by the BSA. In very few cases did the BSA justify their action by completely
overlooking what abuse was alleged to have occurred or by suggesting the youth was not
actually harmed by the abuse and thus taking more formal action could inflict greater damage.
When files did rely on the denial of injury rationalization, the files featured statements that the
victim enjoyed the activities or that seeking legal action could lead to greater harm. In none of
the files was the rationalization tactic of social weighting used. This rationalization tactic
suggested that the BSA would compare themselves to other organizations that have experienced
worse incidents of abuse as a way to justify their action in the case.
When two rationalization tactics were used, the most common combination was metaphor
of the ledger and denial of responsibility. Of the 67 cases featuring two rationalizations, 14.9
percent featured these two rationalizations. The combination of these two rationalizations is not
surprising, given that using these justifications, the organization could claim that the alleged
abuser had always been an outstanding member (metaphor of the ledger) and that the lack of

137

substantial proof against this individual prohibited them from removing the individual or alerting
police (denial of responsibility).
The next most common combination of rationalizations was the use of appeal to higher
loyalties and denial of responsibility, comprising 11.9 percent of cases. When relying on these
two justifications, the BSA maintained that substantiating information was often lacking (denial
of responsibility) and thus the organization was better served by keeping things quiet in order to
avoid negative publicity that could result if awareness of the allegations increased (appeal to
higher loyalties). Finally, in 10.4 percent of those cases featuring multiple rationalizations, the
justifications denial of responsibility and legality were used. These rationalizations are similar in
that the BSA justified their action by stating that the police or outside individuals had conducted
an investigation and found no evidence of abuse or charges were not filed (legality) and that their
own internal investigation could not produce the evidence required for them to remove the
offender at that time (denial of responsibility).
Hypothesis 6 argued that rationalization tactics were employed by the Boy Scouts to
justify their response to allegations of abuse and that the rationalizations appeal to higher
loyalties and metaphor of the ledger would be most frequently used. Results of the content
analysis supported the claim that rationalizations were used by the BSA when justifying their
response and the time it took them to respond. In the files that were coded for content analysis,
and in many of the files not chosen, the BSA provided clear justifications for their behavior
when responding to allegations of abuse against BSA members. The author’s claim that the
rationalizations appeal to higher loyalties and metaphor of the ledger would be the ones used
most frequently was partially supported. Within the files, the rationalization metaphor of the
ledger was one of the most common justifications used by the BSA. However, the most common
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justification used was denial of responsibility. The BSA relied on the metaphor of the ledger
rationalization, often mentioning the good works done by the individual and value he had to the
organization as a way of justifying their failure to take more formal action or the length of time it
took them to remove the individual from the organization and place them on the confidential file.
Rationalizing their behavior by suggesting that there was a lack of evidence supporting the
allegation and therefore it was neither their responsibility nor requirement to report the
individual or quickly remove them from the organization was also commonly used.
Ashforth and Anand (2003) note that often times the use of rationalizations becomes
normalized, especially when corrupt acts require the cooperation of two or more individuals. In
the case of the BSA, the refusal to formally report abuse allegations and the decision to justify
their behavior occurred at both the National and Regional/Local level. Both National and
Regional/Local members had to agree to the course of action decided upon for concealment of
the allegation to be successful. Rationalizations also can become part of an organization’s
memory, as organizational memory is formed when the organization gathers information about
how to act and stores this information for future use (Anand, Manz, & Glick, 1998). Analysis of
the justifications used by the BSA and the time period in which they were used revealed that the
most common justifications, denial of responsibility, appeal to higher loyalties, and legality,
were used consistently from 1960 to 1991. This suggests that within the BSA, these
rationalizations had become a part of the organization’s institutional memory and were
continuously relied upon to justify their action in response to child sexual abuse allegations
because they were successful in the past. While qualitative content analysis provides greater
detail about the justifications used by the BSA, the case studies presented below provide even
more information about the steps taken by the organization to respond to abuse allegations.
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These case studies were selected based on the amount of detail about the BSA response
and the range of different documents contained in the files. A sample representative of the time
periods for which files were created was selected, featuring two cases from the 1960s, three
cases each from the 1970s and 1980s, and two cases from the 1990s. It is important to note that
these files featured both substantiated and unsubstantiated claims of abuse, as well as differing
types of abuse ranging from clothed touching to oral copulation and masturbation. Additionally,
the files chosen included individuals who had prior convictions for child sexual abuse as well as
those for whom the claims resulting from their BSA membership were the first offense. While
these files may not be representative of the entire sample of BSA offenders, they were illustrative
of the different types of offenders and abuse incidents that occurred within the organization from
1960 to 1991.
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Case Study #1 Jack O. Goddard (1962)
A confidential file was created for Jack O. Goddard on July 6th, 1962. Goddard was 35
years old and worked as a national field representative for a sales company. Goddard was
married with five children. He worked as part of the National Supply Service Division in the
BSA in Manhattan, Kansas. Goddard was accused of oral copulation and masturbation of a youth
camp staff member.
Description of Allegation and Reporting
A letter sent from the local Scout Executive to the Regional Scout Executive on June
28th, 1962 explained that the local council had had a “very unfortunate occurrence” with one of
their adult leaders, Goddard, at a Scouting summer ranch. Goddard was a member of the
National Supply Service Division Staff. On June 27th, 1962 the local Scout Executive got a call
from the Camp Director who stated that Goddard was “guilty of attempted acts of perversion
with members of the Worth Ranch camp staff.” The Local Scout Executive called and informed
the Regional Scout Executive and then interviewed camp staff members. The Local Scout
Executive noted that “as a result of these personal conferences, I am completely convinced that
Jack Goddard is a sex pervert and recommend that the National Council, Boy Scouts of America,
take immediate action to expel him from its membership.”
Two camp staff members (both age 17) indicated that they were in the same tent in the
wilderness camp area when Goddard came into their tent on Monday night (6/25/1962) and woke
them up. The boys said that Goddard made “improper advances” toward them and then left the
tent after both told him to stop. Around 4:30am Tuesday morning (6/26/1962), a 16 year old
camp staff member was awoken by Goddard touching him. The camp staff noted that when he
“awoke he found that Goddard had his hands on him at two portions of his body.” The camper
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then pushed Goddard away, got dressed, and went to work. Other camp staff said that Goddard
displayed pornographic material to them in the form of lewd pictures. The Local Scout Executive
noted that “as far as we can ascertain, (names redacted) were the only three staff members to
whom improper advances were made. All of the boys seemed to have had a genuine likeness for
Jack Goddard and were greatly shocked over this action.” The Local Scout Executive again
stated “I am confident that Jack Goddard is guilty of the acts as listed in this letter and feel that
he has absolutely no place in our movement.”
On June 28th, 1962, the Local Scout Executive was also informed that a Scoutmaster had
witnessed Goddard drinking with camp staff members. While interviewing additional camp staff
members about the drinking, the Local Scout Executive learned that one camp staff member had
participated in acts of perversion with Goddard. “We were greatly shocked to get the full truth
from (name redacted) camp staff member, and we are attaching a copy of his signed statement
indicating that he had participated in two acts of perversion with Jack Goddard.” The camp staff
member admitted that he allowed Goddard to perform oral sex and masturbation on him on June
24th and June 25th, 1962. After learning of this, the Regional Scout Executive suggested to the
Local Scout Executive that the camp staff member “who permitted Goddard to give him full
treatment twice” should be removed and placed on the Confidential File. The Local Scout
Executive fired the camp staff member and told him he would not be allowed to work at camp
again.
On July 3rd, 1962, the Regional Scout Executive informed the National Council that
Goddard and the camp staff member should be added to the Confidential File. The National
Council responded that they needed more information and a detailed statement in order to place
Goddard and the camp staffer on the Confidential File. The Regional Scout Executive also
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informed the National Supply Service Division of Goddard’s removal, noting that it was “most
regrettable that it was necessary for him to sever his connections with us, but we had no other
choice. I am personally convinced that a very thorough investigation was made of this whole
matter and the facts have been uncovered.” On July 9th, 1962, after sending statements from the
scouts involved, Goddard case was permanently placed on the Confidential File.
On September 11th, 1962, the Regional Scout Executive sent an additional letter to the
National Council concerning the camp staff member placed on the Confidential File. He
explained that:
This was a most regrettable case to us and I have been doing considerable thinking
concerning (name redacted), 16, who was involved. I have the strong feeling that this boy
was the victim of a completely unprincipled and, as it turned out, mentally unbalanced
man.
The Regional Scout Executive had a conference with the scout and his father, and based
on this he thought the organization was doing the boy an injustice by placing him on the
Confidential File. The boy and his father noted that after the events at camp, he sought
psychiatric help. The Regional Scout Executive noted the boy was the first of his age placed on
the Confidential File. The Regional Scout Executive wanted to make it clear that he did not
support putting the boy on the file, noting his:
earnest recommendation to you … is that (name redacted) name be removed immediately
from the Confidential File of the National Boy Scouts of America in order that he might
be allowed to participate in the program of the Boy Scouts of America. I would not be
writing such a letter if (name redacted) was an adult. He is just a boy.
Following this letter, the boy’s name was removed from the Confidential File.

143

BSA Response
From the time abuse was first reported on June 27th, 1962 until the official closure of the
confidential file on July 9th, 1962, twelve days passed. During this time, the BSA relied on
numerous rationalization tactics to justify the action they took against both Goddard, and the
youth camp staff member who was also placed on the Confidential File. Initially, The BSA relied
on the denial of victims and denial of injury rationalizations to justify their action. When
discussing the abuse that was alleged to have occurred, BSA officials noted that at least one of
the youth involved had consented to the abuse and readily admitted that they “allowed” Goddard
to perform oral sex and masturbation on them. By doing this, the BSA in effect suggested that
there was no victim because the youth participated in the abuse and that there was no injury
because he consented to the sexual acts. The Boy Scout’s use of these phrases in their discussion
of the allegations is especially concerning given that there was no discussion of the power
differential between Goddard, a 35 year old adult, and the 16 year old camp staff member.
Research on professional perpetrators and those who abuse children has often pointed out that
abuse against children is in part a result of the power differential between adults and children
(Sullivan & Beech, 2002). For the BSA to suggest that the youth was a consenting party in the
sexual acts goes against this research and turns the 16 year old victim into an equal party if not a
perpetrator as well.
The National Council also relied on the rationalization denial of responsibility, noting
that they did not have enough information about the alleged abuse to place Goddard or the youth
on the Confidential File. However after receiving supporting information, this rationalization
was no longer useful. Finally, there appears to be some minimal use of the metaphor of the
ledger rationalization. Despite statements from several youth that Goddard sexual molested them
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and provided them with alcohol, the BSA felt it was important to note that these same youth had
a great likeness for Goddard and were shocked by his actions. By providing these character
support statements in the Confidential File, the organization was indirectly suggesting that
Goddard had been liked by all he worked with and the allegations were out of character.
While it took the BSA a relatively short amount of time, twelve days, to permanently
place Goddard on the Confidential File, the fact that these rationalizations were present
throughout the statements and letters provides support for the belief that the BSA did in fact use
rationalizations to justify their behavior, even in cases where they may have been in accordance
with their own policies and procedures.
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Case Study #2 Robert E. Collier (1966)
A confidential file was created for Robert E. Collier on August 28th, 1966. Collier was 33
years old at the time and was separated from his wife. He had no children. Collier was a
freelance worker and had served as a Committee Member as part of a troop in Owosso, Michigan
for approximately one year. Collier was accused of acts of perversion perpetrated against a 13
year old scout in camp. The abuse was substantiated by the Camp Director. As part of the
material sent to substantiate the allegations, the Scout Executive included a signed statement
from the scout, signed statement from the Camp Director, who witnessed the acts, a statement of
the summary of action taken after the incident, and the confidential record sheet and a photo of
the offender. Formal charged were never filed.
Description of Allegation and Reporting
On August 2nd, 1966, a scout and Collier were at the rifle range working on the
marksmanship merit badge. The scout noted that while they were there, Collier proceeded to
molest him under his clothing. Too afraid to do anything, the abuse lasted for approximately five
minutes, at which time Collier simulated sex with the scout (both were fully clothed). The scout
noted that this happened two times while at the rifle range. Upon returning to camp, the scout
reported the incident to his Senior Patrol Leader., a junior leader in the troop. After making
remarks that Collier was “weird”, the scout admitted to his Scoutmaster that Collier had
molested him. The Scoutmaster immediately informed the Camp Director, who admitted “I
expressed disbelief, but asked that the boy…talk with me privately”. The Scoutmaster noted that
if the scout wanted to continue working on his merit badge, he would accompany him to the rifle
range so that he wasn’t alone with Collier. The following night, August 4th, the Camp Director
met with the youth and heard his story. The Camp Director told the scout to keep his
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appointment with Collier the next day, explaining the he would hide in the woods nearby in
order to catch Collier in the act.
On August 5th, 1966, the scout went to the rifle range again with Collier, this time
accompanied by the Camp Director who hid in the woods near the range. During the rifle
practice, Collier molested the boy two additional times, each time being interrupted by the Camp
Director who then returned to his hiding spot in the woods. After the second incident, the Camp
Director stayed until the scout finished shooting and walked back with both the scout and Collier
to camp. He notes that he “did not at this time disclose my knowledge or findings to them
[Collier or the Scout].” After witnessing the acts, the Camp Director contacted the Scout
Executive who told him to inform the scout’s parents. The Camp Director told the parents what
had happened and:
informed them that they would discharge Mr. Collier from employment “quietly” and
request that the National Council flag the man from future scouting membership. I further
informed [the boy’s father] of the right to prosecute under the law, and requested that he
do so. [Father of the scout] … concluded that he did not wish to prosecute, but would
cooperate with us in any way needed to prevent Mr. Collier from being in such a position
with boys again. Meetings closed with agreement to quietly release Mr. Collier, and keep
our knowledge private.
The Camp Director met with Collier on August 6th, 1966, informing him that he was
being released from camp and the parents of the scout did not want to prosecute. Upon hearing
this, the Camp Director noted that Collier broke down, apologizing and noting that “he thought
he had licked it- You don’t know how hard I’ve tried-I just can’t help myself.” Upon returning
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home from camp, the Camp Director learned that Collier had had this problem before four or
five years ago with a local high school student.
It wasn’t until August 12th, 1966 that the National Council was notified of the abuse and a
request sent for Collier to be placed on the Confidential File. A letter from Scout Executive to
National Council on August 8th, 1966 noted that “As usual in such situations the parents of the
scout refused to prosecute although we had clear and unquestioned evidence on the party
involved.” His file was officially closed on September 13th, 1966 after a letter from District
Scout Executive was sent with information pertaining to the allegations. The Scout Executive
noted that “Since these problems happen rarely for me-I hope I have handled this correctly. If I
should have done it differently to flag a man, please advise.”
BSA Response
From the time abuse was first reported on August 2, 1966 until the official closure of the
confidential file on September 13, 1966, one month and eleven days passed. Several
rationalization tactics are featured in the file containing information sent between the Local
Council and the National Council. When first learning of the abuse allegation, the Camp Director
admitted that he was skeptical of the scout’s claims. By doing this, he essentially denied that the
scout’s claims were legitimate. More importantly, his reaction presents a perfect example of why
victims of sexual abuse are often unwilling to report their abuse. Research has repeatedly found
that victims of child sexual abuse often refuse to report their abuse because of fear that they will
not be believed (Sauzier, 1989; Sorenson & Snow, 1991; Goodman-Brown, Edelstein, Goodman,
Jones, & Gordon, 2003). The Camp Director’s response to claims made by the scout that abuse
had occurred was also likely influenced by the lack of awareness of the prevalence of child
sexual abuse and the harmful effects of this abuse (Myers, 2008). Had society in general been
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more aware of the commonality of this type of abuse and the impact it has on children, perhaps
the Camp Director would have responded more seriously upon first learning of the scout’s
claims. The Confidential File also made note of the fact that Collier claimed he thought he had
received treatment for his issue and it was no longer a problem, but he seemed to be unable to
help himself. By including these statements, the BSA appeared somewhat sympathetic to
Collier’s troubles, further removing attention from the victim in this case.
The BSA also relied on the rationalization of appeal to higher loyalties, noting that they
would quietly remove Collier from the organization. Although not specifically stating that they
were doing this in order to save the organization from negative publicity, by keeping this
information as private as possible the organization limited the risk of outsiders finding out and
publicizing the allegations. Finally, the BSA relied heavily on the use of the denial of
responsibility rationalization when discussing the allegation. The Camp Director noted that he
informed the parents that they legally could prosecute the offender, but it was their decision as to
whether this occurred. Further, the BSA appeared to blame the parents for their decision to not
report the abuse to local authorities, noting that “As usual in such situations the parents of the
scout refused to prosecute although we had clear and unquestioned evidence on the party
involved.” In this instance, it appears as though the BSA placed the sole responsibility of
reporting the abuse allegations to the police on the parents of the scout, denying any
responsibility they had to take further action.
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Case Study #3 Hacker (1970)
A confidential file was created for Hacker (first name unknown) on June 18th, 1970.
Hacker was 33 years old at the time and worked as a school teacher. He was married with two
children. Hacker served as a Scoutmaster in Illinois from October 1967 until 1970. Hacker was
arrested for homosexual activity with boys. His victims were both in scouting and through the
school where he worked.
Description of Allegation and Reporting
On February 26th, 1970, the local Scout Executive sent a letter to the National Council
noting that Hacker was registered as a Scoutmaster a few years ago and was removed after
reports of issues with scouts surfaced. The Scout Executive noted that “he was removed as
Scoutmaster of that troop, but we could not secure anything definite from parents or boys on
which we could act.” At the time, “a prominent member of my board called me to say he knew
the family, that Tom was a fine young man, and asked that he not be placed on out “red flag” list.
Because of no concrete evidence, at the time, we did not do this, for which I have had many
hours of regret.” The Scout Executive noted that at the time, Hacker was a bachelor, but he
moved, got married, and had children. When he moved back, they did not ban him from
leadership in the council. He originally registered as a Scoutmaster in 1968, but the Scout
Executive became suspicious a couple of months later and met with Hacker asking him to resign.
The Scout Executive noted that they were in the process of placing him on the Confidential File
when “everything broke.”
On October 27th, 1971, a different council sent a letter to National asking how to respond
to knowledge that one of their leaders, Hacker, had been arrested. On November 2nd, 1971, the
National Council responded noting that the local council had “uncovered the case of a furtive
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individual who has successfully attained registration in the Boy Scouts of America by changing
his name. We have had Mr. Hacker on the Confidential File since June 1970 for exactly the same
reasons you presented.” Upon discovering Hacker had successfully registered after being placed
on the Confidential File, they again suspended his registration and updated the file.
The BSA heard no other information about Hacker until February 2nd, 1988 when they
learned that Hacker had been charged with abusing children. On February 11th, 1988 the Scout
Executive received a call from the Chicago Tribune asking about Hacker. Looking through
records, the Scouting Executive discovered that Hacker had registered in 1984 as a multiple (he
claimed he was already registered in another troop), noting that “at that time we did not check
multiple registrations. We still do not check multiples.” Then in 1985 he re-registered as a
committee chairman. Again, the Scouting Executive noted that “at that time, in early 1985, we
did not check reregistered individuals against the confidential file.” The media began contacting
the local council. Their questions “centered around Hacker’s name being placed on the Boy
Scouts of America ‘confidential file’ in 1970 or 1971 by the council in Indiana. The real issue
was if he was placed on the confidential file, how was he currently registered with the Boy
Scouts of America.”
The Scouting Executive informed the National Council of this news on February 12th,
1988. The BSA then tried to determine how he was able to register, an assumption being that he
“beat the system” by registering as a “multiple.” Newspaper accounts of Hacker’s arrest revealed
that he was able to hide his past and was viewed by many as intelligent and good with children.
This allowed him to gain leadership positions at schools and in the BSA. Hacker was arrested in
1961 for abuse against a scout, although charges were dropped. He was then accused of
molesting 51 boys in 1970, but only charged with sexually abusing one 14 year old boy. In 1988,
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he was charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault against three scouts (11-12 years old).
He was also implicated in 30 assaults from 1983-1987. The newspaper article noted that “he also
became a Boy Scout troop leader …-even though he was banned from the Scouts following the
1970 Indianapolis incident.” The article explained that “Boy Scout officials at the National
Office said Hacker changed his middle initial to avoid detection in a computerized ‘red flag’
system to identify undesirables.”
BSA Response
While the exact date the BSA first learned of allegations against Hacker is not known,
there is indication that they were first alerted in July of 1970. In order to provide a conservative
estimation of how long it took them to respond, July 30th, 1970 is considered the date at which
the BSA first knew of abuse. From the time abuse was first reported on June 30th, 1970 until the
official closure of the confidential file on February 17th, 1988, 17 years, seven months, and
eighteen days passed. Throughout the file, only two rationalization tactics were present, denial of
responsibility and metaphor of the ledger. When confronted by police about their refusal to place
the individual on the Confidential File upon first learning about abuse, the BSA responded by
denying the responsibility of the organization to do so because no formal complaint was made by
either a parent or a BSA member. They claimed that without a formal complaint they did not
have the evidence necessary to remove Hacker from the organization. In addition, at the same
time the Boy Scouts relied on the metaphor of the ledger justification, noting that a prominent
member of the BSA had called the Scout Executive to advocate on behalf of Hacker.
While this file did not feature as many rationalization tactics as the previous case studies,
it did shine light on the apparent failure of their registration system to catch individuals deemed
undesirable. The National Council itself noted that by changing his name, Hacker was able to re-
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register in the organization. The fact that an individual could re-register simply by changing their
name suggests that the Confidential File, which was originally created in the 1920s, may not be
that useful for screening members. In addition, the BSA noted that Hacker was able to
successfully register again because he registered as a multiple, claiming that he was already
registered in the organization and was simply applying to hold an additional position. If this was
the case, any individual could successfully register in the organization by claiming that they were
already registered. This further suggests that the BSA did not actually screen all individuals
registering with the organization, but only new registrations. As evident in this case, only
registering new individuals provided a loop-hole through which undesirable members could reregister with the organization after allegations were made.
Upon learning of this, the media inundated the BSA with questions about their screening
policies, and how an individual could be removed because of allegations of child sexual abuse
and then successfully register in a different location. In this instance, the public became aware of
the discrepancy between the formal policies and procedures they claimed to follow and what
actually occurred in the organization. The realization that the Boy Scouts were not taking proper
measures to screen potential adult leaders threatened the legitimacy and reputation of the
organization. Since organizational legitimacy is based on an organization conforming to social
norms and expectations (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975), the discovery that the Boy Scouts were not
screening all registering members called into question their dedication to protecting scouts
against sexual victimization.
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Case Study #4 Guy E. Conkey III (1973)
A file was created for Guy E. Conkey III on September 26, 1973. Conkey was 40 years
old. In the file, no other identifying information, such as his occupation, marital status, or
whether he had children was included. Conkey served as Assistant Scoutmaster in Troop 50 in
Opa Locka, Florida beginning March 1967, and in April 1968 he became a Committee Member
for Troop 444. Conkey was accused of sexual abuse by two staff members who witnessed the
molestation of a scout while at camp. No formal charges were filed.
Description of Allegation and Reporting
On July 7th, 1973, the Scout Executive at a scout camp in Opa Locka, Florida was
approached by two camp staff members who were concerned that they had just witnessed a
homosexual act. They explained that they had just finished an Indian Pageant dance practice and
were walking past the camp chapel to the rifle range. They heard sounds coming from behind the
camp chapel and when they went to investigate they saw Conkey with a scout kneeling on the
ground. Conkey was lying on his back on the ground with his legs wrapped around the scout.
Both were fully clothed. Conkey was holding onto the scout’s buttocks and was seen moving his
hand to his own genital region several times. Conkey then kissed the boy. The two staff members
were shocked and both went off in different directions. Their departure alerted Conkey, who they
then saw walk out from behind the chapel with the scout. The two staff members then went
directly to alert the Scout Executive.
The Scout Executive approached Conkey, noting that he “seemed meek, shy, and very
apologetic as I confronted him with the information previously told me. He denied everything.”
Conkey claimed that the scout was upset and he took him to the chapel to pray. After praying, he
suggested they go on a nature walk to cheer the scout up. Conkey explained that after the walk
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he and the scout wrestled and that was what the two staff members witnessed. Due to the
conflicting stories, the Scout Executive met with both staff members and Conkey who again
presented different descriptions of what happened. The Scout Executive then called the Council
representative who requested that an official statement of the incident be taken. In addition, the
Sheriff’s Department was called to investigate the events. Police officers arrived and questioned
the scout. They noted that the scout agreed with Conkey’s description of events, even when they
asked questions several times and in different ways. The Scout Executive noted that “The
officers suggested that since a stalemate condition existed they felt it best to stop the
investigation... two department investigators would be shown the statements in the morning and
if they thought further investigation was need they would return.” No one from the police
department returned, and the next day, July 6th, 1973, the Scout Executive informed Conkey that
he needed to leave camp.
Following Conkey’s removal from camp, a letter was sent from one of Conkey’s friends
who was also a member of the BSA. He noted that he had known Conkey for five years and they
had both been on more than fifty camping outings with youth. He argued that “Conkey’s moral
character and conduct ha[d] been exemplary and that his work with youth ha[d] been
constructive and in no way detrimental and that his reputation in all such regards [wa]s
excellent.” Despite this character reference, the local committee met on August 23, 1973 and
voted that they no longer wanted Conkey involved in Troop 444 activities.
Following this, the Scout Executive sent a letter on September 6th to the National Council
requesting that Conkey be placed on the Confidential File. In his letter he noted that Conkey “is
not a violent individual, but he’s certainly questionable in his relationships with boys.” National
Council responded stating that they had started a file, but needed more information, especially
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given that the scout involved did not substantiate the abuse, in order to keep his name on the
Confidential File. The Scout Executive replied on September 26th writing:
You suggest in your letter that the case which has developed around the misconduct of
this Scouter is not sufficiently substantiated. If it is absolutely necessary that we get a
statement from the boy, I guess both the council and the Scouters involved would choose
to not substantiate the case any further. You should know, however, that the committee
chairman of Troop 444, Major Albert E. Diaz, indicated that he had talked to the boy and
the boy had described the liberties which Conkey had taken. Further, Conkey’s friend and
counselor, Jin Gunn, indicated to me here in the office that Conkey had admitted
deviations from the norm in this act.
Conkey’s file was officially closed on October 3, 1973. In April of 1974, the National
Council again received a letter from the local Opa Locka Council stating the Conkey had tried to
re-register in the organization. In August of 1974, National Council was contacted by a Scout
Executive from South Florida who noted that Conkey had donated 80 acres of land to the
Alabama-Florida Council. He noted that the offer included the deed, but there were restrictions,
one being that Conkey could come and go at his leisure and be allowed to keep a house trailer on
the property as long as he lived. Conkey also requested proper recognition of his contribution to
Scouting. Following his gift, the Scout Executive contacted National to get as much information
about Conkey. No response to this request was found in the file. However, there was one final
letter from May 25th, 1979 from the National Council to a troop in Rhode Island stating that
Conkey could not be registered in that council.
BSA Response
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From the time abuse was first reported on July 7th, 1973 until the official closure of the
confidential file on October 3, 1973, two months and twenty-six days passed. When responding
to allegations of abuse against Conkey, the BSA relied on several rationalization tactics,
including denial of the victim, legality, denial of responsibility, and metaphor of the ledger.
When denying that there was actually a victim, the BSA relied on police questioning of the scout
that revealed the scout agreed with Conkey’s claim that no abuse occurred and they were merely
wrestling. By believing the scout’s response to the police, without questioning why the scout
may have been afraid to tell the truth, the Boy Scouts denied that the scout was actually a victim
in the case and did not feel compelled to take quicker action against Conkey. Additionally, the
fact that the police investigated the allegations and believed there was not enough evidence to
arrest Conkey further allowed the Boy Scouts to rely on the legality justification when deciding
on what to do with Conkey.
The file featured a detailed letter from another BSA member and friend of Conkey
suggesting that he was a moral and upstanding individual and had always been an asset to the
organization. It further suggested that there had never been claims of this nature made against
Conkey by scouts or non-scouts. By including this information, the BSA clearly noted that
Conkey had done more good for the organization, illustrating the metaphor of the ledger
justification. Finally, the BSA relied on the denial of responsibility rationalization tactic,
claiming that there was not enough information to provide substantial proof that abuse occurred.
In addition, when asked for additional information by the National Council, the Scout Executive
replied that nothing more would be done on the local level to substantiate the abuse. The
response by the Scout Executive that the local scouting representatives would not actively work
to investigate and substantiate the abuse allegations appears to suggest that because the scout
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agreed with the alleged abuser’s account of events, there was no justifiable reason for the
organization to continue investigating the allegations further.
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Case Study #5 Alan H. Grossman (1977)
A confidential file was created for Alan H. Grossman on July 18th, 1977. Grossman was
44 years old and worked as an Artist and Photographer in Santa Monica, California. He was
single with no children. Grossman served as Scoutmaster in a troop in Santa Monica from
October 30th, 1974 until his arrest on April 26th, 1977. The Confidential File on Grossman noted
that he had three convictions, one acquittal, and an additional arrest in New York prior to joining
the BSA, all for child molestation. These arrests and convictions occurred between 1960 and
1971. Grossman jumped bond on his last arrest in New York and fled to California. Grossman
still had outstanding warrants in New York, but was currently facing three counts of child
molestation and two counts of oral copulation involving three boys in California. One of the boys
was registered in his troop. Grossman pled guilty on July 12th, 1977 to three of the charges and
was set to be extradited to New York following his sentencing.
Description of Allegation and Reporting
On April 27th, 1977, police in Santa Monica informed the Field Scouting Director that
Grossman had been arrested. The police asked for his registration record and information about
troops he was affiliated with, as well as his scouting history prior to his current troop. The Field
Director was shown pictures of nude boys found at Grossman’s home to determine if any were
scouts. The police also requested a search of Scouting records for Grossman’s aliases, however
none showed up. Following this meeting, the Field Director contacted the National Council to
inform them of the events. On April 28th, 1977, the Field Director met with the troop to notify
the scouts, their parents, and the sponsoring body that Grossman would no longer be
Scoutmaster.
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On May 2nd, 1977, the Field Director received a call from the police asking him to check
the Confidential File to see if Allen Bagration, one of Grossman’s aliases, was in their records. A
check of BSA records showed this name was not on their Confidential File. The officer informed
the Field Director of Grossman’s prior criminal history and noted that he was very critical of the
BSA “for permitting individuals like Ross [Grossman} to become scout leaders.” The police
officer said that scouting had a responsibility to ensure that scouts were safe and that since “we
[the BSA] knew about Ross [Grossman] two years ago and did nothing about it, it left us open to
criticism.” The Field Director informed the officer that the BSA knew nothing of Grossman’s
prior history, but the officer claimed that a BSA member and school principal had both informed
the organization about issues with Grossman. The Field Director responded that since no formal
complaint was ever received, “no action could be taken.” The Field Director noted that the
officer then “stated that the police report was going to be very critical of the Boy Scouts
concerning the apparent laxness in the control over the type of leadership... He said he felt that
we might go so far as to request a fingerprint check on leaders...”
On May 11th, 1977, the Field Director spoke with the attorney representing Grossman. He
stated that only one boy was registered with the BSA. A newspaper report of the charged against
Grossman claimed that upon searching his apartment police had found slides depicting young
boys in sexual acts. They initially began their investigation after an informant gave them slides
belonging to Grossman showing young children involved in sexual activity. According to police
and FBI, he had used as many as six aliases and since 1960 has been booked for nine child
molestation related offenses. On July 12th, 1977, the attorney informed the Field Director that
Grossman had pled guilty to three of the charges. The National Council was formally notified on
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September 2nd, 1977 of the charges against Grossman and the request to place him on the
Confidential File.
Grossman’s file was officially closed on January 20th, 1978 after the National Council
received a copy of his court case. While the defense had argued that Grossman needed therapy,
the judge sentenced him to prison, noting that he considered him a compulsive pedophile. The
judge denied him probation, and said that hospitalization was also not appropriate because there
was no indication that this would protect the public or that it would rehabilitate him.
BSA Response
From the time abuse was first reported on April 27th, 1977 until the official closure of the
confidential file on January 20th, 1978, eight months and twenty-four days passed. The only
rationalization tactic featured in this case was the denial of responsibility. The Field Director for
the BSA claimed that since no formal complaint was ever received by the organization, there was
no evidence to warrant the removal of the organization. By saying this, the BSA in effect blamed
the BSA member and school principle who claimed abuse had occurred for not reporting their
suspicions to the BSA. This claim also supported that organization’s response that it was not
their place to report the alleged abuse to the police. Teachers have a clear responsibility as
mandatory reporters to report child sexual abuse suspicions, and the school principal should have
reported his suspicions to the appropriate authorities at the time he thought abuse may have been
occurring.
This case represents a perfect example of how organizations can lose their legitimacy
when their constituents and the outside environment learn of the discrepancies between their
stated formal policies and the actions that are actually taken within the organization. Grossman
had a pretty extensive criminal history that clearly indicated that he was not suitable for
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membership in the organization. The police were critical of the organization, suggesting that they
exhibited “laxness in the control over the type of leadership.” In addition, the police suggested to
the BSA that they should consider running fingerprint checks on all individuals registering with
the organization. Clearly exhibiting resistance to changing their policy of screening members, the
BSA did not institute criminal background checks for Boy Scout professionals until 1994 and
only applied the practice to all volunteers in 2008. The increased awareness of the failure of the
BSA to properly screen individuals who would be allowed to work with scouts posed a threat to
the legitimacy with which they were viewed by society.
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Case Study #6 Joe D. Denison (1981)
A confidential file was created for Joe D. Denison on March 17th, 1981. Denison lived in
Lancaster, Texas and was a 35 year old sale representative for Southwestern Bell Telephone
Company. Denison was single with no children. He served as Scoutmaster of a troop in
Lancaster since 1971. Denison was arrested on March 16th, 1981 for sexual abuse.
Description of Allegation and Reporting
In August of 1980, the District Scouting Executive for Lancaster, Texas met with the
Regional Scouting Executive to report that Denison had been accused by a scout of homosexual
involvement. During the next two weeks, the Regional Executive met with adult leaders and the
scout who claimed that Denison had performed oral sex on him on a number of occasions and
showed him pornographic books. The scout volunteered to take a polygraph test. The Regional
Executive consulted with BSA counsel who informed the National Council. It was determined
that because Denison’s registration had expired, if he tried to re-register, he would be directed to
the Regional Executive. In early September 1980, Denison tried to re-register as a Scoutmaster
of another troop. He was instructed to meet with the Regional Executive who informed him of
the allegations. Denison denied the charges and the Regional Executive suggested he meet with
the scout and his mother and submit to a polygraph test. The Regional Executive noted that all
allegations being made against Denison would be kept confidential.
On November 5th, 1980, the Regional Executive received a letter from Denison’s attorney
stating that he would not meet with the scout and his mother. Denison’s lawyer stated that
“Denison emphatically denies the charges levelled against him by [redacted]” and that:
such a confrontation [between Denison, the scout, and his mother] could prove
embarrassing not only to Mr. Denison, but to the scout and to the Boy Scouts. Mr.
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Denison would prefer to work this out in a professional manner and among as few people
as possible. This would minimize the potential damage to Mr. Denison’s excellent
reputation and would also minimize the liability of the [Redacted] and the Boy Scouts for
repeating unfounded charges about Mr. Denison.
On November 26th, 1980, the Regional Executive and Field Director met with the scout
and his mother and took a full statement of the alleged incidents. On December 12th, 1980,
Denison sent an additional letter stating that he was anxious to resolve the matter, but would not
undergo the polygraph since it was not reliable. Denison noted that he was angry that accusations
hadn’t first been brought to him, and wrote “if the story is so convincing, why haven’t the police
been informed? At least in a court of law I would be entitled to due process.” Denison also
claimed that the scout accusing him was caught smoking marijuana at camp by his Scoutmaster.
The scout underwent the polygraph on December 12th, 1980 at which time he gave a
detailed account of what happened. Denison had performed oral sex on the scout on several
occasions. The scout was afraid to say anything or resist and only came forward after talking
with friends who said there had been problems with Denison and other scouts. The examiner
reported that there was no indication of deception. The Regional Director then informed Denison
that until the matter was resolved in his favor, he was being denied membership in the BSA in
any registered or unregistered capacity.
On February 10th, 1981, Denison met with the troop committee and the Regional
Executive. He explained the allegations against him. The Regional Executive noted that it
appeared the committee already knew about the allegations and “the committee appeared to be
convinced of Mr. Denison’s innocence of the charges and proceeded to try to convince Circle
Ten Council to allow him to continue in at least an unofficial capacity.” The Regional Executive
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restated the policy of the BSA and told them their troop charter would be pulled if they didn’t
comply with BSA policy. On March 1st, 1981, a letter was sent to the National Council
requesting Denison be placed on the Confidential File.
On March 17th, 1981, a newspaper article reported that Denison had been indicted on
charges of sexual abuse of a child. The article stated that Denison had repeatedly engaged in
homosexual acts with a 14 year old boy since he was eleven. The boy told police that he had
grown close to Denison after his father had died. The newspaper article noted that an assistant
leader had heard about the allegations against Denison as early as May 1980 and told the boy’s
mother, but BSA officials did not find out until September of 1980. They article also stated that
“Boy Scout Officials said they do not know how long Denison was part of their organization.”
Following BSA action, Denison requested a local council and regional council review in
September of 1981 and April of 1982. Both reviews concurred with his placement on the
Confidential File. The letter from the Regional review stated that the decision of the Regional
review was subject to review at the National Council Level and he could write to them
explaining why he thought the decision was in error to have review proceedings initiated at the
National level. On February 14th, 1991, Denison again applied for membership in the BSA,
explaining that his son was interested and he wanted to participate with him. The National
Council responded that the BSA would not allow him to register as a leader or participate in any
leadership capacity, but that he could participate as a parent. They also informed him that since
10 years had passed since his last review he could request another.
Denison requested a National Review on February 28th, 1991. This review found that he
was suspended in 1980 for sexually abusing a 14 year old scout but the case was eventually
dismissed in court. Denison previously had both a regional and a national review and both
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reviews decided to maintain his suspension. On June 4th, 1991 the National review informed
Denison that no new evidence had surfaced that would substantiate a review of his placement on
the file and they did not feel it was appropriate for his registration to be renewed. Denison
responded noting that he didn’t understand how after “a successful civil suit against my accuser,
after a dismissal of charges following a complete investigation that the Scouting organization
still will not allow me to register” and that he “was idealistic rather than pragmatic and that-some
lapses in good judgement put me in the position where these false charges could be made.”
BSA Response
Denison’s file was officially closed on April 20th, 1981. While the exact date the BSA
first learned of allegations against Denison is not known, there is indication that they were first
alerted in August of 1980. In order to provide a conservative estimate of how long it took them
to respond, August 31st, 1980 is considered the date at which the BSA first knew of abuse. Based
on this, from the time abuse was first reported on August 31st, 1980 until the official closure of
the confidential file on April 20th, 1981, seven months and twenty days passed. When justifying
their response to allegations against Denison, the BSA relied on the appeal to higher loyalties
and metaphor of the ledger rationalizations. When first learning of abuse, the Scout Executive
noted that all allegations made against Denison would be kept confidential. This was in direct
contrast to mandatory reporting laws requiring the Boy Scouts to report suspected child abuse. In
addition, by refusing to alert authorities or other members of the organization of these
allegations, the Boy Scouts in effect hid the suspected abuse in order to avoid issues, both legal
and reputation wise, that could arise if anyone found out about.
The Boy Scouts also noted that the committee, upon reviewing the charges against
Denison, was skeptical of the allegations made against him and believed that he was innocent of
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all charges. They felt that he should be allowed to stay within the organization because the
accusations could not possibly be true, supporting the metaphor of the ledger rationalization.
While the committee felt Denison was not culpable, the Scout Executive maintained BSA policy,
informing them that he would in fact be removed from the organization, and if the committee did
not comply their charter would be revoked. This case presented an example where conflicts
existed within the organization on how to respond to allegations of abuse, but despite this the
Boy Scouts maintained their policy on dealing with allegations of sexual abuse against scouts.
While the Boy Scouts handled the dispute regarding Denison’s case appropriately, there
is evidence in the file which suggests that initially they did not follow their outlined procedures.
Upon learning that allegations of abuse were made against Denison, the Boy Scouts did not
immediately alert Denison that allegations had been made against him or remove him from the
organization. Instead, they waited until he re-registered before placing him on the Confidential
File. This represents a clear diversion from their stated policy of removing individuals deemed to
be undesirable. Instead, they hoped that Denison would not re-register with the organization.
This tactic also allowed for the possibility that Denison register in another council or region in
which the Scout Executive would not be aware and could not stop his registration. If this had
occurred, it is highly likely that Denison could have successfully registered and perhaps
victimized additional scouts. Finally, when asked how long Denison had been a part of the
organization, the Boy Scouts were unable to provide an answer. This is concerning, given that all
registered individuals should have filled out a registration application upon joining the
organization. That the Boy Scouts were unable to determine how long Denison had been active
in Scouting calls into question the record keeping practices maintained by the Boy Scouts.

167

Case Study #7 Timothy J. Bagshaw (1984)
A confidential file was created for Timothy J. Bagshaw on July 7th, 1984. Bagshaw was
29 years old at the time the file was created and worked as an auto mechanic. He was not married
and had no children. Bagshaw worked as an Assistant Scoutmaster and Scoutmaster in Troop
361 in Central Pennsylvania. Bagshaw was a former police officer and had been in scouting for
22 years. Bagshaw first registered as an Assistant Scoutmaster in 1981 and eventually advanced
to Scoutmaster. He officially resigned from the organization on April 30, 1984 after serving a
total of three years in Troop 361.
During his time in Troop 361, Bagshaw was suspected of child abuse. He was eventually
arrested for sexual assault against two thirteen year old boys who claimed he had touched them
while they were camping. These alleged events took place on separate occasions. Bagshaw was
charged with ten counts of indecent assault, ten counts of endangering the welfare of children,
and ten counts of corruption of the morals of minors. Newspaper reports of the abuse stated that
the abuse occurred November 18-19th and December 16-17th of 1983. Bagshaw pled nolo
contender to two counts of corruption of minors and was sentenced in December 1984 to a
suspended sentence of one to three years in prison and placed on probation for three years, had to
pay for the cost of prosecution and a $500 fine, and had to complete 250 hours of community
service.
Description of Allegation and Reporting
The Local Council first learned of the abuse allegations on April 26th 1984 after the
Assistant Scoutmaster for Troop 361 called the Council Scout Executive informing him that
parents of a scout were making accusations that Bagshaw had committed a sexual act with their
son. The parents stated that their son had related to them that Bagshaw had invited him on a
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weekend ski trip that was not a Scouting activity. The parents agreed and during this trip their
son claimed that Bagshaw approached him during the weekend, although nothing physical
happened. The second incident occurred at a scout camping trip, during which their son claimed
that something happened while he was sharing a tent with Bagshaw. The parents learned of their
son’s victimization after he told a friend what had happened and the friend confirmed that he had
also been approached by Bagshaw. It was only after the parents of both boys spoke to each other
about the claims of their children that they contacted the Assistant Scoutmaster on April 23rd,
1984.
After learning of the allegations, the Assistant Scoutmaster talked to the scout victims
and other parents in the troop, asking them if anything had ever taken place with their sons. This
questioning revealed that an incident had occurred five years prior, although there was no
discussion of what this incident was in the confidential file. Based on the investigation of the
Assistant Scoutmaster, the local Scout Executive and District Chairman decided that a troop
committee meeting needed to take place with Bagshaw present. The troop committee meeting
took place on April 30th, 1984, at which time it was decided that Bagshaw should resign from the
troop and consider retaining legal counsel.
The file notes that when the mother of one of the scouts was informed Bagshaw had
resigned, she indicated that she thought the council should do more, such as conduct an
investigation. At this point, the Scout Executive questioned the responsibility of the organization
to do this, noting that he “was not sure at that point what additional responsibility we had and
indicated I would get back to her [the scout’s mother].” At this point, the Scout Executive called
BSA legal counsel who reviewed a copy of BSA policy and mandatory reporting laws and
informed the Scout Executive that “we had already acted responsibly and that it was now up to

169

the parents to file charges or take action since they were supposedly the hurt party.” Further, the
Scout Executive noted that “never at any time in those few says did we try to investigate it on
any formal basis.” The Scout Executive noted that after telling the parents this, they never heard
from the parents again and assumed they did not press charges.
It was only after all of this had occurred that the National Council was informed of the
allegations and received a request from the Local Council asking them to remove Bagshaw from
their records. Following this request, Bagshaw was observed on May 18-20th, 1984 at a Scout
camporee, leading to additional parents coming forward with claims of abuse against their
children. On June 8th, 1984, the Scout Executive for the Local Council received a call from the
Pennsylvania State Police, informing him that an investigation of Bagshaw was underway and a
warrant was out for his arrest. In addition, the Trooper informed the Scout Executive that he was
being “cited on a summary offense for not reporting a possible child abuse case to the proper
authorities.” After these events transpired, the media began contacting the Local Council. The
Scout Executive noted that “almost without exception each wanted a response from me why I
failed to report it, kind of indicating why I was trying to cover something up.” In response to
these accusations, the Local Council President released a statement noting that:
As president of the Juniata Valley Council, Boy Scouts of America, I totally support and
stand behind our council executive, Roger Rauch [Scout Executive], who we feel has
acted responsibly and has done nothing wrong. We are currently working with legal
counsel and we plan to vigorously resist any charges made on Roger Rauch.
The Scout Executive claimed that he had acted responsibly and had sought out legal
counsel and acted on their advice. He had had no contact with the scouts claiming abuse, only
their parents, and did not refuse to report, but thought it was the responsibility of the parents to
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report. He further noted that “this has really created a very bad and negative image and response
on the council, myself, and the Boy Scouts of America.” In June of 1984, newspaper reports of
the charged against Bagshaw were released, noting that the Scout Executive had failed to report
because he did not know he was obligated to report the allegations. These reports further outlined
the Child Protective Services Law of 1975 which required that any person who, in the course of
their employment, came into contact with children was required to report suspected child abuse
to the proper authorities. They further reported that the Scout Executive stated he was
“concerned that this not get blown out of proportion. We’re here as a positive organization.
Thousands of kids go though it (Boy Scouts) right. Ninety thousand leaders do their jobs right.
It’s very rare that something like this happens.”
In an additional newspaper article, the BSA stated that they would not be making any
policy changes as a result of the arrest of Bagshaw or citation of the Scout Executive, noting that
“We feel that our policy is solid and the he (Mr. Rauch) [Scout Executive] took the proper steps
and followed our procedures exactly.” Going even further, the BSA blamed the lack of parental
involvement as a cause of the abuse, noting that many parents view the Boy Scouts as a
babysitting service and are not involved in the troop. One Scoutmaster noted: “I know
Scoutmasters who spend more time with boys than the boys’ parents do. Some drop off their kids
for the weekend and think we’re babysitters.”
While his file was first created on July 7th, 1984, Bagshaw wasn’t officially placed on the
Confidential File until September 2nd, 1987; after all supporting materials were received and
reviewed by the BSA attorney. Between June 19th 1984 and September 2nd 1987, seven letters
were sent from the National Council to the Local Council asking for the additional information
needed to close the file. One such letter in 1986 stated:
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We really need to know if he has been convicted of child abuse. Apparently, in
1984, he was arrested and charged with some sort of sexual abuse. Since that time, we
have not heard any information concerning whether or not there was a trial and whether
he was found guilty….Without this information, our case is rather weak and we are very
concerned that he might move somewhere else and create further problems for scouting.
Please help us if you can to complete this file, so that we may protect the youth of
America.
BSA Response
Ultimately, from the time abuse was first reported on April 23, 1984 until the official
closure of the confidential file on September 2, 1987, three years, four months, and ten days
passed. In the case of Bagshaw, the BSA relied on the rationalization tactics denial of
responsibility, social weighting, and legality. When denying their responsibility, the Boy Scouts
claimed that they lacked the proper information needed to substantiate abuse, and because of this
their file on Bagshaw was rather weak. The Boy Scouts also blamed the parents of scouts, noting
that often parents used the organization as a babysitting service, rather than taking an active part
in their child’s scouting experience. Because of this, the Boy Scouts claimed parents were
unaware of what went on with their children, and in essence blamed them for any abuse of their
children that occurred. Finally, the Boy Scouts claimed that the parents of the scouts were
responsible for reporting allegations to the authorities, and because of this the Boy Scouts had
acted appropriately. Additionally, the Boy Scouts claimed that because they did not have
information about whether legal action was undertaken and completed, they did not have the
evidence necessary to take action more quickly, supporting the legality rationalization tactic.

172

When questioned by the media about the arrest of Bagshaw and how he was able to enter
the organization even after being placed on the Confidential File, the Scout Executive responded
noting that this event should not get blown out of proportion because the Boy Scouts was a
positive organization for boys employing thousands of leaders with occurrences like this being
very rare. While the Boy Scouts did not directly compare themselves to another organization also
experiencing similar allegations, they did attempt to draw attention away from this single
allegation in favor of addressing all of the good the organization has done. This example of the
social weighting rationalization tactic illustrates how the BSA focused on the positive done by
the organization to lessen the blow of allegations against Bagshaw.
The Bagshaw case is unique in that it presents a clear picture of the organization’s lack of
understanding about mandatory reporting laws. When first confronted with the allegations and
the request of the mother to bring them to the police, the Scout Executive noted that he was
unsure of the Boy Scout’s responsibility and conferred with legal counsel. BSA legal counsel
erroneously informed the Scout Executive that they were not mandated to report allegations and
if further action was taken it had to be done by the parents. Following this, the BSA failed to
conduct their own internal investigation of the allegations. Once media sources learned of the
BSA’s failure and the citation against the Scout Executive for his failure to report the allegations,
it became clear that the Boy Scouts did not have a formal policy outlining the duty of
organization members as mandatory reporters. Further supporting this, when questioned by the
media, the Scout Executive stated that he did not know he was mandated to report allegations.
Perhaps adding insult to injury, the BSA refused to change their policy of reporting
allegations of child sexual abuse, noting that their “policy is solid” and the Scout Executive
“took the proper steps and followed our procedures exactly.” That the BSA refused to change
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their policy, even in the face of widespread awareness of their failure, supports research finding
that sometimes organizations refuse to change merely because they don’t want to (Tichy, 1983).
This finding also questions the idea that legislation may not change organizations as much as
consequences of failing to follow legislation. Ultimately, mandatory reporting of all child abuse
allegations was not required by the Boy Scouts until 2011, roughly 24 years later.
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Case Study #8 Mark Gallick (1989)
A confidential case file was created for Mark Gallick on August 2, 1989. Gallick lived in
Cary, North Carolina and was 25 years old. At the time of his placement on the file he was single
and had no children. Gallick served as a camp staff member at a scout summer camp. Gallick
was accused of sexual abuse of a scout. The BSA conducted an internal investigation, while the
authorities also investigated the allegations. No charges were ultimately filed.
Description of Allegation and Reporting
On July 29th, 1989, the Camp Director was approached by a camp staff member who said
that a scout had woken him up and told him that he had been in his tent talking with Gallick
when Gallick grabbed his genitals. The camp staff member explained that he had praised the
scout for coming to tell him, knowing that it was difficult. The camp director confronted Gallick
with the allegations at which point he denied them. He said he was asleep in the tent and if he
had done anything it would have been in his sleep. Gallick also expressed concern for the scout,
and wanted to talk to him. The camp director told him talking to the scout was “out of the
question” but that he could talk to the Scoutmaster of the scout’s troop. The camp director and
Gallick then approached the Scoutmaster who noted that he had observed the relationship
between Gallick and the scout and that he had “been somewhat concerned, but hadn’t shared it
with anyone.” He said that Gallick had known the scout for four to five years and had visited the
scout in the orphanage where he stayed. The Scoutmaster had “noticed a lot of physical contact
between” Gallick and the scout, “lots of hugging and touching, though never in the genital area.”
The Camp Director told Gallick that “based on what I heard so far, I was putting into
effect the BSA Youth Protection Guidelines. I told him that I was not an officer of the law and
could not legally restrain him, and that he could either stay in my office or leave camp
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premises.” Gallick stated that his career would be finished (he had applied for the FBI) if
information of this got out. The Camp Director then spoke directly to the scout, who said that he
and Gallick were lying in the tent after the other camp members left. The scout said that he
hugged Gallick, who then grabbed his genitals through his shorts. The scout did the same thing
to Gallick, but felt uncomfortable and left to find the camp staff member. The camp director
noted “he [the scout] felt he was partially at fault, and I assured him that he was not at fault, had
nothing to feel guilty about, and that I was proud of him.” The camp director told the camp staff
who were aware of the issue not to discuss the matter with anyone. The camp director then called
the Scout Executive at his home and told him what happened. The camp director was instructed
to call the sheriff’s department and turn the matter over to them.
The sheriff arrived and the camp director told them what happened. The police went to
talk with the scout. When they returned, they said he had given the same story to them, but he
was “vague” and “hard to follow.” Because the scout was 17, the police told him it was his
decision as to whether to press charges. The scout declined to press charges. The police told
Gallick that since the scout didn’t want to press charges there was nothing more they could do.
As the camp director walked the police to their car they said “that there was nothing more they
could do, but that they were convinced something had happened and would be willing to attest to
that if I needed them to do so.”
The camp director then informed the Scout Executive of what happened. Gallick left
camp July 30th, 1989. Later, the Scoutmaster told the camp director that he had been worried
about the relationship, noting that “in all his years in the military, and later working at the
orphanage and in scouting, he had never observed a relationship quite like [Gallick’s] and [the
scouts].” The Camp Director sent a letter detailing the events that happened to the National
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Council on August 1, 1989. In his letter to the National Council, the Camp Director suggested
that “Mark Gallick has been an exemplary staff member and a good friend. Thus it is difficult for
me to be objective, but I must offer the following considered opinions: Gallick should be fired, a
report of the incident should be filed with the National Office and all proper steps taken to
remove him from the BSA, and the BSA attorney should be contacted and information kept on
file about Gallick.” He also stated that he had instructed anyone who knew what had occurred to
not say anything so as to not set the organization up for a defamation of character suit. The
National Council responded on August 31st, 1989 indicating that Gallick’s file was now
permanently on their file.
BSA Response
From the time abuse was first reported on July 29th, 1989 until the official closure of the
confidential file on August 31st, 1999, one month and two days passed. When justifying their
actions and the time it took them to respond, the BSA used denial of responsibility, appeal to
higher loyalties, and metaphor of the ledger as rationalization tactics. The Boy Scouts initially
denied their responsibility in addressing the allegations, noting that members of the organization
who suspected abuse never made formal reports to BSA officials. Without these formal reports,
there was no indication that abuse may have been occurring and no evidence to support Gallick’s
removal. In addition, when investigating the allegation, the police reported to the BSA that while
they suspected something had happened, there was nothing they could do. Finally, because the
scout was 17 and the police informed the Boy Scouts that he was responsible for reporting the
allegations, they left it up to the scout to decide the course of action. The scout refused to report
the allegations, and by also refusing to report the Boy Scouts denied their responsibility on the
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basis that the scout had to make the decision, while also suggesting that they were supporting the
scout’s decision to not report.
Similar to other cases, the Boy Scouts appealed to higher loyalties, asking all members of
the scout camp who were aware of the allegations to keep things quiet so as to not publicize the
allegations and bring unwanted attention on the organization. When responding to the
allegations, the Scout Executive noted that he was a good friend of Gallick and he had always
been an exemplary member, providing support for the metaphor of the ledger rationalization
tactic, which suggests that organizations try to focus on the good the member has done rather
than the deviant acts.
The Gallick file is unique in that it represents one of the very rare times that the Boy
Scouts willingly informed the police about suspected child sexual abuse. The mandatory
reporting of child sexual abuse allegations had yet to be made a requirement by the organization,
this would not occur until 2011, although mandatory reporting laws were in effect at this time in
every state. The decision of the Scout Executive to inform the police of the scout’s claims could
be a result of the manner in which the scout reported his claims and concerns for his well-being,
or a result of the Scout Executive’s awareness of mandatory reporting laws. Ultimately, this case
did not present one of the more clearly substantiated allegations, such as incidents where abuse
was witnessed. This suggests that the decision to report the abuse to the police was based solely
on the Scout Executive’s belief of what the appropriate action should be, not on specific
guidelines and policies detailing how to address abuse allegations.
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Case Study #9 William C. Prentiss (1990)
A confidential file was created for William C. Prentiss on January 22nd, 1990. Prentiss’
age was unknown, although it is known that he was married and worked as a doctor. It is
unknown whether he had children. Prentiss was a Scoutmaster for thirteen years in Florida.
Prentiss was accused of inappropriate behavior with scouts. The police investigated the case but
charges were never filed.
Description of Allegation and Reporting
On September 27th, 1989, Prentiss withdrew his registration from the BSA. The following
day, the Council President and Director of Field Services delivered a letter to Prentiss denying
his registration. At this time, Prentiss denied the claims made against him and said he was not a
child abuser. On October 9th, 1989, the National Council was alerted of the allegations. Prentiss
then requested a regional review on November 6th, 1989. At the time of his request, he claimed
that the reason for his removal stemmed from a camping trip in early September. He noted that
often he allowed the youth in his troop to dictate what they did on camping trips. On this
particular occasion, the scouts asked him to do some exercises with them, without clothing.
Prentiss noted that this was done “in an atmosphere of good sportsmanship and fun” but that
someone reported the event to law enforcement. Law enforcement then investigated the claims
and closed the case without filing charges.
A regional review committee conducted the first review of his case on February 6th, 1990
and decided they were willing to allow Prentiss to re-register as long as the chartered partner
agreed. They stated “We feel very strongly that the charter partner relationship should be
maintained and strengthened. Only the charter partner, not the Council, can give the needed
attention to selection of troop leadership and the supervision of troop leadership.”
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A local review of the Prentiss case was undertaken on July 10th, 1990, during which time
the committee found that “no charter be issued for a troop in which Dr. Prentiss was expected to
serve as an adult Scout leader and that Dr. Prentiss be requested to surrender his membership in
the Boy Scouts of America.” The committee noted that “a significant part of the committee was
concerned about the possibility of adverse publicity and resultant harm to the overall program of
the Central Florida Council if any further incidents with Dr. Prentiss occurred or if the news
media elected to pursue the matter.” This review was largely held because a local judge, in
conjunction with Prentiss, wanted to create a new Boy Scout program for juvenile offenders. The
committee noted that while they saw no issue with creating a boy scout program that was
composed of juvenile offenders referred by local judges, no charter would be issued for a troop
in which Prentiss was involved. They wrote:
All members of the committee were sensitive to the fact that no allegations against Dr.
Prentiss have been proved and that the criminal charges were dropped. It was,
nevertheless, the consensus that the charges were not brought without reason and that
actions acknowledged to have taken place by Dr. Prentiss were reflective of poor
judgement. It was the committee’s opinion that should another incident involving Dr.
Prentiss occur or that should the news media elect to publicize the matter the Central
Florida Council would be perhaps, in a legally defensible position but would clearly be in
an indefensible position as far as the public was concerned and that substantial harm to
the overall Boy Scout program in Central Florida would result.
While the committee was unanimous in their belief that Prentiss could not effectively
serve as a scout leader, they were not unanimous on whether his actions warranted removal.
Ultimately, Prentiss was allowed to stay in the organization.
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On August 2nd, 1990, a detective from the Orange County Sherriff’s department called
the Scout Executive to let him know that they had recently convicted a man for trafficking child
pornography. The officer noted that this individual had a letter from Prentiss that stated he
“appreciate[s] receipt of recent items and understand[s] need for security.” In addition, another
individual who was going to be charged in the near future was a member of Prentiss’s troop.
In August of 1990, Scouting officials met with Prentiss’ troop to discuss what they had learned
from the police and determine the steps to be taken. They decided the troop would continue
without Prentiss.
In October of 1990, Prentiss again requested that his case be reviewed. The reconvened
committee went against the previous decisions and decided that they should not register Prentiss
based on additional information made available to them. Prentiss was informed of this decision
on October 26th, 1990.
BSA Response
It is not known when exactly the BSA learned of abuse allegations, but based on the
information in the file, notification occurred at least as early as September 27th, 1989. Prentiss’s
file was officially closed on October 26th, 1990. From the time abuse was first reported on
September 27th, 1989 until the official closure of the confidential file on October 26th, 1990, one
year and twenty-nine days passed. The BSA employed the denial of responsibility and appeal to
higher loyalties rationalization tactics in the Prentiss case. Interestingly in this case, the boy
Scouts denied their responsibility to decide whether Prentiss should be removed from the
organization, noting that it was up to the chartering partner to determine whether Prentiss could
remain in the troop. This response was in direct conflict with BSA policies and procedures
stating that the Boy Scouts were ultimately responsible for selecting appropriate leaders and
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deciding if individuals were not appropriate for the organization. The appeal to higher authorities
was also illustrated in the file when the committee noted it was concerned about adverse
publicity and harm to the organization if the media focused on the allegations against Prentiss.
Eliminating negative publicity was especially important given that the organization had reviewed
Prentiss’ case in 1989 following a police investigation and had decided to allow him to remain in
the organization.
While it is not known for certain, Prentiss’ standing as a doctor and his connection to
other influential people in the community, may have influenced how the Boy Scouts responded
to his case. Upon initially learning about the abuse allegations, the police investigation revealed
no charges could be filed. Using this as support, and the fact that Prentiss was a doctor and wellconnected, the Boy Scouts may have been unwilling to accept that the allegations were true and
he should be removed from the organization. This is also potentially supported by the fact that
Prentiss’ case is only of the only case studies in which the offender was initially allowed to stay
as an active member after allegations were made and investigated by the police. Ultimately, after
additional allegations of abuse came to light, the Boy Scouts were forced to accept the reality
that Prentiss was not an acceptable scout leader.
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Case Study #10 Frank W. Skeeler (1991)
A confidential file was created for Frank W. Skeeler on September 13, 1991. Skeeler was
a forty year old bank teller in Orange, Texas. Skeeler was single and had no children. Skeeler
served as a Scoutmaster for Troop 23 in Orange, Texas from June 1985 until September 11,
1991. Skeeler was accused of several incidents involving scouts. Formal charges were never
filed.
Description of Allegation and Reporting
On August 27th, 1991, an Assistant Scoutmaster called the local Scout Executive relating
that allegations had been made against Skeeler by the parents of some scouts. The Assistant
Scoutmaster revealed that the first incident occurred several years ago when Skeeler took his
troop on a trip to Galveston, Texas. On this trip, Skeeler was caught looking at pornographic
magazines with a scout. Upon returning home from the trip, the scout informed his parents, who
discussed the incident with the Assistant Scoutmaster. The BSA member noted that at that time,
the parents of the scout knew Skeeler’s parents and “because of the situation did not want to
cause any real commotion.” The Assistant Scoutmaster and scout committee discussed what
occurred and met with Skeeler, telling him the rules were that at no time would an adult
accompany a troop alone and that adults were never allowed to share the same bed with a scout.
The scout’s father also told Skeeler that if he ever heard of this happening again he would go to
council headquarters and alert them.
The next incident occurred in August of 1990 during another Scouting trip. The troop
stopped in Fort Worth for the night and rented two rooms. The Assistant Scoutmaster informed
Skeeler that the rollaway beds were for the adults to sleep on while the boys would sleep on the
beds or the floor. At one point during the evening, the Assistant Scoutmaster walked into the
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room and found Skeeler lying in bed with one of the boys. The Assistant Scoutmaster told him to
get out of the bed and that there was no reason for him to be in the bed with the scout. Skeeler
claimed he was only listening to the radio with the scout. The final incident occurred in August
of 1991 at an Order of the Arrow meeting. While at the event, Skeeler shared a tent with a scout
at a campsite where no other scouts were camping. The scout claimed the he had no bedroll and
Skeeler asked him if he was going to take his clothes off to sleep. The scout refused and slept on
the ground in the tent. While lying there, Skeeler asked the scout if he could pop his back. The
scout told his mother who talked with other parents, including the initial victim’s mother.
The Assistant Scoutmaster stated that he didn’t think there was any evidence of sexual
abuse in any of the incidents and was upset because he was a good friend of the Skeeler and was
worried what he would do if he was removed from scouting. The Assistant Scoutmaster
suggested that the families of both the boys be interviewed. The Scout Executive met with the
BSA attorney on September 5th, 1991 who informed him that Skeeler had broken the rules by
sleeping in the tent with a scout. BSA counsel also stated that based on the available facts, they
could not make accusation of sexual misconduct. It was determined that more information was
needed. The Scout Executive met with the Assistant Scoutmaster who stated that he was not
aware of any sexual abuse or advances made by Skeeler. The Scout Executive was able to obtain
a statement from one of the scout’s mothers. On September, 9th, 1991, the Scout Executive met
with a BSA member who went on the second Scouting trip. This individual said that there was
no pornography or sexual abuse on the trip to his knowledge, however, Skeeler had physically
assaulted a scout who refused to stop playing with a bug when Skeeler told him to.
The Scout Executive spoke to an Executive from another region who noted that “if there
was no ground swell of parents pushing-don’t have grounds or enough to remove him.” He
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claimed that while Skeeler had violated the two-deep leadership policy, it was up to the troop
committee to determine the appropriate response. The Scout Executive met with the father of one
of the scouts who also provided a written statement of the incident involving Skeeler and his son.
Upon receiving this, the Scout Executive met with BSA counsel again who said they had the
necessary proof to remove Skeeler. On September 12th, 1991, the troop committee met with
Skeeler and asked him to resign. On September 16th, 1991, a letter was sent from the local
council to the National Council asking them to remove Skeeler from membership and place him
on the Confidential File. On October 25th, 1991, his file was officially closed.
BSA Response
From the time abuse was first reported on August 27th, 1991 until the official closure of
the confidential file on October 25th, 1991, one month and twenty-eight days passed. The Boy
Scouts justified their response to allegations using the rationalization tactics denial of
responsibility, metaphor of the ledger, and denial of the victim. When denying that they were
responsible for reporting the allegations or taking swift action against Skeeler, the organization
noted that they did not have enough substantiating evidence to remove Skeeler from the
organization. This determination was not just made by a Scout Executive though, but was also
supported after discussion with BSA counsel. The Boy Scouts also noted that the parents of the
scout did not want to take any additional action against Skeeler because they knew his parents
and did not want to make this into a bigger issue. The BSA used this to justify their own decision
not to report the allegations to law enforcement. After learning of additional abuse incidents, the
BSA still refused to report Skeeler noting that “if there was no ground swell of parents pushingdon’t have grounds or enough to remove him.” By stating this, the organization indicated that it
was clearly the responsibility of the parents to press for Skeeler’s removal from the organization.
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The metaphor of the ledger rationalization tactic was also clearly present when an
Assistant Scoutmaster in the Boy Scouts who was a friend of Skeeler’s stated he did not believe
the allegations were true because Skeeler had always been a model member. In addition, the
Assistant Scoutmaster denied that the scout was a victim, moving the focus away from the
allegations made against Skeeler to what would happen if they Boy Scouts removed him. The
Assistant Scoutmaster’s suggestion that Skeeler might hurt himself if he was removed from
Scouting suggested that Skeeler himself may have been a victim of emotional or mental issues
and may not have been responsible for his actions. If the Boy Scouts removed him and he hurt
himself, the Assistant Scoutmaster indicated that they would be solely responsible.
Overall, in nine out of the ten cases the BSA used the denial of responsibility
rationalization to justify the action taken. This justification often relied on the excuse that the
organization did not have enough information about the alleged acts to support reporting to the
police or removing them more quickly, or the parents of the victims were unwilling or did not
want to press formal charges. The second most common rationalization was the metaphor of the
ledger, in which the BSA often noted how the alleged offender had never had any previous
allegations against them or that they had always been a contributing and model member of the
organization. Following these rationalizations, the next two most commonly used were denial of
the victim and appeal to higher loyalties. The BSA largely used the denial of the victim
rationalization in instances where the scout denied abuse had occurred or by suggesting the scout
was an active and willing participant. Notably, the Boy Scouts most often relied on the
rationalization appeal to higher loyalties in cases where the media or outside individuals had
already learned of the abuse allegations. In these cases, removing the offender and keeping
things as quiet as possible was used more to draw negative attention away from the organization,
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rather than prevent this negative attention from occurring. In this sense, the appeal to higher
loyalties rationalization tactic served as a way to minimize the damage to the organization’s
reputation by keeping allegations as internal as possible all while limiting their interaction with
the media and individuals outside the organization.
Content analysis of files spanning from the 1960s to the early 1990s and in-depth case
study analysis revealed that rationalization tactics were relied on by the Boy Scouts of America
when justifying their decision to keep information about allegations of abuse within the
organization and determining the length of time it took them to remove the individual. Both the
content analysis and case study analysis showed that the most commonly used rationalization
was the denial of responsibility. This tactic was used in cases featuring both substantiated and
unsubstantiated abuse and often relied on the claim that the organization did not have enough
information to justify removing the individual sooner, or that the parents of the victim did not
want to press charges. The organization’s reliance on the belief that it was solely the
responsibility of parents to determine if the allegations should be brought to the police allowed
them to remove themselves from the decision-making process and allowed them to ignore their
duty as mandatory reporters.
It is important to note that the use of justifications did not necessarily signify that the
individual was not removed from the organization, but rather are useful in understanding how
members within the organization viewed deviance by other organization members and why the
Boy Scouts repeatedly decided to quietly remove the individual rather than alert police of the
allegations. Ashforth and Anand (2003) note that corruption can often be normalized or
institutionalized in organizations and that this is especially true when more than two individuals
take part in the corrupt behavior. It would appear as though this concept applies to the Boy
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Scouts of America. When responding to allegations of abuse, numerous BSA members at the
local, regional, and national level were involved in deciding how to act. The repeated procedure
of the BSA learning of allegations, refusing to report the allegations to police, and quiet removal
of the individual from the organization served to solidify this process into the structure of the
organization. The continued reliance on this process further served to routinize the BSA’s
response. Cases which featured a divergence from this process were largely different in that one
specific individual thought it was necessary to take formal action and because of this the Boy
Scout’s response was shifted.
In addition, qualitative analysis shed light on the failure of the Boy Scout’s screening
policy and practices to adequately identify potentially unsuitable members, and issues relating to
the implementation of these policies. It was not uncommon for individuals placed on the
Confidential File to successfully register in another location. In one such case, the individual
only had to change their name in order to successfully register, leading a law enforcement officer
to suggest that the Boy Scouts fingerprint their registered member. In another cases, the BSA
stated that the individual claimed they were already registered in the organization, and thus an indepth screening was not required. Both of these cases represent instances where the
organization’s screening process was not able to identify individuals who had already been
removed from the organization or instances where the Boy Scouts chose not to screen individuals
before allowing them to serve in the organization. These findings presented clear issues with the
organization’s youth protection policies. The next and final chapter addresses the overall
findings of the study and provides policy recommendations that could be useful in addressing
these failures.
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Chapter 9: Discussion & Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to address allegations of child sexual abuse against Boy
Scouts of America members and examine how the Boy Scouts responded to these allegations on
an organizational level. While this study did not address all of the issues related to reporting and
responding to sexual abuse allegations, it represented the first study of this kind of the Boy
Scouts of America. Ultimately, the findings of this study shed light on the occurrence of child
sexual abuse in the BSA and directed needed attention to the issue of organizational responses of
youth serving organizations to sexual deviance within their ranks.
Results of the analysis revealed that the majority of offenders in the organization were
younger Scoutmasters. The majority of files featured unspecified sexual abuse; however, when
details of the abuse were present the majority featured some form of explicit sexual contact. In
addition, most cases featured isolated incidents rather than numerous abuse incidents committed
by one individual. Within the sample of BSA allegations, the majority of victims disclosed their
abuse to a parent or immediate family member. These findings, and others presented in this
dissertation, represented the first information known about offenders within the Boy Scouts of
America. The findings of the current study were interesting when compared to studies of
professional perpetrators having found that those who target organizations in order to offend are
more likely to be older, not have children, and are less likely to be in sexual relationships with
adults (Haywood, 1994; Sullivan & Beech, 2004). Similarly, offenders in the BSA were also less
likely to have children or be married, although they were more likely to be younger. These
findings provided interesting parallels between research on professional perpetrators and
offenders within the BSA, but also outlined significant differences that may be indicative of the
Boy Scouts’ organization.
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When learning of abuse incidents, it was most common for the BSA to be informed via
phone calls. While there was not information as to why individuals chose to alert the BSA using
phone calls rather than in person or through some other method, it is very likely that the method
could be directly related to the individual reporting this abuse to the organization. In response to
allegations of abuse, in the majority of cases the Boy Scouts relied on informal methods to deal
with alleged offenders, favoring removal from the organization over reporting of allegations to
law enforcement. Analysis of responses across regions found that there were not significant
differences in the BSA’s response between the South, Northeast, Midwest, and West, despite the
decentralized nature of the organization. The BSA’s reliance on informal responses within the
organization when dealing with abuse allegations against members suggests that the organization
was aware of the harm that could occur to its reputation and mission had allegations been made
public. These findings also suggested a calculated effort on the part of the Boy Scouts to deal
with allegations as quietly as possible in order to maintain their legitimacy and standing within
society. These findings provided full support for hypotheses 2b and 2c, and partial support for
hypothesis 1a and 1b. A table of significant findings is provided in Appendix D.
Survival analysis showed that the median survival time before a confidential file was
created was 24.6 months. In the context of formal responses to allegations, analyses showed that
older offenders and Assistant Scoutmasters were less likely to be referred to law enforcement or
mental health treatment. Individuals who had allegations against scouts were more likely to
result in formal responses. In addition, individuals who did not have allegations of non-sexual
abuse were less likely to result in formal responses. Analyses also addressed the factors
influencing the BSA’s response time: Offenders who had allegations of more than three abuse
incidents, those who had female victims, those who were formally charged, and those cases

190

where the police informed the BSA about possible allegations all resulted in a shorter time from
initial reporting to placement on the Confidential File. Older offenders, those who had
allegations against a scout, those allegations in councils in the Western region, and those
individuals who had prior child sexual abuse histories all resulted in longer response times by the
BSA. These findings only provided partial support for hypothesis 4d.
Finally, the intervention analysis examined whether the BSA’s implementation of their
two-deep leadership policy, designed to reduce the incidence of child sexual abuse, influenced
the number of reports received by the organization. Results showed that the implementation of
this policy actually increased the number of reports of child sexual abuse against organization
members, providing no support for hypothesis 5. However, this increase could be due to other
factors, such as an overall increase in mandatory reporting occurring at the time or a lagged
effect between when abuse occurred and when it was reported to the organization. This finding
underscored the need to examine the effectiveness of policies implemented to reduce child
sexual abuse in youth serving organizations and the impact these policies may have on reporting
within the organization.
The current study also relied on qualitative analysis to provide greater detail about two
aspects: 1) how the Boy Scouts replied to allegations against organization members and 2) to
further examine whether BSA officials relied on rationalization tactics as a means of justifying
their response and how long it took them to complete it. Qualitative content analysis and case
study analysis revealed that the organization did in fact use rationalization tactics, relying heavily
on the denial of responsibility and metaphor of the ledger justifications, providing support for
hypothesis 6. Using these justifications, the organization argued that they were either not
required to take formal action or did not have substantial evidence to justify a more serious
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response. They were simultaneously focusing on the positive role the individual played in the
organization rather than the allegations that were made against them.
Although this study was exploratory in nature, the findings provided important
information about the extent of child sexual abuse within the Boy Scouts and lay a foundation
from which future research on child sexual abuse within youth serving organizations can build.
The application of institutional theories and organizational theories to the issue of organizational
responses to child sexual abuse also has several important implications for research on the topic
of organizational responses to deviance.
9.1 Implications for Research and Theory
While research has addressed the characteristics of child sexual offenders in general, very
few studies have looked specifically at the characteristics of offenders within youth serving
organizations. Research has also noted the existence of professional perpetrators and the threat
they pose to youth serving organizations, leading to an increased focus on policies and
procedures for screening members (Saul & Audage, 2007). It is indeed important to focus on
implementing policies and procedures designed to protect youth, but it is misguided to create
these policies and procedures without first knowing the true extent of the issue and how these
offenders and incidents are similar or different from what we already know about child sexual
abuse. The current study extended this literature by providing additional information about
abusers within the Boy Scouts of America, noting who these offenders are, who their victims are,
and details of the abuse incident.
Research has repeatedly found that child sexual abuse is an important issue in youth
serving organizations (Wolfe et al., 2003; Shakeshaft, 2004; Beck et al., 2010). Despite this,
information on how these organizations respond to abuse allegations and the effectiveness of
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policies implemented to protect youth members is sorely lacking. To date, no studies have been
conducted on the organizational responses of youth serving organizations to allegations of child
sexual abuse within their organization. This study represented the first examination of how a
youth serving organization learned of abuse allegations, how they responded to these allegations,
and the policies and procedures they put in place to prevent abuse by organization members.
While traditional organizational theories, such as institutional theory, have been used in
organizational psychology literature to explain how internal and external factors influence how
organizations function, very little research has addressed how organizational theories could
explain why and how organizations respond to deviance by their members. Ultimately, the
internal and external factors that influence an organization’s development and functioning may
also play an important role in dictating how that same organization will address deviance by
members within its ranks. The current study was the first to apply organizational theories to
explain how the Boy Scouts of America responded to abuse allegations and how the
organization’s development and relationship with outside society influenced their actions. The
results of the study suggested that organizations are not completely divorced from the larger
environment in which they find themselves, especially when determining how to respond to
deviance. In the case of the Boy Scouts, the desire to maintain organizational legitimacy and
avoid stigmatization resulting from widespread knowledge of abuse within the organization led
the BSA to ignore laws requiring mandatory reporting of child abuse allegations in favor of
internal removal of the individual. By doing this, the BSA exhibited symbolic management of
societal expectations, claiming to take appropriate action to protect youth and respond quickly to
abuse allegations. In reality focus was placed on removing these individuals and maintaining the
organization’s moral standing in society. These findings hint at a more complex relationship
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between organizations and the larger environment that could be useful in explaining how other
types of organizations respond to other forms of deviance.
The current study also expanded research on the rationalizations used by organizations to
justify action taken in response to deviance. Techniques of neutralization created by Sykes and
Matza have been modified to apply to organizational responses to corruption, resulting in seven
rationalization tactics. While these tactics have been applied to organizational responses to
corruption, these studies have mostly focused on forms of white-collar crime and corruption
within larger organizations (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Anand et al., 2005; Rabl & Kuhlmann
2009). This study represented the first time rationalization tactics were used to explain
organizational responses to child sexual abuse. The findings indicated that rationalization tactics
were in fact employed by the BSA to justify the action taken against alleged abusers and that the
use of these rationalizations remained constant throughout the years for which cases were
available. Content analysis of the 250 files ranging from the 1960s to the early 1990s showed
that throughout all of these decades the organization repeatedly relied on these justifications
when deciding how to act. They provided internal justification to BSA officials as well as
external justification to individuals outside the organization. The BSA results also shed light on
how deviance, or in this case the refusal to report child sexual abuse allegations, became
institutionalized and normalized within the organization. This is especially important given the
fact that organizational deviance often requires a unified response from numerous individuals
within the organization, who outside of the organization would be considered paragons of moral
integrity. Only by understanding the dynamics that occur between an organization and society
and those within the organization itself can we truly understand how deviance occurs at the
organizational level, why it occurs, and implement policies and procedures to reduce it.
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Although this study was exploratory in nature, it provided ample suggestions for future
research. Future research should continue to address the characteristics of abusers and abuse
within youth serving organizations. Although it was beyond the scope of the current study, it
appears that child sexual abuse is a substantial issue in the BSA and most likely other youth
serving organizations. Further research should examine personality traits, developmental
experiences, and professional pathways that could distinguish offenders in youth serving
organizations from non-offenders in these institutions. Research should also examine the extent
to which offenders within youth serving organizations are similar or different from what is
known about perpetrators of child sexual abuse in general. Research ought to distinguish
individuals who offend in organizations, or those individuals who target these organizations in
order to defend, from non-offenders in the organization. This categorization could also be useful
in helping organizations appropriately screen volunteers and members and implement policies
that can reduce the opportunity for child sexual abuse to occur.
This study represented the first examination of how a youth serving organization learned
of abuse allegations and the methods chosen to respond to these allegations. Future research
should continue this line of study, examining how other organizations, such as other youth
serving organizations, Colleges and Universities, and the military respond to allegations of
sexual abuse. Ultimately, characteristics of the abuser and incident, the method of discovery of
allegations, and characteristics of the organization itself may all influence how organizations
react to allegations. Future research should also examine the presence of rationalization tactics
used in other organizations serving children, and in organizations in general, as a means of
justify organizational responses and deviance. It is known that individuals often rely on
justifications to explain their deviant actions (Sykes & Matza, 1957), and this study suggested
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that organizations are not that different. Future studies would be wise to examine how
organizations use these rationalizations to explain their behavior and the processes that occur to
institutionalize and normalize this type of behavior within the organization. Research should also
address how organizations are able to influence individual members to conform to behaviors and
actions that would be viewed as deviant by society. For example, why were individual members
within the Boy Scouts compliant with simply removing offenders rather than referring these
individuals to law enforcement? This dissertation has provided ample areas for future research,
and also provides important implications for policy within youth serving organizations.

9.2 Implications for Policy
Policies aimed at reducing sexual offending often take the form of laws focused on
punishing offenders. While these laws have grown in scope, quantity, as well as unintended
consequences, little research has addressed the specific responses of organizations to child sexual
abuse. This research was undertaken with the goal of informing the larger scientific community
as to how the culture of child focused institutions may influence their response to allegations of
child sexual abuse. We also aimed to discover whether this information can be used to
implement policies to prevent child sexual abuse by members and facilitate the mandatory
reporting of sexual abuse by organization members.
Research has largely questioned the effectiveness of criminal background checks for
employees and volunteers and educational programs, designed to teach children how to identify
dangerous situations, refuse advances, and ask for help, in reducing sexual victimization.
Education programs are believed to promote disclosure of abuse and understanding of
appropriate and inappropriate behavior, although no studies have evaluated the extent to which
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these policies actually reduce sexual victimization. Similarly, the effectiveness of criminal
background checks in reducing sexual victimization has received little attention in the literature
(Finkelhor, 2009).
Despite this lack of research, entities such as the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services have presented strategies for child sexual abuse prevention programs in youth serving
organizations. These strategies usually include six key components, namely screening and
selection of appropriate employees and volunteers, creating guidelines on interactions between
adults and children, creating policies for monitoring behavior, ensuring safe environments,
responding to inappropriate behavior and allegations/suspicions of abuse, and training
organization members on child sexual abuse prevention (Saul & Audage, 2007). Based on these
recommendations and the information gained from the current study, some important policy
recommendations for the Boy Scouts of America are apparent.
The Boy Scout’s refusal to report allegations to law enforcement officials and the lack of
understanding of mandatory reporting laws suggests that changes need to be made to the way in
which the organization trains individuals on mandatory reporting. In several files, it was obvious
that organization members were not aware that their work with children designated them as
mandatory reporters of suspected child abuse. These findings suggested the organization should
include in all Youth Protection materials a detailed discussion of mandatory reporting laws and
the responsibility of their members to comply with these laws, as well as in-depth training on
how to identify potential indicators of abuse and the process to report allegations to appropriate
authorities. In 2011, the BSA instituted mandatory reporting of all allegations of abuse within the
organization to the individual in charge at the time and the local Scout Executive. While this
requires that BSA officials are informed of abuse allegations, it did not mandate that anyone
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aware of allegations of sexual abuse by members report to law enforcement or child protective
services. This policy requires that individuals first report to the organization, who will then
report allegations to the appropriate authorities. Findings that Scout Executives were unaware of
the responsibility of the organization to report suspected child sexual abuse suggests that the
policy that BSA members should bring suspicions to BSA officials who will then report abuse
poses potential issues. From an organizational standpoint, this policy allows the Boy Scouts to
determine if and when allegations are reported, shifting the responsibility from organization
members to BSA officials. However, from a child protection standpoint this policy violates
mandatory reporting laws. The BSA’s requirement that individual members report to BSA
officials rather than report directly to law enforcement adds an additional layer of reporting that
could potentially inhibit the timely reporting of allegations, and in some cases allow for
continued abuse to occur.
Instead, all members should be instructed that it is their duty to report to the appropriate
authorities immediately upon learning of allegations. Ultimately, the Boy Scouts must place the
safety and protection of their youth members above the desire to shield the organization from
negative criticism resulting from publicized allegations. The Boy Scouts could follow a page
from the Big Brothers Big Sisters handbook and create a manual featuring indicators of abuse,
appropriate responses by organization members, and a section on the individual’s role as a
mandatory reporter. Doing this would certainly eliminate any confusion among BSA members as
to how they should respond to allegations and allow for the prompt reporting of abuse
allegations.
While the BSA instituted mandatory youth protection training for all volunteers in the
organization in 2010, this dissertation found that Boy Scout professionals, including Scout
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Executives, were often times the perpetrators of abuse. This suggests that all individuals within
the organization, regardless of their position as a volunteer or paid member, should be required
to undergo this training. Any organization featuring both adult and youth members should be
aware that the power differential between adults and youth inherently creates an environment
where abuse can occur. Because of this, all members of these organizations should be properly
trained as to appropriate and inappropriate behavior and on how to identify possible indicators
that abuse is occurring. Additionally, youth members should also be informed of what behavior
is appropriate, what behavior is not appropriate, and informed of the importance of reporting
inappropriate behavior when it occurs. By addressing the issue of sexual abuse head on, the BSA
would make it clear to all members, adult and youth alike, that there is zero-tolerance for this
type of behavior and all allegations will be taken seriously.
Results of the current study also found issues with the BSA’s screening of new members
and consultation of the Confidential File. Analysis of the files often found that individuals within
the organization had prior criminal histories for both sexual and non-sexual offenses. The BSA
instituted full criminal background checks for all professionals in 1994 and all volunteers in
2008. This should address the issue of allowing individuals with prior criminal histories into the
organization. However, as noted in one of the case studies, an individual was able to successfully
re-register because he claimed to already be registered in the organization. The Boy Scouts did
not run these “multiple” registrations against the Confidential File. In order to close this loophole
in the screening process, all individuals should be compared to the Confidential File, regardless
of claims that they are already registered in another troop or council in the BSA.
Additionally, individuals were often able to re-register because of the nature of the
Confidential File. The confidential files were paper copies of materials of allegations against

199

BSA members submitted by local and regional BSA members to the National Council. All files
were housed with the National Council, with local and regional councils having no access to the
information. Only the National Council was able to refer to the Confidential File, a practice
which is still in effect today. Ultimately, this system made it possible for individuals to
successfully re-register. A computerized Confidential File system that could be accessed by the
National Council, as well as regional and local Executives, would serve to increase the ability of
local councils to screen their own registration applications. It would also reduce the length of
time it took to complete this screening process. In addition, the Confidential File should feature
information about the individual that can be used to successfully identify them if they re-register,
such as fingerprints or Social Security Numbers. The use of fingerprint screening was suggested
by one law enforcement official to the BSA and would eliminate the ability of someone placed
on the Confidential File to re-register by simply changing their name.
Another important contribution of this dissertation was the examination of a specific
policy instituted by the BSA to reduce instances of organizational CSA. If polices like the BSA’s
two-deep policy are useful tools for reducing the occurrence of institutional CSA, it would be
beneficial for other youth serving organizations to adopt similar policies as a means of protecting
their youth. Results of the current study revealed that the two-deep leadership policy did not
reduce the number of reports. However, these findings alone cannot be used to support the claim
that the policy was ineffective due to lack of information about when abuse incidents occurred
within the Boy Scouts in comparison to the policy’s implementation. The information available
about abuse incidents within the BSA showed that they often occurred when adults had one-onone contact with youth. This indicates that the policy may be effective in reducing the occurrence
of child sexual abuse. The real determination of the effectiveness of this policy and others like it
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is wholly based on the extent to which it is enforced by the organization. Although beyond the
current scope of this study, research on child protection policies instituted by youth serving
organizations should address the fidelity with which these policies are implemented in order to
accurately determine their efficacy. Along with this, organizations need to institute quality
control procedures to ensure that policies are being followed and failure to follow these policies
results in immediate disciplinary action. Ultimately, the policy recommendations suggested
above may be useful for the Boy Scouts of America, as well as other youth serving
organizations, in an effort to protect youth members from sexual abuse.

9.3 Limitations
As with all research, there are some limitations to this dissertation. Since this dissertation
was both exploratory and the first to address how the BSA responded to allegations of child
sexual abuse, the ability of these findings to be generalized to other youth serving organizations,
or adult serving organizations, is not ensured. In addition, the sample used only contained files
on those cases that were reported to the Boy Scouts of America and were made public as a result
of court rulings. This underestimates the true extent of sexual abuse within the BSA and may
overestimate both formal and informal action taken by the BSA against members with abuse
allegations. Another important limitation of the current study was the reliance on files which
report allegations of sexual abuse, not necessarily substantiated cases. While some files feature
law enforcement documents detailing that the allegations eventually led to a criminal conviction,
not all files feature this. Thus, while the majority of files pertain to actual sexual abuse
committed by BSA agents, it is possible that some of the files feature false allegations.
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The records released by the BSA date from 1959-1991. This was a limitation of the
current study because the BSA instituted policies beginning in 1994 which specifically aim to
prevent the occurrence of institutional CSA. Since the files in the current dataset only range from
1959-1991, these files do not reflect any of the prevention methods taken by the BSA to reduce
the occurrence of child sexual abuse within the organization. In order to determine the effect of
these policies on allegations of child sexual abuse, data on allegations made after 1991 are
required. The BSA themselves note on their website that:
The Ineligible Volunteer Files maintained by the BSA have always served solely as a
barrier to entry preventing those who are ineligible to serve as Scout leaders from joining
or rejoining Scouting. Suggesting that they would provide any greater insight from a
research perspective reflects a misunderstanding of the purpose and content of the files.
The BSA believes—and independent, third-party experts have confirmed—there is
nothing in the files that would further the research field or help develop a profile to
prevent abuse (Boy Scouts of America, 2014).
Unless a similar lawsuit successfully requires the organization to release these files, it is
unlikely that researchers will be able to examine child sexual abuse allegations within the
organization dating after 1991.
The nature of the information provided in the cases also presented a limitation. The
information featured in the files is based on data collected by BSA officials. Because of this, the
information contained in each file differs. While some files are extensive in nature and provide
more than adequate information, other files feature scant information. The difference in
information contained in the files ultimately affects the reliability and validity of findings. Due to
the lack of information on the issue of child sexual abuse in the Boy Scouts, the current sample
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represents the most complete picture available to date. The files featured a wealth of information
about abuse within the organization and the organization’s response. However, there are
undoubtedly factors that are not featured in the files that would shed further light on the issue of
institutional child sexual abuse, including variables relating to the short and long-term
consequences for victims and information about prior and post criminal behaver by these
individuals. The lack of information on the exact timing of abuse also limits the ability to
examine offending patterns of offenders within the organization and the relationship between
when offenders joined the organization and when abuse first occurred. Further, the lack of
information on when abuse occurred limits understanding of the time between when abuse
incidents took place and when disclosure of the abuse first occurred.
Finally, missing data was a limitation of the current study. Meticulous and in-depth
coding of all files provided rich and detailed information about abuse allegations and responses,
but this was only possible when the BSA had adequately investigated allegations and included
this information in the files. Ultimately, the availability of data for each case was wholly
dependent on the rigor with which internal investigations were conducted by the Boy Scouts of
America. As previously stated, quantitative analysis was run both with the original dataset and
with missing data imputed in order to overcome the limitations of missing data.
Despite the limitations listed above, this study has the potential to shed light on how the
BSA responded to allegations of child sexual abuse by organization members and provide
greater insight into organizational responses to child sexual abuse. More importantly, this
dissertation helped to illuminate how one very important youth serving organization, the Boy
Scouts of America, handled its own CSA crisis.
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9.4 Conclusion
The goal of this dissertation was threefold. First, analysis of the characteristics of
offending provided insight into common offending patterns in the BSA. Second, the use of event
history analysis and multivariate statistics examined how the BSA responded to allegations and
how long it took them to respond to allegations of abuse, noting the factors that predicted a
quicker institutional response. In addition, intervention analysis addressed the extent to which
policies implemented by the Boy Scouts for the express purpose of reducing sexual abuse were
effective. Finally, the use of qualitative content analysis and case study approaches allowed for a
greater understanding of how the BSA responded to allegations of sexual abuse internally,
including how BSA officials viewed the accused and whether this influenced the decision that
was made regarding the allegations. This research represents the first step in the examination of
child sexual abuse in youth serving organizations and their responses to this issue.
While the majority of studies address characteristics of offending in order to develop
policies aimed specifically at offenders, this dissertation took a more innovative approach by
addressing the role and dynamics of institutions in addressing allegations of CSA. By
understanding the complex relationship between organizational structure, culture, and sexual
abuse, perhaps we can develop policies and practices which protect youth in these youth serving
institutions prior to being victimized, rather than focus on policies and procedures designed
solely to respond to abuse that has already occurred. Organizations cannot be viewed as isolated
from their larger environment. If organizations are viewed as isolated entities, researchers cannot
truly understand why organizations respond to abuse in certain manners and how their actions
are influenced by the larger society. This dissertation aimed to fill this gap in research,
specifically when dealing with child sexual abuse in the BSA, and perhaps provides a framework
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to study the response of other organizations to child sexual abuse and other forms of deviance by
organization members.
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Appendix A: Boy Scouts of America Youth Protection Policies
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Appendix B: Operationalizations of Rationalization Tactics
Study
Elliason & Dodder
(1999)

Cressey (1953)

Conklin (1977)

Greenberg (1990)

Friedrichs (1996)

Copes, Vieraitis, &
Jochum (2007)

Subject Matter
Deer Poaching

Sample
Survey of 42
poachers; indepth
interviews
with 20
poachers and
5 game
wardens

Operationalization
Denial of Responsibility- situation
as mistake or accident; didn’t know
the law prohibited it; laws not
written clearly
Metaphor of the Ledger- good
person in spite of the incident, good
qualities make up for this one
instance
Defense of Necessity- they needed
the deer meet to feed themselves
and their family
Condemnation of the CondemnersBelieved the game wardens hunted
deer illegally as well
Embezzlement 133 convicted Denial of Injury- only borrowing
embezzlers
the money and going to pay it back,
no actual harm caused
White-collar
N/A
Condemnation of condemnersoffenders
government impedes efforts
through strict regulation of business
practices, inhibits free enterprise
Appeal to Higher loyaltiesabsorbed in workplace climate that
has success and accomplishments
as higher loyalties than government
regulations
Employee
143 nonunion Denial of Victim- employer didn’t
theft
employees at give raise to they deserved
manufacturing victimization
plants
White collar
N/A
Denial of Responsibility- pollution
crime
laws are too complex or vague;
pollution happened by accident,
forced to do so by superiors
Reid
59 federally
Denial of Injury-it didn’t hurt
Interrogations convicted
anyone, different than normal crime
of Identity
identity
because with identity theft there is
thieves
thieves
no real harm and they can repair the
damage easily
Denial of Victim- large, faceless
organization that deserved
victimization
Appeal to Higher Loyalties- they
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Piquero, Tibbetts, &
Blankenship (2005)

Corporate
133 MBA
offending in
students
the promotion
and sales of a
hypothetical
pharmaceutical
drug

Ashforth & Anand
(2003)

Organizational
corruption

N/A

Anand, Ashforth, &
Joshi (2005)

Organizational
corruption

N/A
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are actually trying to help people,
“for the safety of my kids”
Denial of Responsibility- only
played a minimal role, “really
didn’t do anything”
Denial of Injury- “the government
exaggerates the danger to
consumers from most products”
Condemnation of condemners“government regulations impede
business”
Appeal to Higher Loyalties- “profit
is emphasized above everything
else at my place of work”
Denial of Victim- “caveat emptor’
(let the buyer beware) is the motto
of my employer”
Denial of Responsibility- “where I
work, it is all right to do anything
to make profit unless it is against
the law”
Legality- the behavior is not
actually illegal
Denial of Responsibility- no other
choice, forced to participate due to
factors beyond their control
Denial of Injury- didn’t cause
harm, organization is insured
Denial of Victim- they deserved
what happened or participated, the
victim is dehumanized
Social Weighting- they compare
themselves to a selective social
comparison
Appeal to Higher Loyalties- have to
sacrifice to realize higher values
Metaphor of the Ledger- entitled to
act corruptly because of accrued
good works
Refocusing Attention- suppress
knowledge of acts or
compartmentalize wrongdoing
Denial of Responsibility- “What
can I do? My arm is being twisted”
Denial of Injury- “No one was
really harmed,” “It could have been

Rabl & Kuhlmann
(2009)

Corporate
corruption

196 German
University
students
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worse”
Denial of Victim- “They deserved
it,” “They chose to participate”
Social Weighting- “You have not
right to criticize,” “Others are
worse than we are”
Appeal to Higher Loyalties- “We
answered to a more important
cause”
Metaphor of the Ledger- “We’ve
earned the right”
Legality- “It’s not written anywhere
that this is not allowed”
Denial of Responsibility- “It was
the only chance to increase our
profit,” “Everybody does it”
Denial of Injury- “It didn’t harm
anybody. It paid off for
everybody,” “It was only about
relatively small amounts”
Denial of Victim- “Because of the
competitors? It doesn’t matter that
they once also get the short
end of the stick,” “Why? Because
of the competitors who miss out?
That’s business”
Social Weighting- “To get orders,
others are doing things that are
even worse”
Appeal to Higher Loyalties- “I only
did everything to increase the order
situation and the income of our
company,” “I only tried to maintain
a good business relationship with a
good customer”
Metaphor of the Ledger- “Why
shouldn’t I take advantage of the
good business relationship I
developed over several years”
Refocusing Attention- “After all I
got the order for our business”

Appendix C: Boy Scouts of America Ineligible Files Codebook
Variable Name

Values

Missing Values

BOXID

Enter number of the BOX

No missing values

FILEID

Enter last 4 digits of the PDF file

No missing values

CASEID

Computed from BOX+FILE ID

No missing values

FILEDATE
(Date on Record
Sheet)

Enter date from record sheet
mm/dd/yyy
*Date that ineligible file was created
for individual by BSA

FYEAR (file year)

Enter year of filing from record sheet

-99

CITY

Enter City name

-99

STATE

Enter 2-character State Name

AGE
(Age of accused)

Enter age of accused

RELIGION
(of accused)

Enter Religion of accused from record
sheet

NATIONALITY
(of accused)

Enter Nationality of accused from record
sheet

OCCUPATION

Enter Occupation from record sheet

-99

-99

-99

-99

-99

-99

-99
INTERESTS

Enter ”Interests” from record sheet

CHARACT

Enter “Outstanding characteristics” from
record sheet
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-99

-99
MARRIED
(Yes if ever married)

1 = Yes

2 = No
-99

CHILDREN
(How many children
does the Abuser have?)
Ls1month
(month registered)

1=January 5=May 9=September -99
2= February 6=June 10= October
3=March
7=July 11=November
4=April
8=August 12=December
-99

Ls1year
(year registered)

Enter YEAR REGISTERED from the
Life Scout entry on the record sheet

LSDATE1
(date registered)

Enter DATE REGISTERED from the
Life Scout entry on the record sheet

-99

Ls2month
(month resigned)

1=January 5=May 9=September -99
2= February 6=June 10= October
3=March
7=July 11=November
4=April
8=August 12=December
-99

Ls2year
(year resigned)

Enter YEAR RESIGNED from the
Life Scout entry on the record sheet
-99

LSDATE2
(date resigned)

Enter DATE RESIGNED from the
Life Scout entry on the record sheet
-99

ABDATE1
(BSA abuse start date)

Enter date BSA abuse started –only if
a date is given - in form mm/dd/yyyy

ABDATE2
(BSA abuse end date)

Enter date BSA abuse ended –only if
a date is given - in form mm/dd/yyyy

YEARFIRST
(first year of abuse)

Enter first year of abuse if no specific
data is given - in form yyyy

-99

-99
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-99
YEARLAST
(last year of abuse)

Enter last year of abuse if no specific
data is given - in form yyyy
-99

RPTDATE
(Date abuse was first
reported to ANY BSA
member)
BSARESPO
(How did the BSA
respond to allegations
of abuse?)

BSARESP2
(Second response if
applicable)

DISCLO1
(To whom was abuse
first disclosed?)

DISCLOT (who
reported abuse as text)
ALLHOW

Enter date abuse was reported to
BSA–only if a date is given in form
mm/dd/yyyy

1- Referral to law enforcement
2- Referral to mental health
treatment
3- Removal from the
organization
4- Other
1- Referral to law enforcement
2- Referral to mental health
treatment
3- Removal from the
organization
4- Other

-99

Victim
Teacher
Cleric
Parent/Guardian
Police officer (Any CRJ)
Lay person (include friends)
Doctor
Victim’s attorney
Self-reported
Other
Siblings/other family
Anonymous
Counselor/Therapist

-99

01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13

Enter text of who reported
abuse
Called BSA 01
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-99

List values for 10 (Other):
__________________
__________________
__________________
__________________
__________________
__________________
__________________

-99

-99 = data missing

(How was abuse
reported? )

Sent a letter
Sent anon. letter
In person
Media
Legal filing
BSA contacted victim

Other unrelated adult
Accused self-report
Police/any CRJ auth
SNAP, victim hotline
School representative
Other
ALLHOWT (how was
abuse reported-text)

ABUSHIST
(Number of events of
abuse in reported case)

ABUSECT (Actual
count of abuse events,
if available)

FEMVIC
(Any evidence of
female victims)

02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13

List values for 13 (Other):
__________________
__________________
__________________
__________________
__________________
__________________
__________________

-99
Enter source of reported abuse as text.

Once = 1
More than once (2 to 3 times) = 2
Numerous times (more than 3 times)
=3
1=1
2=2
3=3

4= 4
5=5

-99 = data missing

-99 = data missing
-77 = don’t know

Female =2 Transexual=3

9 = data missing

-99
MULTIPLE
(Any evidence of other
victims)

Yes = 1 No = 2

NUMBER
(Number of victims)

Enter number of victims

AGEVENT1
(Age of first victim at
time of event, or when
abuse began)

Enter age of victim at beginning of
abuse
If an age range is given (i.e., 12-13,
enter the midpoint - 12.5)
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-99

-99

-99
AGEATEND1
(Age of first victim
when abuse ended)

AGEVENT2
(Age of second victim
at time of event, or
when abuse began)

st

Enter age of 1 victim at end of abuse
If an age range is given (i.e., 12-13,
enter the midpoint - 12.5)
Enter age of 1st victim at start of
abuse
If an age range is given (i.e., 12-13,
enter the midpoint - 12.5)

-99

-99
AGEATEND2
(Age of second victim
when abuse ended)

AGEEVENT3
(Age of third victim at
time of event, or when
abuse began)

Enter age of 2nd victim at end of
abuse
If an age range is given (i.e., 12-13,
enter the midpoint - 12.5)
Enter age of 3rd victim at beginning of
abuse
If an age range is given (i.e., 12-13,
enter the midpoint - 12.5)

-99

-99
AGEATEND3
(Age of second victim
when abuse ended)

Enter age of 3rd victim at end of
abuse
If an age range is given (i.e., 12-13,
enter the midpoint - 12.5)

AGEVENT4
(Age of third victim
when abuse ended)

Enter age of 4th victim at beginning
of abuse
If an age range is given (i.e., 12-13,
enter the midpoint - 12.5)

AGEATEND4 (Age of
third victim when
abuse ended)

Enter age of 4th victim at end of abuse -99
If an age range is given (i.e., 12-13,
enter the midpoint - 12.5)

CONNECT
(How did abuser first
meet victim?)

BSA group 01
Pre BSA 02
Other 03

-99

-99 = data missing

Other
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CONNECTT
(How did abuse first
meet victim text)

Enter text of how abuser met
victim
Scoutmaster
Assistant Scoutmaster
Boy scout professional
Other

DUTY
(What was the abusers
role in BSA at time of
abuse)
DUTYT(Abusers role
in BSA text)

Enter text of abusers role in
BSA

SOCIAL1
(Did the abuser
socialize with the
victim outside BSA?)

Yes = 1

SOCIAL2
Type of socializing

SOCIALT
(social behavior text)

01
02
03
04

-99 = data missing
-88 = not applicable
(no family)

No = 2

No information = 3

Work on Merit Badge
Time in Abuser’s residence
Rides home
Vacations
Camping
Sports
Other
Visits to victim’s home
Enter text of social behavior

-99 = data missing

01
02
03
04
05
06
07
10

-99 = data missing
-88 = not applicable
(If answer to Q18 is 2)
List values for 7 (Other):
__________________
__________________
__________________

-99
GIFTS
(Victim given gifts?)

Yes = 1

No = 2

GIFTTYPE
(Type of gift as text)

Type of gift – write in the kind of gift

-99

-99
ENTICE
(Victim given other
enticements?)
ENTICETYPE
(type of enticement as
text)

Yes = 1

No = 2

-99
Type of enticement, write it in
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-99
PORN
(Did the abuser share
pornography?)

Yes = 1

No = 2

-99
PORNTYPE
(Type of pornography
as text)

Type of porn, write it in
Magazines
Photos
Videos
Photos & Videos
Other

01
02
03
04
05

Verbal
Abuser disrobed
Victim disrobed
Hugs and kissing
Photos of victim
Sexual games
Unspecified sexual abuse
Touch over abuser’s clothes
Touch over victim’s clothes
Touch under abuser’s clothes
Touch under victim’s clothes
Abuser perform oral sex
Vic performed oral sex
Masturbation
Mutual masturbation
Manual penetration
Group sex or coerced se
Penetration or attempt
Penetration w/object
Other

01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

RPORNTYPE
(Recoded Porntype)

ABEHAV –
ABEHAV2
(Type of behavior
alleged by victim –
with 20 values:
Enter the most serious
in for first variable,
then add any others to
the next two)

ABEHAVT
(abuse behavior text)

-99 = data missing
(Use only if PORN = 1 and
there is no further
information)

Missing = -99
List values for 19 (Other):
_________________
__________________
__________________
__________________
__________________
__________________
__________________

Enter abuse behavior as text

-99
VTHREAT
(Victim threatened?)

Yes = 1

No = 2
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VTHREAT2
(If yes to Q21, what
type of threat? )

VTHREATT(victim
threatened text)
AOCCUR1AOCCUR2
(Where was the abuse
reported to have
happened)

Phys. threat w/weapon
Phys. threat w/o weapon
Verbal
Other (i.e.- merit badges)
None

1
2
3
4
5

-99 = data missing
Use if VTHREAT = 1
but no further info

01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

-99
List values for 12 (Other):
_________________
__________________
__________________
__________________

Enter text of victim threat
In church
In victim’s home
In school
In a hotel room
Retreat house
Abuser’s home

Abuser’s office
In the hospital
In a car
Vacation house
Outings/camp/park/pool
Other
In tent
No Record / unknown
Congregate residence
In other residences (cleric's
friends, family)
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atime1 – atime2
(When did the abuse
reportedly occur?)

atimet (where did
abuse reportedly
occur as text)

During a retreat
Church service (before, during,
after)
During travel
During counseling
During social event
During reconciliation
During sporting event
During other travel
Outings
School hours (before, during,
after)
Other
No record / unknown
Abuser visited home
Visiting/working at Abuser’s
home
Hospital visit

Guardian2 (was
another adult present
when abuse
occurred?)
VLIVE
(Who did the victim
live with when

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

-99
List values for 11 (Other):
__________________
__________________
__________________
__________________

11
12
13
14
15
16

Enter text of where abuse
occurred

TIME (At what time
of day did the abuse
occur?)
Guardian (How
many individuals
were present while
abuse occurred?)

1
2

Morning
Afternoon
Evening
Overnight

1
2
3
4
-99

1=1
2=2
3=3

-99
Yes = 0

No=1

Mother only
Father only
Both parents
Brother(s)
218

01
02
03
04

-99 = data missing
-77 = not known

abused?)

Sister(s)
Other guardian
Grandparents
Boarding school
Foster parents
Orphanage/institution
Other

05
06
07
08
09
10
11

VLIVET
(Who did victim live
with when abused,
text)

Enter text of who victim lived with
when abused

SIBLINGS
(Any siblings abused?)

Yes = 0

List values for 11 (Other):
____________________
____________________
____________________
____________________
____________________
____________________
____________________

-99
No = 1

-99
DRUGSV
(Victim used drugs,
alcohol?)

Yes = 0

No = 1

DRUGSA
(Abuser used drugs,
alcohol?)

Yes = 0

No = 1

-99

POLICE
(BSA reported the
abuse to police?)

Yes = 0

No = 1

-99 = data missing

Yes = 0

No = 1

-99 = data missing

Yes = 0

No = 1

-99 = data missing

POLICE2
(Police reported to
BSA?)

CHARGE
(Abuser charged
criminally?)
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ABPREBSA
(Evidence of sexual
abuse of youth/peers
before BSA incident?)
NARRATIV
(Does this file have
more narrative
information about the
abuse case?)

Yes = 0

No = 1

-99= data missing

-99
Yes = 0

No = 1

NARRATIVT
(narrative text)

Enter narrative

SCOUTRE
(Scout related offense;
Was the victim a
scout?)
INCEST
(Is there any indication
of incest by the
abuser? NOTE: This
could be past incest or
incest in the current
offense.)
OTHCRIMES
(Is there evidence that
the accused has
committed other, nonsexual crimes?)
REGISTER
(Did the accused try to
re-register at any time
with the BSA?)

Yes = 0

No = 1

-99

Yes = 0

No = 1

-99

Yes = 0

No = 1

-99

Yes = 0

No = 1

-99

REGION4
Region in 4 categories

1=Northeast
2= Midwest
3= South
4= West
8 = Not Applicable
99 - Missing

-99
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REGION9
Region in 9 Categories

1= New England
2= Middle Atlantic
3 = East North Central
4 =South Atlantic
5 = East South Central
6 = West South Central
7 = West North Central
8 = Mountain
9 = Pacific
88 = Not Applicable
99= Missing

-99

VICTOTAL
(Total number of
victims)
ADULTVICS
(Total number of adult
victims

-99

CHILDVICS
(Total number of child
victims)

-99

NONSEX
(Nonsexual offenses
present?)
SEXUALOFF
(Sexual offenses
present)
PROPERTYOFF
(Property offenses
present?)
CODER

-99

1= yes
0 = no

-99

1= yes
0 = no

-99

1= yes
0 = no

-99

-99

Time_to_File
(Time from report to
creation of file, days)

-99

LOBSA_DAYS
(Length of BSA
Registration in Days)

-99

LOBSA_YEAR
(Length of BSA
Registration in years)

-99
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LOABUSE_DAYS
(Length of abuse in
days)

-99

LOABUSE_YEARS
(Length of abuse in
years)

-99

FORMAL
(Formal versus
informal method of
response)
CHILD_YN
( Binary measure of if
abuser has children)

0= Informal
1= Formal

-99

0= No
1= Yes

-99

ABEHAV_B
(Binary measure of
Abuse type)

0= Explicit sexual contact
1= Clothed verbal or physical contact

-99

ABUSEHIST_R
(Binary measure of
abuse cts)

0=One to three times
1= More than three times

-99

TIME_R
(Binary measure of
time to file)

0= One year or less
1= More than one year

-99

RATION1
(Was a rationalization
tactic used by the BSA
in response to the
abuse?)
RATION2
(Which rationalization
tactic was used?)

Yes = 0
No = 1
Unknown=2

-99

0= legality
1= denial of responsibility
2= denial of injury
3= denial of victim
4= social weighting
5= appeal to higher loyalties
6= metaphor of the ledger
7= refocusing attention
8= other
9= unknown

-99

RATIONT
(Provide the actual text
of the rationalization)
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Analysis
Chapter Five
Descriptives
Chi-square

Appendix D: Table of Significant Findings
Significant Variables
Findings
Abuser Has Children
Nonsexual Offenses Present
Married
Female Victims
Incest
Scout Related
Abuser Used Drugs
Prior CSA
Region

ANOVA
-&
Kruskal Wallis
Chapter Six
Survival
Scout Related
Analysis

-The majority of BSA offenders were younger (under 40 years) and served as
Scoutmasters
-The majority of abuse incidents was isolated incidents and most files
featured more serious abuse when information was available
-The BSA most often learned of abuse from in person reporting
-The majority of victims first disclosed their abuse to their parents or
immediate guardian
-The BSA was more likely to handle cases informally through the use of
removal from the organization
- Whether the offender was married, had children, had evidence of nonsexual offenses, used alcohol or drugs, their duty within the organization,
and if the allegation was against a scout were all found to have a significant,
although weak relationship, with the type of response used
-There was no significant difference in the time it took the BSA to create a
confidential file or whether they relied on formal or informal responses
across council regions
-The median survival time for offenders before a file was created was 24.6
months
- The comparison of scout related and non-scout related survival times
approached significance, indicating the membership of the victim may have
influenced how long it took to create a file
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Logistic
Regression

Offender Age (-)
BSA Duty (-)
Scout Related (+)
Nonsexual Offenses Present (-)

Negative
Binomial
Regression

Offender Age (+)
Scout Related (+)
Region (+)
Police Reported to BSA (-)
Abuse Incidents Count (-)
Prior CSA (+)
Charged (+)
Female Victims (-)

Chapter Seven
Intervention Average Age of offender (+)
Analysis
Two-Deep Policy (+)
Chapter Eight
Qualitative
Content
Analysis
&
Case Study
Analysis

Rationalization Tactics

-Older offenders had a smaller likelihood of that the BSA would use a formal
response
-Offenders who victimized a scout were more likely to face a formal response
-Assistant Scoutmasters were less likely to be dealt with formally
-The BSA was less likely to use a formal response against offenders who did
not have allegations of non-sexual abuse
-Older offenders were more likely to feature a longer response time
-When the victim was a scout, the BSA took longer to respond
-Councils in the Western region took longer to create files
-When police reported abuse allegations, the reaction time of the BSA was
shorter
-When more than three abuse incidents occurred, the BSA took less time to
respond
-Abusers who were formally charged were dealt with more quickly
-When female victims were present, the BSA took less time to respond
-Individuals who had prior convictions for CSA were more likely to have
longer response times
-As the offender’s age increased over time, the number of reports also
increased
-The number of allegations increased after implementation of the two-deep
leadership policy
-Rationalizations were used by the BSA when justifying their response and
the time it took them to respond
-The most common rationalization was denial of responsibility, while the
second most common was metaphor of the ledger
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